“Sauna Sweethearts”: and the ‘general reasons’ for such behaviour.
“The Price of maintaining amicable relations with the Soviet Union was a fundamentally Finlandised polity.” Explain and Discuss.
Introduction.
Through the course of this essay I intend to achieve several outcomes; i) explain what ‘Finlandisation’ entails, ii) show the major indicators of the process, iii) with reference to the EU highlight the adaptability of Finnish foreign policy, iv) create an argument for Finlandisation being beneficial, and even expected. Then finally look back on several other factors before making the concluding remarks.
However, before indulging in the salacious debate surrounding the ominous affects of Finlandisation it is first essential that this process be explained clearly. Although almost twenty years old the characterization from ‘The Consensual Democracies’ (Elder, 1988) – an “increasing and insidious penetration of Finland’s internal affairs” – is still widely accepted today. The reoccurring argument that surrounds Finlandisation is that Finnish sovereignty and integrity were compromised by the USSR, principally with their meddling of the political system. The next part of this essay intends to outline the irregular behaviour of Finland as a whole throughout the Cold War and providing enough evidence to assert the claims of Finlandisation.
Friendship and cooperation.
One could not embark on a study of ‘Finlandisation’ without first exploring the basis of Fenno-Soviet relations throughout the Cold War: ‘The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance’ (FCMA / YYA). From 1948 this treaty was integral to much of Finnish politics for over forty years and only terminated with the disintegration of the USSR. Some have even gone as far to say that the FCMA’s “importance exceeded everything else in Finnish polity” (Punasalo, 1978), but without overplaying the importance of this treaty – it was ultimately only threatened to be used once, and never actually called into effect – some interesting observations can be drawn from the main text.
The special case of Finnish neutrality, which was not officially recognised by international law, stemmed from one vague sentence in the preamble that spoke of “Finland’s desire to remain outside the conflicting interests of the Great Powers”. It is unsurprising to learn that this muddy statement hoodwinked very few people into believing this neutrality outside of Finland. Another imprecise assertion is the second article that reads “The high Contrasting Parties shall confer with each other if it is established that the threat of an armed attack as described in Article 1 is present”. In particular the use of the word ‘threat’ makes article 2 very ambiguous, and means that it can be, and was, put into effect on very little evidence.
By and large the purpose of the FCMA as viewed from the Soviet Union was simply to use Finland as a protective barrier for its western border through articles one and two, dissuading its enemies to attack the Soviet Union through Finland. Through article six, the “principle of mutual respect of sovereignty and integrity and that of non-interference of the internal affairs of the other state”, Finland benefited from being able to uphold her independence. It is interesting to note that articles two and six are oxymoronic because evoking article two would immediately breach the assurances of ‘integrity’ and ‘sovereignty’ under article six. The following examples of ‘Finlandisation’ aim to show that in reality the USSR clearly didn’t care much for article six, or the FCMA whatsoever.
The Indicators of Finlandisation,
I) Neutrality; to Russia.
From the 1940’s to the early 1990’s Finnish citizens and Politicians, some more than others, acknowledged and accepted their newfound position of neutrality and the belief that they were to remain outside of the superpower confrontation. Kekkonen himself spoke of Finland’s dilemma in the 1920’s as having to choose between “an anti-Russian line or neutrality in relation to Russia”. (Kekkonen, 1970). Initially they chose the former option, and ended up losing two unpleasant wars against the Soviets. However, from the mid 1940’s President Paasikivi – and later Kekkonen – realised that the latter option of ‘neutrality’ was the best way to conduct Finland’s complex relationship with her neighbour Great Power.
It was because of this ‘neutrality’ based upon the foreword to the FCMA treaty that Finland lost out – so to speak – on the initial trend of integration and cooperation, particularly in when related to the Nordic region. It has been written that Finland was “obliged to look on as a bystander while Nordic cooperation developed” (Jussila, 1999). The cases of the EU, EFTA, the Nordic Council and Nordek all show different levels of Finland’s ‘willingness’ or ‘inability’ to integrate with the regional and international organisations.
When indeed Finland’s request for Nordic Council membership had been ‘permitted’, there was the stipulation that discussion on security policy was to be proscribed at all times. This was clearly because Finnish security policy would have been subjugated by the USSR at the time of her ascension to the Nordic Council, and due to the private nature of such a relationship with Moscow, it was not to be discussed between countries outside the deal. There was a similar case for Finland’s membership of EFTA; initially it only entered as an associate member because the “Kremlin ruled out full membership” (Tiilikainen, 2003). Complete membership was eventually granted in 1986 from what I will go on to show was a more merciful Kremlin.
The ‘Nordek’ project was an attempt at creating another integrational firework, and unsurprisingly, the Finns did not want to set this one alight either. The final result was that almost two years of intense negociations were “killed when President Kekkonen declared [at the last minute] that the Finnish government would not sign the treaty” (Hancock, 1972). Again, the only conclusion one can draw from this would be that a Nordic Customs Union would have considerably bolstered Finland’s ties with the other countries in the region, that were - from the windows of the Kremlin - too ideologically aligned with it’s contrasting superpower. These are all clear-cut examples of Finnish ‘Neutrality’ being tampered with by Soviet Union and their continual breaking of the terms of the FCMA treaty. These actions deliberately interfered with Finnish politics; by majorly influencing it’s foreign policy, and trying to maintain hey loyalty to the USSR.
