What’s so special about the Nordic Welfare Model? Critically analyse the challenges facing it on the threshold of the new millennium.
Introduction:
In recent decades the international portrait that has been painted of the Nordic welfare state has been somewhat caricatured, with the prevailing notions that the state provides facilities of almost every nature, with near 100% income replacement levels for those who require it and free provision of all the essential social and healthcare services. This essay intends to first explore whether a ‘Scandinavian’ style of welfare does indeed exist, and if so, what the main features of such a system are. The main body of this paper will focus on the elements that confront the Nordic welfare states, and if there are any possible solutions to these threats. In the conclusion I intend to summarise the findings of my research and create a hypothesis for the future of welfare in the Nordic region.
A Nordic Model?
Before diving in at the deep end and assessing the current challenges facing the welfare models of the Nordic countries it first is necessary get our feet wet in with a succinct outline and understanding of the brief history and key features of the Nordic welfare state.
If one were to guess the nature of welfare using only stereotypes and reputation, the foremost assumption would be that the Nordic (Scandinavian) states have a very distinct and substantial welfare system when contrasted with other countries worldwide. This, in reality, is true; Francis Castles goes as far as to talk about “Intra-Scandinavian convergence tendencies” [i] when assessing change in welfare policies amongst ‘clusters’ of nations throughout the world. There are several reasons for the emergence of the Scandinavian (or indeed Anglo-Saxon or Mediterranean) welfare systems. These regional differences are the cause of many effects from a shared common history to the specific needs or politics of any given area. One other key aspect to the evolution of a specific cluster of welfare states is that the economies of these Nordic states are all very similar. The countries all have relatively small, but open, markets with large export sections which in turn bring high capital mobility.
The next step away from the shallow end of our Scandinavian swimming pool is to highlight the distinctive features of this established ‘Scandinavian Welfare’ model; however it would make more sense explain the current traits by using history and how the welfare model evolved into what it is today.
Firstly, and perhaps the single most important reason for Scandinavia having such a distinguishable welfare style is the dominance of Social Democracy. However, to give the Social Democratic political parties all of the glory would be slightly unfair because although they have governed as a single-party minority, they also used a variety of coalition types to enter the government. From as early as the 1930’s they have been able to find their way into approximately 90% of the Nordic governments and have slowly moulded an undivided opinion amongst Scandinavian citizens – especially in Sweden and Norway – that a high-tax, strong welfare state is the best way forward. The prevalence of strong, united Trade Unions[ii] and a general lack of credible political alternatives (except in Denmark where a sizeable Conservative party did emerge) meant that, as policy makers, the Social Democrats were for the most part of the last century in the ‘driving seat’.
With a common goal amongst most politicians in the Nordic countries the parties began piecing together the foundations of their welfare state with the introduction of pensions and benefits in the 1940s and 1950s to ensure there was a reasonable standard of living. These aspects were strengthened and expanded in subsequent decades whilst the dice of economic fortune rolled in favour of the Scandinavian markets and the countries saw a steady increase in employment with remarkably low levels of inflation. This period very much brought around the beginning of the distinct institutional nature of the Nordic model. However, the oil crises of the 1970’s were the first sings that the Nordic countries were in about to encounter some turbulence. Recession climaxed in the late 1980’s / early 1990’s with a dramatic effect on the direction of Scandinavian welfare.
Whilst the other Nordic countries began to suffer unemployment on a previously unthinkable scale, Norway - with its vast revenue from national oil - was the only country that managed to avoid this situation and also got by without announcing any welfare cutbacks. [iii] The other Scandinavian countries however were not as fortunate; the Swedes suffered a currency devaluation of 16% in a single year (on top of the previous years’ 10%); the Danes experienced a new unemployment high of 11.3% in 1992; and the Finns underwent an all-time unemployment high of 17% in 1991. [iv]
Several different methods were tried out by the countries in order to recover from such distressing fluctuations such as Sweden unveiling the comprehensive “tax reform of the century” with some extensive cutbacks in the public sector. Denmark on the other hand opted for a more active approach of new labour-market policies. [v] Another significant detail to note about the ‘bouncing back’ of the Scandinavian models is that even after some drastic changes to the fundamental organisation of the redistribution of welfare - and the taxation of capital to support it - none of the countries had broken away from the ‘Nordic model’ per-se.
Although the current welfare states are definitely less generous than they have been for previous generations, the stereotype of Scandinavian states taking care of their citizens from the womb-to-the-tomb is not an entirely false statement. Whilst there are minor differences in rates and income coverage between the nations the Nordic countries are generally recognised as having three main characteristics. [vi] The first trait is a broad scope of public and social policy with a commitment to full employment and an active labour market. The main reason for this is that with more people working, the government receives more funding for the welfare system though the high tax levels, which is redistributed directly back into society in several different ways.Another feature that links the Nordic welfare states is a universal flat-rate basic security, on an earnings related basis. This ‘insurance’ is only given to citizens who find themselves off for work a variety of reasons from unemployment to maternal or paternal leave. The percentage of a persons wage replacement differs from approximately 50% to 80% depending on the country and their occupation, however these rates are still amongst the most charitable in the world. The third attribute of the Nordic welfare state is the local, publicly funded provisions. The most common example of these are the childcare centres which are not just heavily used by parents but also responsible for the creation of thousands of jobs, especially amongst women, with the almost comical situation of a mother dropping her child off in one centre, then going to work in another. It is because of initiatives like this that region is also noted as having the world’s highest gender wage equality and gender employment levels.
To fund such high levels of public expenditure the Nordic countries have also become synonymous with some of the highest tax levels in the world. In 1998 Norwegians saw 48% of their total earnings go straight back to their government, Danes had a higher figure of 52% and the Swedes saw a staggering 55% of their income deducted through various taxes. [vii] As extreme as these figures may sound, especially when compared to more conservative tax levels in other welfare models, against the backdrop of such a substantial welfare state, Swedish citizens can still afford to live amongst some of the highest standards in the world with only 45% of their full wage.
Threats to the current Nordic welfare state.
And so we arrive at the deep end of the pool where, despite the relatively successful comeback of the Nordic welfare state with regards to unemployment and malfunctioning economies in previous decades, there are still several substantial challenges looming on the horizon that will push the limits of the already extensive coverage enjoyed by many Scandinavians.
Some of these new challenges will require changes to be made in the in the workings of the welfare system if it is to ensure it survives in tomorrow’s world. This is where the fundamental problem of the challenges starts because most Scandinavians grew up pleased, content and even proud of their unique system. The ramification of this is that public opinion hangs predominantly in favour of preserving the status quo. This attachment of the voters to the system has been written about by Paul Pierson[viii] who states that welfare supporters in Scandinavia are able to effectively fight to sustain their existing benefits, through the previously mentioned trade unions and high levels of democracy.This is a very logical argument, much in the same vein as the FPTP elected government changing the electoral system to a PR scenario, in that it would be irrational for a Scandinavian voter to shooting themselves in the foot. It would then make no sense for the electorate in any of the Nordic countries to support a party who would promote radical cut backs and reforms in the welfare sector. In 2002 Goeran Persson successfully demolished all opposition and saw himself re-elected as the Swedish Prime Minister with a campaign that primarily focused on protecting the country’s welfare system. [ix]. The magnitude of the victory (a gap of over 1 million - 20% - of the votes) is a good indicator not just at how successful Social Democracy still is, but also at how big an issue the survival of the welfare state is in an election. In line with the grain of history the Conservative parties in the region are currently the only electorally successful parties that openly propose anything more than incremental changes to the welfare state.
One of the most striking problems that stalks Nordic welfare system is ever-increasing number of aged people that are legible to collect their pensions. Whilst this is not a problem limited specifically to Scandinavia, the situation is amplified several times by the fact that the region not only has the highest life expectancy rates of any countries in the world but that they also sport some of the largest and most liberal pension payouts per head.
The World Bank have dubbed this upcoming global problem as the ‘Old Age Crisis’ and has published a detailed report on how best to handle the scenario. [x] The report showed that Sweden was already at a disadvantage with the world’s highest percentage of pensioners in the population in 1990 (23%, with the world average sitting at a significantly lower 10%). The CSIS published a similar, but updated, paper in 2002. [xi] Whilst this newer report does not suggest any solutions as such, it does highlight that Norway and Sweden have began taking active measures to slow the rate of pension-related stress on their GDP expenditure, with the later initiating tax incentives for people who rely on private employer pensions.
A second problem presented to the region, and in particular the metropolitan countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, is that of membership with The European Union. This problem is two fold in that the countries not only had to adapt to initially join the union, but that ensuing expansions of the European Union would also add to yet more financial burdens. To contextualise this problem, it is interesting to see that the Social Democrats – synonymous with the region and welfare – were the only mainstream political party that showed signs of Euro-scepticism. [xii] The main concern was that entrance to the E.U. with possibility of further deepening and broadening could endanger the principals of domestic welfare.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the Swedish Social Democrats also claimed that membership would disgrace the country’s lengthy reputation of international neutrality. However the government finally applied for membership in 1990. One must not rule out the decision of the Social Democrats to sustain this argument, for decades after Danish and Norwegian entrances to the E.U. and E.F.T.A. respectively, as a cunning way of ensuring electoral success by using the aforementioned electoral popularity of politicising the welfare state.
Having to support the needs of the further ten central and eastern European struggling states is an extensive task for the European Union as a whole. Immediately after the collapse of communism these nations stated their intentions of a ‘return to Europe’ with a specific emphasis on the economic aspects. Most of these ‘new European’ countries are still struggling in the aftermath of a gigantic increase in poverty related to the collapse of the USSR. Between 1987 and 1994 Estonia (a 2004 entrant) showed a poverty level jump from 1% to 34% and Romania (set for 2007 admission) displayed an 800% jump from 6% to 48% of their population living in poverty.[xiii] Whilst the differences were not quite as drastic by the time these countries entered the E.U. there was still a clearly divisible poverty gap.
A brand new report into the spending on displaced refugees throughout the capitalised world highlighted the European Union’s solution to the growing problem. [xiv] Whilst the E.U. strategy involves the burden sharing of three main pillars – policy, money and actual refugees – the report show’s the amongst the most successful economies in the world it is the smaller nations that are carrying the largest responsibilities. The only two countries in the world that pay a higher percentage of their GDP towards funding refugee protection are the Netherlands and Switzerland.
Another noteworthy set of statistics is Anders Widfeldt’s yearly review of the changes in Sweden.[xv] He comments on a gradual slowing down of the national economy, and an increase in the numbers of unemployed Swedes. Whilst these drops and rises are nowhere near as significant as the values at the time of Sweden’s ‘crisis’ they still demonstrate the fiscal burden being generated within the state. This paradox of a decreasing economy and increasing unemployment highlights the need for a change in the nature of Swedish welfare (and might echo changes across the region if the Swedish way is still to be believed to epitomise the Nordic model).
The above statistics highlight the growing concerns that the Scandinavian welfare states are facing high levels pressure from within their own domestic spheres through forms of increased levels of unemployment, higher pension demands and a fluctuating economy. On top of this there are also some International problems with the expansion of the European Union and the cost of refugee protection, which adds an even greater strain on national expenditure.