As for the legacies of Paasikivi and Kekkonen, and their noteworthy ‘Paasikivi-Kekkonen’ policy line of active neutrality, whilst it was arguably the single biggest factor in retaining Finland’s Cold War independence, it was promptly abandoned with the demise of the Soviet Union and the ‘New World Order’ that emerged. Along with this came the collapse of the FCMA treaty, which underscored the emerging realisation that Finland no longer had to worry about any soft or hard Soviet threats to her polity in the foreseeable future. Recent commentators have also noted that the post Cold War era, open and often heated discussions focused on the EU and NATO show that neutrality – and ‘Finlandisation’ – are no longer “holy or everlasting” (Tiilikainen, 1996).
II) Kekkonen’s unending reign.
Perhaps one of the more astute methods in which the USSR sought to influence Finland was to ensure the appointment of politicians who could be regarded as sympathisers, or at least of Soviet inclination. In the delicate situation of Northern Europe, and with significance to the Nordic Balance, it was probably for the best that the man in charge of Finland’s foreign policy was willing to cooperate. It is no surprise to find that once elected, Urho Kekkonen dominated Finnish politics until long after he was no longer capable to do the job. George Maude (1976) spoke of a ‘perpetual presidency of the pro-Soviet Kekkonen with little opposition’.
Once in power Kekkonen utilised article 33 of the Finnish constitution to ensure that foreign policy was a one-man job. This situation led to a highly personalised relationship between the Finnish and Soviet heads of state, which at times incorporated some very private meetings. After the Note Crisis Kruschev and Kekkonen met one-to-one at a Sauna in Siberia, with no interpreters present. This demonstrates how few people it could take to conduct relations between the two states, something that would have greatly benefited Moscow greatly when they had someone as sensitive to the USSR as Kekkonen in the Finnish ‘driving seat’. It would also be foolish to underestimate Kekkonen’s power over Finland’s national politics, he literally was the kingmaker within the country’s political arena.
On reflection, the Note crisis of 1961 was an obvious – and successful – attempt to sway public opinion towards Kekkonen and ensure his re-election, although this was not recognised at the time. In the aftermath of the ‘crisis’ friends and foes alike praised him for his outstanding handling of the combustible situation, it also allowed him to play the ‘Moscow card’ whenever he faced strong opposition. Another stunt over a decade later was the 1973 extension of Kekkonen’s position in office through an ‘emergency law’ that ensured the election scheduled for 1974 was bypassed. To this date no explanation has been given for this but it can only be assumed that the Kremlin had a great deal of influence behind this action.
The ‘Night Frost’ and ‘Note Crisis’ of 1959 and 1961 respectively highlight another aspect that is overlooked in most papers on Finlandisation, that being that the Finns never “fully grasped the Kremlin’s almost obsessive concern about a possible resurgence of German militarism” (Arter, 1995). Whilst this could possibly be included under the umbrella of ‘geopolitics’ the crises illustrated Russia’s almost irrational fear of another attack in the vein of Operation Barbarossa, and their belief that Finland had sufficient military strength to handle such advancement.
III) You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour.
Perhaps the largest penalty as an upshot of Finlandization was the pressure on the media, and predominantly the press, not to release any material that was critical of the Kremlin and the Soviet Union. The main argument was that it could risk jeopardising what was seen as a delicate relationship between the two countries. Because of this the reality was that Finland – at least in terms of relaying propaganda – became Russia’s voice towards the East. In it’s heyday the “Finnish press relied on the Swedish newspapers” (Salminen, 1999) for non-biased accounts of the current political events because there was so much Soviet hot air being circulated in their own editions.
Politicians were also limited in what they wanted say about the shape of Finland’s foreign and domestic policy and the Soviet Union. Most infamously, Johannes Virolainen detonated the ‘midsummer bomb’ episode when he was asked why the conservatives did not take their opportunity to participate in government and replied that it was for “general reasons” (Arter, 1981). This answer blatantly meant that the Kremlin objected to conservative activities within the government, but with the suppression of free speech senior politicians realised it was not worth criticising the status quo.Even Kekkonen, despite being the most powerful man in the country, chose detach himself from some of his political beliefs under the cover of various pseudonyms. It is not clear whether these activities were to avoid hullabaloo among Finns or evade scrutiny from the Kremlin it but it has emerged that he wrote a many of his opinions on heavyweight issues, such as NATO, under the pen name ‘Liimatainen’ (Allison, 1985). This could be viewed as another example of free speech being impeded through to the highest levels of Finnish society.
The demise of the USSR; and Finland’s ‘neutrality’.
With the official collapse of the USSR and termination of the FCMA Finland was left in a vacuum with no strong political allies and a substantial chunk missing from her economy. Recession in the early 1990’s hit Finland hard, even more so after losing trade with the USSR (Jenssen, 1998). Eager to escape this furrow parliament simultaneously butchered the myth of ‘Neutrality’ and confirmed existence of ‘Finlandisation’ by applying for unconditional membership of the European Union – including the CFSP – within three months of the USSR’s demise.
It seems paradoxical when a country that had spent the entire Cold War believing in a foreign policy of ‘active neutrality’ and had previously engaged in several wars (including a vicious civil war) to maintain independence submits an application to an organisation that contradicts these historical notions. The reality of this application is that Finland not only wished to be a fully-fledged member, but that it displayed a “willingness to concede autonomy to the European Union” (Mouritzen, 1998).
As with every other member country, including those who do not show the level of Finland’s eagerness, the levels of bureaucracy amassed from EU membership increases year upon year. An OECD report from 2003 notes that the increased coordination between these the state and the organisation means “Finnish legislation increasingly orientates in E.U. legislation” – a case that opponents of the EU would have certainly voiced before the hasty membership.
There is a line of argument that one of the main motives for E.U. membership was to gain “sufficient additional security… especially from Russia” (Readman, 2004). At the time of the application it is believed that this standpoint could not be voiced by parliament for fears of aggravating Russia and inciting further tussles with her neighbour. Although this is a reasonable notion the former Soviet Union had larger matters to deal with than Finland in it’s first three months.