Proposed Solutions.
There are several suggested routes down which the Nordic welfare model can venture. One of the most and topical proposals at the moment is put forward by one of the main contributors of reading on the region, Gøsta Esping-Andersen. [xvi] His supposition suggests that in the light of the economies slowly grinding to a stand still, Nordic nations are at a crossroad between liberalising private services, thus creating wage inequalities or actually keeping a degree of wage equality in workplaces and risking higher levels of unemployment.
The nature of the Norwegian welfare state, heavily influenced by the presence of “business elites” [xvii] has led to a recent development. Although these important decision-makers are from privileged backgrounds, such as civil servants and judges, they still predominantly support the existing welfare system. With the support of interest groups and mass public opinion also in line with these business elites a new theory has developed that there will be problems within the governments of Scandinavia regarding the welfare state long before any gaps appear in the public opinion.
However, if one observes the track record of the Nordic welfare state since it has matured over the last sixty or so years it is clear to see that it is one of the more durable aspects of anything associated with the Nordic group of countries. Even though it had reached its absolute limits of expansion and was teetering on the verge of a total collapse it still managed to evolve and provide yet more solutions to new problems. This is also fascinating because all countries have so much belief in the system that they waited until the situation of recession hit a ‘crisis’ level before any changes are made.
Unlike the other notable aspects such as the party system, which experienced a radical alteration in the 1970’s, the Scandinavian welfare system has not seen any such drastic change, and even what little change there has been it has manifested itself in the form of cut backs, in a more incremental fashion.
Closing Assertion & Proposed Hypothesis.
In the course of this essay I have shown that there is definitely a distinctive Nordic model of welfare that goes hand in hand with the policies of social democracy. This model’s distinct features include a commitment to full employment, equal and high standards of living for all citizens, substantial pension rates and high wage replacement benefits. It is also true that although the current welfare state is not as munificent as it has been in recent decades, Nordic countries still have some of the highest levels of welfare.
I have also emphasised that the Nordic states are currently under a great deal of stress from both domestic and international pressures. The domestic tensions vary from an increase in the number of the unemployed claiming benefits and the rising number of citizens that have reached the pensionable age whereas international anxiety presents itself in the form of the European Union and the unequal distribution of refugee protection.
Hypothesis:
Change of the Scandinavian welfare state is indisputable because if the situation continues to cruise along its current course on autopilot the upcoming generation of middle-aged, post war ‘baby-boomers’ making the transition to pensionable citizens alone will be enough to make the entire system collapse under the domestic pressures within the next decade or so. However, much like the previous unemployment situations that confronted the region in the 1980’s and 1990’s, I believe that governments will wait until the conditions hit the ‘crisis’ level before adapting any new policies because they believe in the efficiency of their system.
Under these circumstances my conjecture is that the mechanics of the Nordic welfare state will have to undergo some changes in order to keep the public opinion, which is unquestionably in favour of the system, towards that of the government in any country at any time. Whether this means countries will have to unveil new “tax reforms of this century” or adapt a tiered approach with several moderate reforms will be down to the individual governments, but I do feel that governments might have to risk some unpopular decisions amongst the voters if they are to keep a recognisable version of the Scandinavian welfare system for future generations.
Word Count: 3,142
[i] Castles, Francis Geoffrey. “The future of the welfare state: crisis myths and crisis realities”
Oxford University Press, 2004. Page 171.
[ii] Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. “The three worlds of welfare capitalism”. Cambridge. Polity Press.
1990. Page 167.
[iii] Stephens, John D. “The Scandinavian Welfare States: Achievements, Crisis and Prospects”. In Book: “Welfare States In Transition”. Ed. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. Sage Publications. 1996. Page 52.
[iv] Ibid. Pages 34, 54 & 53 respectively.
[v] Goul Andersen, Jørgen.. “Europe’s New State Of Welfare: Unemployment, Employment Policies
and Citizenship”. Policy Press. 2002. Page 54
[vi] Kautto, Mikko. “Nordic States in a European Context’. New York. Routledge. 2001. Page 6.
[vii] Boje, Thomas. “Scandinavia in a New Europe”. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1993. Page47
[viii] Pierson, Paul. “New Politics of the Welfare State”. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 2001 Page 413.
[ix] News Story: “Swedish Left Wins Re-Election”. 16th September 2002. Accessed from site: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2255843.stm
Date: 9th May 2006.
[x] The World Bank. “Averting the Old Age Crisis”. Oxford University Press. 1994. Page 33. Accessed from: Click
Date: 5th May 2006.
[xi] Centre for Strategic and International Studies. “The Global Retirement Crisis”. Washington DC. April 2002. Page 38. Accessed from: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/global_retirement.pdf Date: 3rd May 2006.
[xii] Sitter, Nick. “The Politics of Opposition and European Integration”. West European Politics. Vol. 24. No. 4. Pages 22-39. October 2001.
[xiii] Wagner, Hans-Júrgen. “The Welfare State in Transition Economies and Acension to the E.U”.
West European Politics. Vol 25. No. 2. April 2002.
[xiv] Dewan, Torun. “The Myth of Free-Riding: Refugee Protection and Implicit Burden-Sharing”.
West European Politics. Vol. 29. No. 2. Pages 351-369. March 2006.
[xv] Widfeldt, Anders. “Sweden”. (A yearly review). European Journal of Political Research.
Vol. 43. No. 7-8. Pages 1144-1150. December 2004.
[xvi] Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. “Why we need a new welfare state”. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
Page 185.
[xvii] Gulbrandsen, Trygve. “Elite Consensus on the Norwegian Welfare Model”. West European
Politics. Vol. 28. No. 4. Pages 898-918. September 2005.
Saturday, May 13, 2006
Thursday, May 04, 2006
P & I.R. End of History?
Was there ever an End of 'History'?
“I believe that in the end I remain right: modernity is a very powerful freight train that will not be derailed by recent events, however painful. Democracy and free markets will continue to expand as the dominant organising principles for much of the world.” [i]
Francis Fukuyama
One month after 9/11
Ever since the publication of his original article ‘The End of History?’ American born philosopher Francis Fukuyama has been at the centre of a relatively unnecessary yet ongoing debate as to whether his original and most famous hypothesis is actually feasible or just another radical piece of academic fiction.
The main misunderstanding that readers gather from the article – and later published book titled ‘The End of History and the Last Man’ – is they think that the End of History can only be possible if everything immediately backs down and surrenders to both capitalism and liberal democracy, this however is not the case. Fukuyama makes it very clear in the first part of the proper book that there is a clear definition between ‘history’ and ‘events’. The above quote encapsulates his stance perfectly because even though he recognises that the events of September 11th 2001 were tragic, they still have very little effect on the progression of the western style economy and democracy and if one was to gamble on the outcome it has more than encouraged the spread of Liberal Democracy.
Here lies the biggest problem in assessing whether or not there has been an end of history since Fukuyama’s paper was published. His differentiation between ‘events’ and ‘history’ as previously stated means that he can dismiss most of the opposition he gets by stating that it is merely a single blip or ‘event’ that goes against the idea of his theory. It is very true that comparatively speaking, although a span of twenty years is a long time in one’s life, when put in the context of human history it is a very short slot.
To get around this problem I intend to look at what little, credible, cited evidence there has been in attempts to either prove or disprove the theory, and to measure the effects of these over the course of the last twenty or so years. I will conclude this paper with my own belief of whether or not we have indeed reached the notorious End of History, or if not, how far along the process we are at the moment.
The Hard Evidence.
Despite the volume of criticism and negativity that emerged when the theory was initially released almost twenty years later there is some strong evidence that can verify, at least parts of, Fukuyama’s theory.
Throughout the book Fukuyama deliberately conflicts his notion of history coming to an end against that of Karl Marx’s original concept. The historical materialists believe that history would come to an end in a “communist utopia” [ii] in which societies infamous dialect between the master and the slave would be eradicated, forming the perfect egalitarian and classless society. Fukuyama however believes that this eventuality can only realistically take place in a liberal democracy[iii]. Again, this spread of liberal democracy is the key aspect of the texts.
One source that authenticates the End of History theory is the Freedom House organisation. According to their official statistics the total number of ‘free’ countries has more then doubled from 1975 to 2005; from 40 countries to 89 respectively. Also, when Fukuyama’s paper was first published in 1989 only 69 countries were official democracies. Today, the number of governments decided in ‘electoral democracies’ stands at a far more impressive 122.[iv] This is hard evidence goes a long way in backing up what Fukuyama originally hypothesised about the spread of western liberal democracy.
Another set of statistics in a similar vein is that many of the former soviet countries, after the collapse of communism, successfully managed to increase their levels of freedom and democracy. Using the ‘Comparative Freedom Rankings’[v] scale (7 being the least free and 1 being the most) it’s easy to see how countries such as Latvia, Bulgaria and Lithuania have managed to embrace the democratic values of the west. Estonia currently stands sits on a rating of 1, which is a phenomenal achievement after having only regained its full independence in 1991.
Because the selected countries have all applied for and been subsequently approved of membership to the European Union it must be brought into question as to how much of an influence the Copenhagen Criteria was in these countries transition to democracies. This argument can also be brought up in the global context, with the suggestion that liberal democracy has only been so readily accepted because of the west’s strength and influence. Yet, regardless of the reasons for change within these sovereign states, the fact is that the empirical figures of the countries that have accepted electoral democracies and the idea of the free market economy definitely support Fukuyama’s proposed conjecture..
Two Green Problems.
However, further examination of the freedom ranking figures highlights a clear dividing line between the former soviet countries located in and near Eastern Europe, and those situated in the continent of Asia. The states of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have all shown plummets in their freedom ratings from 1991 through to 2005 with the later showing the worst score possible, a freedom rating of seven.
It is not without a sense of irony that when understanding the threat from these states, that it was partly created from the successful progression of liberal democracy to all ends of the globe. Several authors describe in detail how the influence of the western - secular - powers eclipsed Islam and that it could only survive if it incorporated elements of totalitarianism to keep the younger generation from completely losing interest in what was becoming a comparatively dated and stagnant system of governance.
“What began as an ideological current became an extreme, radical political movement” [vi]
-Youssef M. Choueiri
The rapid rise and strength of the Islamic Fundamentalist movement, often nicknamed the ‘green pearl’, has undoubtedly been one of the largest counter-arguments regarding the End of History thesis, especially since it burst into the global limelight in 2001. This growing menace has also taken the form of a new kind of threat due to the very volatile and broad spectrum of people that are represented under the very lose term.
Inherent behavioural traits of an Islamic political faction can differ greatly depending on the circumstances. When there is room for political negotiation Islam can take the shape of a moderating and reforming movement, however when this political space is blocked it can develop into a radical and destructive force. [vii] It is unfortunately this volatile nature of the Islamic political groups and the tiny minority of extremists who resort to physical violence or terror that appear to be leaving a negative mark on western society. Recent publication of the already infamous Muhammad cartoons is the perfect illustration of the radical side of Islamic politics and the clash between the values of the east and the west regarding freedom of the press.