As far as the ‘Finlandisation’ debate is concerned the haste in which E.U. membership was applied is an obtrusive sign that government had been seeking to join the confederation for some time but had been barred from discussing such an arrangement from Moscow. Yet more proof, if need be, that concrete Finlandisation did exist throughout the cold war.
The benefits of an expected partnership.
Although the examples shown above paint a lucid picture of a country clearly handicapped by a Finlandised polity the next section will argue that, even though Finland’s international veracity had been compromised, it was both tolerable and even unsurprising; especially when viewed against the backdrop her history and the agreement’s beneficial aspects.
The economic reward:
From the implementation of the FCMA, and the unique Fenno-Soviet relationship that developed accordingly, Finland has not had as raw a deal as some social scientists would lead us to believe. Not only was it accepted that Finland would keep her political and economic systems that were distinctly western, but an added bonus of the pact involved 5-year barter trade agreements between the cosignatories that would prove to be a stabilising feature of the Finnish economy. Erkki Berndston (1991) makes a strong case for this, and notes that – particularly from the 1960’s onwards – trade between the nations kept unemployment low and that “economically, Finlandization seems to have benefited Finland”.
Although Soviet trade was an important feature of Finland’s economy it was not large enough to create any form of dependency for either party. At its peak, Soviet trade accounted for just over 20% of Finland’s economy, with the remaining 75% or so of her income being generated from the western democracies. It is largely because of this combination of being able to fluctuate trade between the communist and capitalist markets that Finland enjoyed some of the highest global levels of economic growth in the Cold War era, and much like the stereotyped ‘Nordic welfare model’ Finland still enjoys a reputation as one of the worlds financial successes. It is also by no chance that Finland managed to circumvent much of the negative effects of the oil crises in the 1970’s.
A history of coercion.
A brief glance at her last thousand years it is evident that Finland is certainly no stranger to foreign influence. Over the centuries she has ‘clocked up’ approximately five hundred years as part of the Kingdom of Sweden and over one hundred years as a Duchy of the Russian Empire. The latter included some heavy-handed ‘Russification’ efforts that interfered with language, laws and other central aspects of Finnish culture (Arter, 1999). In comparison to these previous encounters of peripheral influence regarding the overall timescale – and the severity of the original ‘Russification’ effort – forty or so years Finlandisation suddenly seems like a reasonable arrangement.
A second argument is that Finland has also previously sided with one of the biggest ogres to have ever appeared on the political stage: Nazi Germany. Even though Germany’s aggressive military expansionism of the early 1940’s was “based on cultural values that the Finns abhorred” (Berry, 1987) Finland became bedfellows with the Germans in order to enhance her capacity to fight against Russia in the ‘Winter War’. Whilst this relationship was short-lived it highlights the fact that Finland has gone to great lengths in order to remain independent, even if it meant collaborating with one of the most notorious states in history.
Some other ‘general reasons’.
Ultimately, the case of Finland, and Finlandisation is peppered with many contradictions and oddities. Ideologically, Finland is considered to be in the western camp as she is a rich, modern democracy with a flourishing capitalist market and free, fair elections. However, in relation to her geography, Finland occupies a somewhat helpless spot somewhere between no-man’s land and the east of Europe. It is because of this grey zone that Finland has experienced isolation and the aforementioned pressures of external influences, nevertheless, it also is because of this grey area and her bifurcated personality that she was able to get the best of both worlds throughout the second world war.
What else is true is that although it unquestionably existed, the severity of Finlandisation decreased over time, and most rapidly from the 1980’s, for several reasons. To begin with, there was the emergence of more ‘compassionate’ Soviet leaders such as Gorbachev, who granted Finland full membership status of EFTA in 1986. Secondly, Finland’s strategic significance declined with Germany’s integration into the EEC – thus ending the threat of an attack via Finland. Thirdly, the USSR shifts to a focus of internal policy following the appointment of Yeltsin as communist party leader. Fourthly, my suggestion that by the mid 1980’s Finland is so deeply integrated with western organisations (UN, Nordic Council, EFTA, OECD…) that that she was deemed a lost cause.
Perhaps it is more unfortunate than anything else that the Finns came to be identified as the international illustration of a state being affected by the presence of a nearby superpower. Throughout the early twentieth century Denmark had established a foreign policy to avoid confrontation with the adjoining German Reich. It was only when Denmark has able to abandon this policy, after World War II that Finland was left no choice but to opt for a ‘Danish’ policy. (Sundelious, 1982). It is also true that throughout the Second World War Iceland was not just forced to cooperate with Great Britain and America, but was subjected to an compulsory occupation that - at one point - included over 20,000 troops. These are just two examples from a historical catalogue of states that have been subject to compulsory cooperation, or influenced by their neighbours; yet ‘Icelandisation’ or ‘Denmarkisation’ failed to appear in the literature of their times.
Conclusions.
After examining the FCMA document I drew attention to the major arguments supporting the view that Finland’s polity was indeed ‘Finlandised’ during the Cold War using the three most prolific examples that have appeared in the narrative on the subject. In the second portion, I highlighted a distinct change in Finland’s policy, from the Cold War traits ‘neutrality’ and ‘independence’ and how they were hurriedly shelved using the example of European Union membership.In the third part, I argued that the Finlandisation itself was not an unbelievable direction of policy against the milieu of events before the cold war’, and that the country even benefited from the process, then highlighted some other – perhaps unfortunate – features of Finland and her relationship with the Russian Bear.