The Cold War is seen as the faultless personification of a battle between two conflicting ideologies and economic systems, however the so-called ‘green threat’ of Islam pushes this even further, into previously un-marked territory, with the addition of religion. The emergence of Islamic Fundamentalism has also drawn the emphasis away from the traditional Realist concept of inter-state actions because there is no longer a single state that can be held responsible for any actions made in the name of Islam; it also adds another dimension to the ‘classical’ equation.
The overall problem with classifying Islamic Fundamentalism as a factor that disproves the End of History is that although its presence, especially in the more violent and unstable manifestations, can pose a threat to the immediate physical security of people living in the west, it has yet to be proven as a viable alternative to a capitalist democracy. It has a very low appeal to people raised elsewhere in the world and due to it’s totalitarian nature can be easily discredited, much in the same way as all the previous ‘alternatives’ to a liberal democracy.
Ecologists put forward the second significant argument that runs against the grain of Fukuyama’s hypothesis. The main reason for them doubting the ‘End of History’ is that they believe as capitalism spreads, especially when mixed with an increasing population, it will eventually collide with Earth’s natural restrictions, forcing a drastic change of policy from the west. Michael Parkin has already noted, “Economic activity directly influences the quality of the environment”.[viii] Examples he uses are the depletion of non-renewable resources, clearing of forests and the pollution of lakes and rivers amongst others.
Other Environmentalists have taken a more direct line and directly criticised Fukuyama’s writings. One such academic is Michael Carley who argues that the End of History merges Capitalism with Consumerism and Liberal Democracy and simply assumes the inevitability of the entire package. Carley contends that an economic system, value system and political ideology are entirely separate and makes the rational claim that capitalism has “no inherent dependence or affinity with political freedom”[ix]
The exponential rate at which the global population is expanding is a serious contributor that – in the long run – could be the single biggest threat to Fukuyama’s vision of a democratic utopia. In china alone 8.5 million hectares of farmland are being lost every year to the construction industry and the annual income per head has doubled in approximately ten years. [x] This is reached in the UK only every 60 years. Losing so much farming and agricultural land every year to accommodate for an increasing population is interesting predicament because it appears to be burning the candle at both ends.
Whilst these sound like logical arguments they do not appear to have been properly addressed by Fukuyama, nor have they been given much praise from anybody outside the traditional Green movement. Since these valid points have been relatively overlooked there is definitely a possibility of an interesting contingency plan in several decades time that could see food shortages and starvation jump over from the borders of what might be left of the third world and into an overly-populated ‘developed’ world that can’t support the saddle of it’s own success.
The End Of… Realism?
Another important aspect that is rarely brought forward when discussing ‘The End Of History?’ and the subsequent book is the era in with Fukuyama was raised and educated in. Born in 1952, a mere five years after the significant primary events of the Cold War began, Fukuyama would have been growing up and moulded in a time where the battle between communism and capitalism was the biggest factor in every level of politics. By the time he had reached university age Fukuyama would have lived through and studied key cold war events such as the ‘Bay Of Pigs’, ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ and ‘Strategic Arms Limitation Talks’[xi] in the same, if not greater, depth as today’s generation studies the Berlin Wall and Iraq invasion.
The main point being that Fukuyama grew up in an era that was dominated and defined by the Cold War, and that once it showed signs of drawing to an end everybody could only hypothesise as to what changes this would bring to International society in the so called ‘New World Order’. Due to the vacuum of the post Cold War political climate many different theories emerged, although I believe the spotlight shone brightest on Fukuyama’s theory because it was released just before the fall of the Berlin Wall, an image that has become synonymous with the triumph of liberal democracy over the discredited communism. With the lessening importance of traditional Realist traits in the international system such as restraints on the use of force in world politics, dramatic improvements in peace building and peace making, the phenomenon of collective security and limitations of sovereignty all looming on the horizon it can be almost understandable why others could have taken the wrong idea from the book.
Another interesting aspect about the timeframe in which Fukuyama released his famous theory was that – in a similar style to Huntington – the title of the published book differed to that of the original article. In 1989 the article title was 'The End of History?’. However by the time the full-length book was published the title had been changed to 'The End of History and the Last Man'. With the removal of the question mark we must assume that Fukuyama believed his hypothesis was in the at least in the process of beginning. With the notion of the 'Last Man' being placed at the end, we also know that Fukuyama drew greatly from 19th century thinker Friedrich Nietzsche, who originally coined the term. It is also interesting to note that in the second half of the book, dedicated to the idea of the pessimistic last man, Fukuyama does not endorse the theory at all, but simply views it as an inevitability.
Fukuyama himself has made it no secret that he is still a firm believer and dedicated supporter of liberal democracy. Being one of the key members of the ‘Project for the New American Century’ think tank he made a public recommendation that President Clinton should overthrow Saddam Hussein in 1998 [xii] and participated in a similar letter after the 9/11 attacks on America.[xiii] These actions clearly show that Fukuyama still views his country as the predominant defender and promoter of liberal values, and free democracy.
Closing premise.
Overall, the concept of the End of History is very fascinating, even though it’s neither new nor completely original. As a mark of how intelligent he is, Fukuyama managed to let himself off lightly by being very ambiguous. There is no mention of a specific timescale in which history will effectively end, and it is true that no matter what happens in the international sphere, short of the United States crumbling overnight, Fukuyama would be able to pass it off as an ‘event’. The only risk he actually appears to have taken would be that nothing overly drastic changes in the international field of politics.
With the fall of the USSR in the epic battle for the title of undisputed superpower and no other contender with the capabilities to challenge America it would appear that in the foreseeable future the chance of a fresh interstate conflict between two of the smallest ever number of non-democracies is as slim as ever. However, in saying all of this I too would be inclined to hop on the bandwagon because after the fall of fascism, communism and so forth, no other ideology has risen to the task of providing a credible alternative to the current status quo. Coupled this with the hard fact that non-democracies are becoming more of a collector’s item and it would seem like a pretty good bet that nothing will go too wrong.
Finally, as I showed earlier in this paper, the only real challenge to liberal democracy at the moment comes from Islamic Fundamentalism, and even then, it is practically immeasurable at this point in time. The only question that remains to be answered once and for all is whether Huntington or Fukuyama was correct in their ‘solutions’ or answers for the post Cold War planet. As with many other things in the world, only time can tell, but to answer the question in today’s world, it would be a very strong statement to say that history has drawn to a close given the way in which foreign policy is pointing all most democratic countries towards Asia. Personally, I don’t think anybody will know until the outcome of the feud between the Middle East and the Democratic West, although I think everybody knows who Fukuyama is rooting for.
Word Count: 2,648.
Endnotes:
[i] ‘The West has won’. The Guardian Newspaper. Francis Fukuyama. 11th October 2001.
Accessed from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,567333,00.html Date: 1st May 2006.
[ii] Francis Fukuyama, “The End Of History?”. ‘The National Interest’, Summer, 1989. Page 2. Accessed from: http://www.marion.ohio-state.edu/fac/vsteffel/web597/Fukuyama_history.pdf Date: 24th April 2006.
[iii] Fukuyama, Francis. “The end of history and the last man” London : Penguin, 1992
Page 118
[iv] ‘Freedom in the World 2006’. Freedom House. Pages 3 & 5.
Accessed from: http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/Charts2006.pdf
Date: 27th April 2006.
[v] ‘Freedom in the World Comparative Rankings: 1973-2005’. Accessed from: http://65.110.85.181/uploads/FIWrank7305.xls
Date: May 1st 2006.
[vi] Choueiri, Youssef. “Islamic fundamentalism” London ; Washington, D.C. 1997.
Page 63.
[vii] Mawsilili, Ahmad. “Islamic Fundamentalism: myths and realities.” Reading: Ithaca, 1998.
Page 25.
[viii] Parkin, Michael “Economics” Boston; London: Addison-Wesley 2003 Page 446.
[ix] Carley, Michael. “Managing sustainable development”. London; Sterling : Earthscan, 2000.
Page 37.
[x] Ibid. Page 36.
[xi] Events taken from ‘The Cold War Museum’ online. Accessed from: http://www.coldwar.org Date: 20th April 2006.
[xii] ‘Letter To President Clinton On Iraq’. January 26th 1998. Accessed from: http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm
Date 19th April 2006
[xiii] ‘Letter to President Bush on the War On Terrorism’. September 20th 2001. Accessed From: http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm
“I believe that in the end I remain right: modernity is a very powerful freight train that will not be derailed by recent events, however painful. Democracy and free markets will continue to expand as the dominant organising principles for much of the world.” [i]
Francis Fukuyama
One month after 9/11
Ever since the publication of his original article ‘The End of History?’ American born philosopher Francis Fukuyama has been at the centre of a relatively unnecessary yet ongoing debate as to whether his original and most famous hypothesis is actually feasible or just another radical piece of academic fiction.
The main misunderstanding that readers gather from the article – and later published book titled ‘The End of History and the Last Man’ – is they think that the End of History can only be possible if everything immediately backs down and surrenders to both capitalism and liberal democracy, this however is not the case. Fukuyama makes it very clear in the first part of the proper book that there is a clear definition between ‘history’ and ‘events’. The above quote encapsulates his stance perfectly because even though he recognises that the events of September 11th 2001 were tragic, they still have very little effect on the progression of the western style economy and democracy and if one was to gamble on the outcome it has more than encouraged the spread of Liberal Democracy.
Here lies the biggest problem in assessing whether or not there has been an end of history since Fukuyama’s paper was published. His differentiation between ‘events’ and ‘history’ as previously stated means that he can dismiss most of the opposition he gets by stating that it is merely a single blip or ‘event’ that goes against the idea of his theory. It is very true that comparatively speaking, although a span of twenty years is a long time in one’s life, when put in the context of human history it is a very short slot.
To get around this problem I intend to look at what little, credible, cited evidence there has been in attempts to either prove or disprove the theory, and to measure the effects of these over the course of the last twenty or so years. I will conclude this paper with my own belief of whether or not we have indeed reached the notorious End of History, or if not, how far along the process we are at the moment.
The Hard Evidence.
Despite the volume of criticism and negativity that emerged when the theory was initially released almost twenty years later there is some strong evidence that can verify, at least parts of, Fukuyama’s theory.
Throughout the book Fukuyama deliberately conflicts his notion of history coming to an end against that of Karl Marx’s original concept. The historical materialists believe that history would come to an end in a “communist utopia” [ii] in which societies infamous dialect between the master and the slave would be eradicated, forming the perfect egalitarian and classless society. Fukuyama however believes that this eventuality can only realistically take place in a liberal democracy[iii]. Again, this spread of liberal democracy is the key aspect of the texts.
One source that authenticates the End of History theory is the Freedom House organisation. According to their official statistics the total number of ‘free’ countries has more then doubled from 1975 to 2005; from 40 countries to 89 respectively. Also, when Fukuyama’s paper was first published in 1989 only 69 countries were official democracies. Today, the number of governments decided in ‘electoral democracies’ stands at a far more impressive 122.[iv] This is hard evidence goes a long way in backing up what Fukuyama originally hypothesised about the spread of western liberal democracy.