As for the future of Finland, any beliefs of neutrality should have been wiped away with full EU membership – and how fast the security aspect of the FCMA was traded by the EU’s CFSP. It is because of this, and indeed her history of, sporadic decisions that it would be foolish to rule out NATO membership in the near future, especially on the grounds that it is still taboo because, as I’ve hopefully demonstrated, Finland will do almost anything to that will benefit her position either economically or internationally. It is also valuable to note that the country has participated in NATO schemes such as the ‘Partnership for Peace’ for many years.
Finally, and above all else, it is incredible to observe that even after all of the trauma and turmoil in Finnish history, Finland and her people have accomplished the mean feat of retaining a strong cultural identity in one form or another. This has been facilitated by two factors; the first has been the adaptability of the foreign policy direction and the second has indeed been the obvious resilience of the Finnish people. It is due to the latter part that even if Finland continues her trend of integration through organisations that there will always be a strong national identity.
Word Count – 3,506.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Allison, Roy. “Finland's relations with the Soviet Union, 1944-84” London: Macmillan: In association with St. Antony's College Oxford, 1985. Page 67.
Arter, David. “Kekkonen’s Finland: Enlightened Despotism or Consensual Democracy?” West European Politics, 3, 1981. Page 224.
Arter, David. “The EU Referendum in Finland on 16 October 1994: A Vote for the West, not for Maastricht” Journal of Common Market Studies 33,3,1995, Page 363.
Arter, David. “Scandinavian politics today” Manchester University Press, 1999. Page 27.
Berndston, Erkki “Finlandization: Paradoxes of External and Internal Dynamics” From ‘Government and Opposition’ Vol.26 No.1 Winter 1991. Page 26.
Berry, R. Michael “American foreign policy and the Finnish exception: Ideological preferences and wartime realities” Helsinki, 1987. Page 94.
Elder, Neil. “e consensual democracies?: The government and politics of the Scandinavian states” Oxford, UK; Blackwell, 1988. Page 205.
Hancock, Dondald. “Sweden, Scandinavia and the EEC”. International Affairs, Vol 48. No. 3. Page 429.
Jenssen, Anders. “To join or not to join: Three Nordic referendums on membership in the European Union” Oslo: Scandinavian University Press 1998. Page 311.
Jussila, Osmo. “From Grand Duchy to a Modern State: a political history of Finland since 1809” London: Hurst & Company, 1999. Page 283.
Kekkonen, Urho, “Neutrality: the Finnish position – speeches” London, Heinemann, 1970. Page 19.
Maude, George. “The Finnish dilemma: neutrality in the shadow of power” London; Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, 1976. Page 45.
Mouritzen, Hans. “Bordering Russia: Theory and prospects for Europe's Baltic Rim” Aldershot; Brookfield, VT: Ashgate. 1998 Page 94.
OECD: “Finland: a new consensus for change” Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003. Page 61.
Punasalo, V. I. “The reality of Finlandisation: living under the Soviet shadow” Conflict Studies No. 39, March 1978. Page 2.
Readman, Kristina. “Germany and the Baltic problem after the Cold War: the development of a new Ostpolitik 1989-2000” London: Routledge, 2004. Page 183.
Salminen, Esko. “The silenced media: the propaganda war between Russia and the West in northern Europe.” Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999. Page 160.
Sundelius, Bengt.. “Foreign policies of Northern Europe” Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1982. Page 22.
Tiilikainen Teija “Finland & the European Union” Chapter from Miles, Lee. (Ed.) “The European Union and the Nordic countries” London; Routledge, 1996. Page 130.
Tiilikainen Teija. “Finland in the European Union” London: Frank Cass, 2003 Page 11.
Monday, December 18, 2006
Friday, November 24, 2006
I.R. - Mexican Election (2000)
Was the year 2000 a watershed for the Mexican political system?
Introduction.
Anybody who has shown even a remote interest in Mexican politics since the beginning of the new millennium will be well aware that the 2000 Presidential election has been one of the most talked about events in the contemporary history of the country. In brief: for arguably the first time in living memory Mexican elections were no longer dominated by a single party or laden with electoral fraud and a candidate form a party other than the PRI was elected as the country’s new president.
This essay intends to create the argument that although the year 2000 was the end of the PRI’s seventy-year clasp on Mexico’s political system, it was merely the final stage of a very long series of events that began over thirty years earlier. I aim to highlight the starting point of this process and follow its progression through the decades and the 2000 election, which will hopefully illustrate that the PRI’s loss of Mexico’s Presidency was unavoidable.
A brief history:
Since the violent Mexican revolution against repression and the creation of a new political system in the late 1920’s it was – until the 1970’s – almost an understatement to say that the country’s politics was absolutely dominated by the only political party affiliated with the famous revolt, and what was for many years the only official party that an individual could support. With little change to the country’s political system in decades scholars began to debate whether this single-party regime was an imperfect democracy or the perfect dictatorship.
This Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had power over of every level of government, from the lower house of Mexico’s bi-cameral legislature through to the highest electable office, and what was to be the centre of attention in 2000; the country’s head of state, the President.
El Presidente, and his ‘tyrannical’ status:
Since the revolution and the subsequent constitution that was drawn up the Mexican president has been in one of the most powerful elected officials within any country in the world. In the heyday of his power contemporary literature described him as having the party and government ‘under his thumb’ and even went as far to say that the entire political system was built around “presidential despotism” (Hodges, 1979). Whilst this text is slanted against the PRI it did highlight the lack of checks and balances or indeed any other restraints the president is had at the time of its publishing. Before the opening of the system towards representation and transparency the president could personally handpick his successor, cabinets, governments, congressmen and justices of the Supreme Court.