Another set of statistics in a similar vein is that many of the former soviet countries, after the collapse of communism, successfully managed to increase their levels of freedom and democracy. Using the ‘Comparative Freedom Rankings’[v] scale (7 being the least free and 1 being the most) it’s easy to see how countries such as Latvia, Bulgaria and Lithuania have managed to embrace the democratic values of the west. Estonia currently stands sits on a rating of 1, which is a phenomenal achievement after having only regained its full independence in 1991.
Because the selected countries have all applied for and been subsequently approved of membership to the European Union it must be brought into question as to how much of an influence the Copenhagen Criteria was in these countries transition to democracies. This argument can also be brought up in the global context, with the suggestion that liberal democracy has only been so readily accepted because of the west’s strength and influence. Yet, regardless of the reasons for change within these sovereign states, the fact is that the empirical figures of the countries that have accepted electoral democracies and the idea of the free market economy definitely support Fukuyama’s proposed conjecture..
Two Green Problems.
However, further examination of the freedom ranking figures highlights a clear dividing line between the former soviet countries located in and near Eastern Europe, and those situated in the continent of Asia. The states of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have all shown plummets in their freedom ratings from 1991 through to 2005 with the later showing the worst score possible, a freedom rating of seven.
It is not without a sense of irony that when understanding the threat from these states, that it was partly created from the successful progression of liberal democracy to all ends of the globe. Several authors describe in detail how the influence of the western - secular - powers eclipsed Islam and that it could only survive if it incorporated elements of totalitarianism to keep the younger generation from completely losing interest in what was becoming a comparatively dated and stagnant system of governance.
“What began as an ideological current became an extreme, radical political movement” [vi]
-Youssef M. Choueiri
The rapid rise and strength of the Islamic Fundamentalist movement, often nicknamed the ‘green pearl’, has undoubtedly been one of the largest counter-arguments regarding the End of History thesis, especially since it burst into the global limelight in 2001. This growing menace has also taken the form of a new kind of threat due to the very volatile and broad spectrum of people that are represented under the very lose term.
Inherent behavioural traits of an Islamic political faction can differ greatly depending on the circumstances. When there is room for political negotiation Islam can take the shape of a moderating and reforming movement, however when this political space is blocked it can develop into a radical and destructive force. [vii] It is unfortunately this volatile nature of the Islamic political groups and the tiny minority of extremists who resort to physical violence or terror that appear to be leaving a negative mark on western society. Recent publication of the already infamous Muhammad cartoons is the perfect illustration of the radical side of Islamic politics and the clash between the values of the east and the west regarding freedom of the press.
The Cold War is seen as the faultless personification of a battle between two conflicting ideologies and economic systems, however the so-called ‘green threat’ of Islam pushes this even further, into previously un-marked territory, with the addition of religion. The emergence of Islamic Fundamentalism has also drawn the emphasis away from the traditional Realist concept of inter-state actions because there is no longer a single state that can be held responsible for any actions made in the name of Islam; it also adds another dimension to the ‘classical’ equation.
The overall problem with classifying Islamic Fundamentalism as a factor that disproves the End of History is that although its presence, especially in the more violent and unstable manifestations, can pose a threat to the immediate physical security of people living in the west, it has yet to be proven as a viable alternative to a capitalist democracy. It has a very low appeal to people raised elsewhere in the world and due to it’s totalitarian nature can be easily discredited, much in the same way as all the previous ‘alternatives’ to a liberal democracy.
Ecologists put forward the second significant argument that runs against the grain of Fukuyama’s hypothesis. The main reason for them doubting the ‘End of History’ is that they believe as capitalism spreads, especially when mixed with an increasing population, it will eventually collide with Earth’s natural restrictions, forcing a drastic change of policy from the west. Michael Parkin has already noted, “Economic activity directly influences the quality of the environment”.[viii] Examples he uses are the depletion of non-renewable resources, clearing of forests and the pollution of lakes and rivers amongst others.
Other Environmentalists have taken a more direct line and directly criticised Fukuyama’s writings. One such academic is Michael Carley who argues that the End of History merges Capitalism with Consumerism and Liberal Democracy and simply assumes the inevitability of the entire package. Carley contends that an economic system, value system and political ideology are entirely separate and makes the rational claim that capitalism has “no inherent dependence or affinity with political freedom”[ix]
The exponential rate at which the global population is expanding is a serious contributor that – in the long run – could be the single biggest threat to Fukuyama’s vision of a democratic utopia. In china alone 8.5 million hectares of farmland are being lost every year to the construction industry and the annual income per head has doubled in approximately ten years. [x] This is reached in the UK only every 60 years. Losing so much farming and agricultural land every year to accommodate for an increasing population is interesting predicament because it appears to be burning the candle at both ends.
Whilst these sound like logical arguments they do not appear to have been properly addressed by Fukuyama, nor have they been given much praise from anybody outside the traditional Green movement. Since these valid points have been relatively overlooked there is definitely a possibility of an interesting contingency plan in several decades time that could see food shortages and starvation jump over from the borders of what might be left of the third world and into an overly-populated ‘developed’ world that can’t support the saddle of it’s own success.
The End Of… Realism?
Another important aspect that is rarely brought forward when discussing ‘The End Of History?’ and the subsequent book is the era in with Fukuyama was raised and educated in. Born in 1952, a mere five years after the significant primary events of the Cold War began, Fukuyama would have been growing up and moulded in a time where the battle between communism and capitalism was the biggest factor in every level of politics. By the time he had reached university age Fukuyama would have lived through and studied key cold war events such as the ‘Bay Of Pigs’, ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ and ‘Strategic Arms Limitation Talks’[xi] in the same, if not greater, depth as today’s generation studies the Berlin Wall and Iraq invasion.
The main point being that Fukuyama grew up in an era that was dominated and defined by the Cold War, and that once it showed signs of drawing to an end everybody could only hypothesise as to what changes this would bring to International society in the so called ‘New World Order’. Due to the vacuum of the post Cold War political climate many different theories emerged, although I believe the spotlight shone brightest on Fukuyama’s theory because it was released just before the fall of the Berlin Wall, an image that has become synonymous with the triumph of liberal democracy over the discredited communism. With the lessening importance of traditional Realist traits in the international system such as restraints on the use of force in world politics, dramatic improvements in peace building and peace making, the phenomenon of collective security and limitations of sovereignty all looming on the horizon it can be almost understandable why others could have taken the wrong idea from the book.
Another interesting aspect about the timeframe in which Fukuyama released his famous theory was that – in a similar style to Huntington – the title of the published book differed to that of the original article. In 1989 the article title was 'The End of History?’. However by the time the full-length book was published the title had been changed to 'The End of History and the Last Man'. With the removal of the question mark we must assume that Fukuyama believed his hypothesis was in the at least in the process of beginning. With the notion of the 'Last Man' being placed at the end, we also know that Fukuyama drew greatly from 19th century thinker Friedrich Nietzsche, who originally coined the term. It is also interesting to note that in the second half of the book, dedicated to the idea of the pessimistic last man, Fukuyama does not endorse the theory at all, but simply views it as an inevitability.
Fukuyama himself has made it no secret that he is still a firm believer and dedicated supporter of liberal democracy. Being one of the key members of the ‘Project for the New American Century’ think tank he made a public recommendation that President Clinton should overthrow Saddam Hussein in 1998 [xii] and participated in a similar letter after the 9/11 attacks on America.[xiii] These actions clearly show that Fukuyama still views his country as the predominant defender and promoter of liberal values, and free democracy.
Closing premise.
Overall, the concept of the End of History is very fascinating, even though it’s neither new nor completely original. As a mark of how intelligent he is, Fukuyama managed to let himself off lightly by being very ambiguous. There is no mention of a specific timescale in which history will effectively end, and it is true that no matter what happens in the international sphere, short of the United States crumbling overnight, Fukuyama would be able to pass it off as an ‘event’. The only risk he actually appears to have taken would be that nothing overly drastic changes in the international field of politics.
With the fall of the USSR in the epic battle for the title of undisputed superpower and no other contender with the capabilities to challenge America it would appear that in the foreseeable future the chance of a fresh interstate conflict between two of the smallest ever number of non-democracies is as slim as ever. However, in saying all of this I too would be inclined to hop on the bandwagon because after the fall of fascism, communism and so forth, no other ideology has risen to the task of providing a credible alternative to the current status quo. Coupled this with the hard fact that non-democracies are becoming more of a collector’s item and it would seem like a pretty good bet that nothing will go too wrong.
Finally, as I showed earlier in this paper, the only real challenge to liberal democracy at the moment comes from Islamic Fundamentalism, and even then, it is practically immeasurable at this point in time. The only question that remains to be answered once and for all is whether Huntington or Fukuyama was correct in their ‘solutions’ or answers for the post Cold War planet. As with many other things in the world, only time can tell, but to answer the question in today’s world, it would be a very strong statement to say that history has drawn to a close given the way in which foreign policy is pointing all most democratic countries towards Asia. Personally, I don’t think anybody will know until the outcome of the feud between the Middle East and the Democratic West, although I think everybody knows who Fukuyama is rooting for.
Word Count: 2,648.
Endnotes:
[i] ‘The West has won’. The Guardian Newspaper. Francis Fukuyama. 11th October 2001.
Accessed from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,567333,00.html Date: 1st May 2006.
[ii] Francis Fukuyama, “The End Of History?”. ‘The National Interest’, Summer, 1989. Page 2. Accessed from: http://www.marion.ohio-state.edu/fac/vsteffel/web597/Fukuyama_history.pdf Date: 24th April 2006.
[iii] Fukuyama, Francis. “The end of history and the last man” London : Penguin, 1992
Page 118
[iv] ‘Freedom in the World 2006’. Freedom House. Pages 3 & 5.
Accessed from: http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/Charts2006.pdf
Date: 27th April 2006.
[v] ‘Freedom in the World Comparative Rankings: 1973-2005’. Accessed from: http://65.110.85.181/uploads/FIWrank7305.xls
Date: May 1st 2006.
[vi] Choueiri, Youssef. “Islamic fundamentalism” London ; Washington, D.C. 1997.
Page 63.
[vii] Mawsilili, Ahmad. “Islamic Fundamentalism: myths and realities.” Reading: Ithaca, 1998.
Page 25.
[viii] Parkin, Michael “Economics” Boston; London: Addison-Wesley 2003 Page 446.
[ix] Carley, Michael. “Managing sustainable development”. London; Sterling : Earthscan, 2000.
Page 37.
[x] Ibid. Page 36.
[xi] Events taken from ‘The Cold War Museum’ online. Accessed from: http://www.coldwar.org Date: 20th April 2006.
[xii] ‘Letter To President Clinton On Iraq’. January 26th 1998. Accessed from: http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm
Date 19th April 2006
[xiii] ‘Letter to President Bush on the War On Terrorism’. September 20th 2001. Accessed From: http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm
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