With this level of power vested in one individual it is no surprise to find out that the PRI were more than reluctant to sacrifice this position of office – and that they would go to any lengths, be it legal or not, to retain the privilege. Maintaining control of this luxurious position was one of the few constants that defined the PRI throughout the 20th century, and it keeping the Presidency arguably meant more to the PRI than any of the other political party actually taking control of it. This is also the reason why so much so much stress – perhaps even an over-emphasis – was made when Vicente Fox won the 2000 election.
The true Mexican watershed:
This incident, which I would personally call the ‘real’ watershed, produced a nascent pressure on the government which grew and grew until it eventually became enough to topple the PRI from highest level of government at the beginning of the new millennium. The one single incident that I would class as the event that catalysed three decades of political change in Mexico – and more generally shook “Mexican cultural life as a whole” (Foster, 2002) – is the notorious student massacre in Tlatelolco square.
Ironically, in 1968 several thousand students held a demonstration highlighting the heavy-handed methods used against them by the army and police. This rally was also deliberately held in an area of great cultural significance: Tlatelolco Square. Although the world’s media was watching – it was only a little over one week before Mexico City hosted the Olympic Games –army and police officers opened motiveless fire on the crowd killing what is said to be around three hundred people, with thousands more being arrested, imprisoned and wounded. When the smoke had settled and the sun rose the following day it was clear that the government had crushed its opposition, however, the political costs would proved to be ‘definitive’ (Hershfield, 1999).
Although this kind of action was not a new occurrence – Pilcher (2003) states that these heavy-handed authoritarian measures had previously been used before on workers and peasants – this was an unprovoked and savage assault on a previously untouched section of society. The government had authorized an attack on Mexico’s youth, and more importantly, Mexico’s educated and middle class, which started a chain reaction that would eventually see them losing power at all levels of governance and the ultimately, the prestigious Presidential office at the top of the nations political system.
Limited political change; pre 1968.
To argue that the Tlatelolco massacre was the absolute raison d'être for political change in Mexico would be inaccurate. Robert Miller (1985) points out that a constitutional amendment from 1964 “guaranteed minority parties representation based on their percentage of the national vote”. This, he said, was to alleviate criticism that the PRI had a monopoly on the government. At this time opposition parties were polling lower than 10% meaning that the most successful of them – PAN – received a meagre 20 seats from the total of 210 in the chamber of deputies at this time.
Whilst political change clearly did happen before 1968, and even beyond then, the intensity and consequences of them was negligible and only in the years after Tlatelolco did amendments provide the opposition with any real prospect of gaining credible and influential levels of power.
The first group of political reforms and their focus on increased representation.
The late 1970’s:
The first of the major changes to the Mexican political system came less than ten years after the Tlatelolco massacre when, in 1977, congress approved a new law which is best known by the acronym “LFOPPE”. The main aim of this new decree was to simplify the registration of political parties, thus increasing the levels of representation amongst the parties that could participate in elections. Although this did not initially have a large impact on the composition of any powerful positions it did appear to allow smaller parties the opportunity to ‘access public office and gain experience with legislation’ (Shirk, 2005). It is important to note that even though other bills and propositions have passed, that ensured simpler means and lower barriers for other parties to participate in elections and gain positions of power, the LFOPPE law was the real cornerstone in increasing representation in contemporary Mexican politics.
The LFOPPE law also saw the Chamber of Deputies expand for the first time since the revolution, which included one hundred new seats that were exclusively set-aside for the opposition parties (Camp, 2003 b). Although this may sound like a mammoth leap forward in the representation of smaller parties the reality was that the PRI still had more than a governing majority over the chamber and could continue to ratify any legislation with ease.
The reasons for there being no significant change in the make-up of the chamber of deputies throughout the 1970’s, even after the creation of the LFOPPE law, were two-fold. The first was that in the initial aftermath of Tlatelolco no movement, regardless of its size and power, would dare challenge the state’s authority in fear that the sporadic use of violence would be repeated on them; this belief also meant that many activists that emerged over the next thirty years, such as the EZLN, chose to begin their work ‘underground’.
Secondly the PRI appeared to be doing well, especially in their handling of the economic situation. Mexico’s booming economy fuelled by newly discovered oil and favourable conditions for borrowing money at the time meant that rising inflation rates were kept under control. Unfortunately for the PRI this success story was only a short-lived experience.
Whilst the previous ten years of Mexican politics appear to be marked by a series of healthy looking democratic victories with changes contributed to LFOPPE, on close inspection it is clear that the regime had merely shifted its main focus. The PRI policies that seemed dedicated on improving representation of even the smallest political parties obscured the reality that they had simply changed their focus towards the organisation of the elections and consequently suppressing the effects any electoral laws they passed by rigging the elections. When coupled with the other points mentioned above the party’s domination of the political system seemed as strong as ever.
The 1980’s:
Events between the years of 1980 and 1989 would prove to be some of the most important since the revolution for Mexico and it’s political system. This decade saw challenges to the PRI’s domination coming from all sides of the political spectrum and the roots of civil society – something that has never traditionally characterised the Latin American nations.
At the start of the decade the oil prices collapsed and in 1982, and because the country was declared officially bankrupt, President Carlos Salinas was required to force a program of radical reconstruction on the economy. This new model included the privatisation of all but of a handful of the hundreds of state-owned companies with the notable exception being the national oil company PEMEX (Blouet, 2002). Whilst this was an inescapable condition of the country’s dire economic situation it would have undoubtedly began to hinder the loyalty of traditional party support from workers and labourers and the average citizen who were all hit the hardest with a currency on the verge of collapsing and increasing food prices.
Corruption and abuse:
One of the traits of the Mexican political system is the average citizen’s lack of trust in it, particularly from the beginning of the 1980’s when, through a mixture of both foolish economic policy and a sequence of unfortunate world events, there was an economic crisis that severely affected almost every section of Mexican society. Even though Mexico was in turmoil, the economy was in a state of rapid declension and the government was very unpopular, the PRI presidential candidate emerged victorious in the 1982 election.
Before the 1985 mid-term elections a survey conducted by a leading newspaper revealed that only 13% of Mexicans accepted the ‘official’ electoral results to be a truthful reflection of the ballots cast (Adelphi, 1989). The reason for this shocking statistic is that the PRI had become ever more synonymous with corruption and electoral fraud and with every election that passed the results would undoubtedly reinforce its unremitting domination of Mexican politics.
Exactly how far back fraudulent elections date may never be known, however if one were to hazard an expected guess it would have most likely have began to play a major part during the sexino of Jóse López Portillo and would have only intensified with developments attributed to LFOPPE. The threat of the opposition parties’ lust for office gaining real momentum, by capitalising on the voters frustration regarding their unfortunate situation, was also all to real. As the aforementioned figure shows, by the mid 1980’s unfair elections were almost universally accepted by most Mexicans, who knew better than to believe the results they were shown.
To combat these fears the PRI had numerous dirty tricks up their sleeves when it came to rigging elections at every level. Some of the tactics were subtler than others. To name but a few the vast list has been known to include: missing ballot boxes – which were later found burnt out in ditches and rivers, duplicate votes, dead & other illegible ‘electorate’ casting ballots, crashing computers, and drastic last minute changes ranging from polling booth locations to disqualified opposition poll watchers (Camp, 2003 a).
One may ask why such a crooked political system was allowed to exist for several decades however in Mexico the ruling party’s influence stretched well beyond the realm of just politics. Caroline Beer (2006) noted that throughout the seven decades of PRI rule, the government managed to keep their negative qualities such as corruption, the use of violence and electoral fraud out of the public eye, particularly through their stringent control of the media. This was just one of the many extra ways the government and particularly the president could flex their powers of influence beyond the sphere of the political system.
The nascent stage of a new Mexican society:
In 1985 an immense earthquake shook the country’s capital destroying hundreds of buildings and leaving thousands homeless – exact figures are hard to attain because of massive discrepancies between the unreliable governmental statistics and other estimates. Unable to rely on their government ordinary citizens were forced to pull their provisions together and look out for one another buy building shelters and providing basic medical assistance for the injured.
From the rubble of this natural catastrophe rose the foundations of what became one of the most powerful threats to the PRI regime: the ‘rise of civic participation’ (Skidmore, 2005) – or civil society. Up until this period levels of social capital shown in Mexico had been relatively low, yet in the aftermath of the earthquake citizens had learned that they could work together and be more efficient than the government. This realisation brought around a sharp rise in civic trust, which aided the process.
Another factor common to the rise of civic participation across the region as a whole was the appearance of oppressive – mostly military – regimes, which tended to bring together groups with totally conflicting agendas and compelled them to work together against the common enemy. Naturally, the one historic incident specific to the Mexican case that would have fostered the uniting of virtually everybody who didn’t sympathise with the PRI regime would have been the Tlatelolco massacre.
With an increasing pressure being placed on the government and the observable success of some anti-governmental movements in the years to come, the snowballing of Mexican civil society had begun. Gerardo Otero’s book “Mexico in Transition” (2004) is perhaps one of the most detailed accounts of almost every echelon in society – from peasants and sugar cane growers through to bank debtors and the political class – and how they have been able to exert different levels of influence on past and present governments.
The second wave of political reforms: increasing electoral transparency.
The pivot point in political reform:
By the late nineteen eighties the government realised that something would have to be done in order to appease the dissatisfied citizens, of which there was an ever increasing number. Because of this governmental foresight 1987 marked the beginning of a series of electoral reforms that would aid the creation of a more ‘transparent electoral system’ (Kirby, 2003). The first of these was the expansion of the chamber of deputies by 200 new seats – bringing the new total to approximately 500 – elected exclusively through proportional representation. However, although Kirby notes that the first non-PRI governor was elected in 1989, it would be another decade before the party would unwillingly surrender their majority in the lower house of congress.
The 1988 presidential election provided perhaps the most blatant case of fraud when the vote counting computer experienced a ‘technical fault’. Before this hitch the computer displayed that the PRD leader – after splitting from the PRI in the follow up to the election – Cuauthémoc Cardenas (also son of former president and revolutionary icon Lázaro Cárdenas) was sitting comfortably in the lead. However, once this mishap had been resolved the results conveniently displayed that the PRI contender Carlos Salinas had narrowly sealed a victory.
Perhaps the next biggest call for an end to deliberate electoral rigging was after a series of key state elections (Baja California, Yutcán, Tabasco…) between December 1988 and November 1990 in which “the evidence of fraud and abuse was flagrant” (Gentleman, 1992) and claims of the PRI using violence against the PRD and their supporters were particular shocking. It is my belief that these two cases provided to be the pivotal point for which the most important focus of political reform switched from increased representation towards the increased transparency of elections at all levels, which was the new obstacle preventing the smaller parties from being truly represented.
1994; the free and open electoral system Mexico had been waiting for?
Legislation in 1990 formed a new electoral code best known by the abbreviation COFIPE and a new body to observe the elections, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). Through these developments a ‘whole network of people and mechanisms’ were established to ‘ensure that electoral fraud was not committed’ (Scherlen, 1998). These included; party, citizen and foreign observers in precincts; transparent surfaces of ballot boxes to counter the notion of box-stuffing; fair distribution of television air-time to all nine political parties and even indelible ink that was put on voters finger tips once their ballots had been cast.
Despite these attempts to improve the fairness of elections on the day, the PRI still had a trick or two up their sleeves. One of their final ploys was ‘manipulating the distribution of benefits from federal entitlement programs’ (Klesner, 2001). The case that creeps up time and time again in the body of literature is the PROCAMPO scheme, which was initially introduced in 1993 by the government to subsidise farmers who were still suffering at the hands of the imposition of the unsympathetic economic reforms in the 1980’s. However, it was widely reported that the government deliberately targeted volatile voting areas and was especially generous in the weeks before elections.
Only several weeks before the presidential election of 1994 PROCAMPO assumed a high profile with hundreds of thousands of farmers receiving their first payments (Stephen 1997). These pre-election payments were almost exclusively for the regions where the outcomes of the elections were predicted to be close, or even leaning towards the PAN or PRD. Judith Teichman (1997) also describes PROCAMPO as an ‘important ingredient’ in the PRI’s 1994 electoral victory because in areas where they were sure to win, money was held until after the election when it was given to these loyal districts as a reward. Very little could be done to conceal the fact that this was a conscious decision to literally buy undecided votes and sustain the strongholds but this did not matter because astute schemes like this were the final gasping breaths that the government had to ensure a steady flow of votes, especially at a time when electoral transparency was the heart of the reforms.
The indigenous threat.
Whilst the 1st of January 1994 was supposed to be a historic day in which Mexico began it’s step towards becoming a fully developed nation with the beginning of the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the countries prestige was tainted when a different kind of social movement reared its head in the form of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (the EZLN). This was a group of indigenous Mexicans who had been working ‘underground’ for some time that declared war against Mexico politicians because to coincide with NATFA’s harsh consequences on the native farmers.
A cease-fire was put in place a little over one week after their initial attacks because such poorly armed and trained combatants had little chance against the Mexican national army. This shift from weapons to words was a change in tactics from warfare towards what Clifford Bob (2005) describes as “armed non-violence”, and began a process of negotiations between the EZLN and PRI government.
The apparent success and influence of the EZLN were short lived when, even after accords on indigenous rights and culture were signed, they resorted back to low intensity warfare because of the government’s lack of “political will and the intention to fulfil its word” (Higgins, 2004). To this date, even after several failed attempts to negotiate from both sides, the EZLN are still considered a rebel force and a constant thorn in the government’s side, regardless of the chambers composition.
Good things come in time.
In 1997 the swelling pressure applied to the government over the past two decades was eventually starting to show some major success, and the PRI suffered in what was, at the time, arguably their first major defeat since its creation. Although opposition parties – mainly the PRD and PAN – had been winning small numbers of low-level seats in previous elections 1997 was when the PRI lost its legislative majority in the chamber of deputies and lots of ground at regional level elections. Perhaps the biggest blow was the loss of the prestigious post of the Mexico City Mayor. The significance of this lays in the fact that traditionally this has been used as a stepping-stone to the presidency (Martin, 2005).
The new millennium and a new slate.
Then came the 2000 election, which was viewed by most spectators as a real Mexican miracle. The victory of Vicente Fox dealt the final blow to the PRIs seventy-year domination of the political system. At the risk of playing down the importance of this victory I would argue that this was more of a symbolic result that anything. With the PRI slowly losing more and more ground as the pressure applied from all levels of society and the political spectrum intensified and their methods of controlling the electoral outcomes finally being exhausted.
Fast-forward to the recent 2006 elections and the continuation of this process can be seen, through the further losses for the PRI in both the in both legislative chambers. In the Chamber of Deputies since the 2003 mid-term elections the PAN and PRD saw increases from 151 to 206 seats, and 96 to 159 respectively (Economist, 2006). With a new ‘sub-total’ of 122 seats – a staggering drop form 2003’s 239 seats – the PRI is down to an all-time low but still not out. Because no party has an overall majority legislation will have to be passed by a government comprising at least two of the parties, meaning the PRI can still exert a degree of influence.
Conclusion.
In this essay I hope to have shown that the PRI’s loss in 2000’s presidential was nothing more than another effect of a movement against them that was set in motion over thirty years earlier and that the victory was more emblematic than an unexpected or a turning point against the past success of the PRI.
After highlighting why the power of the Mexican President made it such a sought-after position I went on to explain that the infamous events at Tlatelolco laid the foundations for a slow, but almost exponential increase of pressure on the government that took the shape of new legislation. These new laws (post 1968) had two prominent manifestations; at first they sought after a more representative system, by making the registration process easier and fairer.
The second materialization of these laws came after the realisation that the PRI had been suppressing the representation, even after the formation of a civil society, by fixing the outcomes of the elections through various doubtful means. This second round of reforms called for an increase in electoral transparency, through the creation of COFIPE and the IFE. Once the PRI had exhausted its last efforts to maintain the grip on the political system, which it had held for so long it was only a matter of time before they began to lose political ground.
Unfortunately for Vicente Fox in the future he is more than likely going to be remembered as the first man who defeated the PRI over anything he achieved whilst serving his sexino. By looking at the latest election I hope to have shown that the PRI are still feeling the effect of this pressure and are still losing ground at every election.
Word count – 3,999 (Excluding bibliography)
4,390 (Including bibliography)
Bibliography.
Adelphi Papers: 242. “Mexico: converging challenges”. Autumn 1989. P.28
Beer, Caroline. “Undermining the rule of law: Democratisation and the dark side of police reform in Mexico” Latin American Politics and Society: Vol 48, No.1 P.64
Blouet, Brian. “Latin America and the Caribbean: a systematic and regional survey” New York: Chichester: Wiley, c2002 P.236
Camp, Roderic Ai. “Politics in Mexico : the democratic transformation.” Oxford University Press, 2003. a – Page 189 b – 188
Bob, Clifford, “The marketing of rebellion: Insurgents, media, and international activism” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 P.139
Economist, The. “Pregnant Pause” Table – The age of minority’. Time to wake up – special report on Mexico. November 18th-24th 2006. P.5
Foster, David William. “Mexico City in contemporary Mexican cinema” Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002. P.1
Fox, Claire F. “The fence and the river: culture and politics at the U.S.-Mexico border” Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1999. P.5
Gentleman, Judith “International Integration and Democratic Development: The Cases of Poland and Mexico” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol.34 No.1 P.86
Hershfield, Joanne. “Mexico's cinema: a century of film and filmmakers” Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 1999. P.200
Higgins, Nicholas. “Understanding the Chiapas Rebellion” University of Texas Press. 2004. P.156Hodges, Donald Clark. “Mexico, 1910-1982: reform or revolution?” London : Zed Press. 1979. P.99
Kirby, Peadar. “Introduction to Latin America. Twenty-first century challenges” London; Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2003. P.41
Klessner, Joseph L. “Adiós to the PRI? Changing voter turnout in Mexico’s political transition” Mexican Studies Vol.17 No.1 2001 P.27
Martin, Jo Ann. “Tepoztlán and the transformation of the Mexican state: the politics of loose connections” Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005. P.7
Miller, Robert Ryal. “Mexico: a history” Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985 P.239
Pilcher, Jeffery. “The human tradition in Mexico” Wilmington, Del: SR Books, 2003 P.182Schelren,
Renee G. “Lessons to build on: the 1994 Mexican Presidential Election” Journal of interamerican studies and world affairs. Vol.40 No.1 1998 P.24-25
Shirk, David A. “Mexico's new politics: the PAN and democratic change” Boulder, Colo; London: Lynne Rienner, 2005. P.36
Skidmore, Thomas E. “Modern Latin America” New York; Oxford University Press, 2005. P.59
Stephen, Lynn “Pro-Zapatista and Pro-Pri: Resolving the Contradictions of Zapatismo in Rural Oaxaca” Latin American Research Review Vol.32 No.2 P.55
Teichman, Judith. “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Mexican Authoritarianism”. Mexican Studies Vol.13 No.1 1997 P.141-142
Introduction.
Anybody who has shown even a remote interest in Mexican politics since the beginning of the new millennium will be well aware that the 2000 Presidential election has been one of the most talked about events in the contemporary history of the country. In brief: for arguably the first time in living memory Mexican elections were no longer dominated by a single party or laden with electoral fraud and a candidate form a party other than the PRI was elected as the country’s new president.
This essay intends to create the argument that although the year 2000 was the end of the PRI’s seventy-year clasp on Mexico’s political system, it was merely the final stage of a very long series of events that began over thirty years earlier. I aim to highlight the starting point of this process and follow its progression through the decades and the 2000 election, which will hopefully illustrate that the PRI’s loss of Mexico’s Presidency was unavoidable.
A brief history:
Since the violent Mexican revolution against repression and the creation of a new political system in the late 1920’s it was – until the 1970’s – almost an understatement to say that the country’s politics was absolutely dominated by the only political party affiliated with the famous revolt, and what was for many years the only official party that an individual could support. With little change to the country’s political system in decades scholars began to debate whether this single-party regime was an imperfect democracy or the perfect dictatorship.
This Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had power over of every level of government, from the lower house of Mexico’s bi-cameral legislature through to the highest electable office, and what was to be the centre of attention in 2000; the country’s head of state, the President.
El Presidente, and his ‘tyrannical’ status:
Since the revolution and the subsequent constitution that was drawn up the Mexican president has been in one of the most powerful elected officials within any country in the world. In the heyday of his power contemporary literature described him as having the party and government ‘under his thumb’ and even went as far to say that the entire political system was built around “presidential despotism” (Hodges, 1979). Whilst this text is slanted against the PRI it did highlight the lack of checks and balances or indeed any other restraints the president is had at the time of its publishing. Before the opening of the system towards representation and transparency the president could personally handpick his successor, cabinets, governments, congressmen and justices of the Supreme Court.
With this level of power vested in one individual it is no surprise to find out that the PRI were more than reluctant to sacrifice this position of office – and that they would go to any lengths, be it legal or not, to retain the privilege. Maintaining control of this luxurious position was one of the few constants that defined the PRI throughout the 20th century, and it keeping the Presidency arguably meant more to the PRI than any of the other political party actually taking control of it. This is also the reason why so much so much stress – perhaps even an over-emphasis – was made when Vicente Fox won the 2000 election.
The true Mexican watershed:
This incident, which I would personally call the ‘real’ watershed, produced a nascent pressure on the government which grew and grew until it eventually became enough to topple the PRI from highest level of government at the beginning of the new millennium. The one single incident that I would class as the event that catalysed three decades of political change in Mexico – and more generally shook “Mexican cultural life as a whole” (Foster, 2002) – is the notorious student massacre in Tlatelolco square.
Ironically, in 1968 several thousand students held a demonstration highlighting the heavy-handed methods used against them by the army and police. This rally was also deliberately held in an area of great cultural significance: Tlatelolco Square. Although the world’s media was watching – it was only a little over one week before Mexico City hosted the Olympic Games –army and police officers opened motiveless fire on the crowd killing what is said to be around three hundred people, with thousands more being arrested, imprisoned and wounded. When the smoke had settled and the sun rose the following day it was clear that the government had crushed its opposition, however, the political costs would proved to be ‘definitive’ (Hershfield, 1999).
Although this kind of action was not a new occurrence – Pilcher (2003) states that these heavy-handed authoritarian measures had previously been used before on workers and peasants – this was an unprovoked and savage assault on a previously untouched section of society. The government had authorized an attack on Mexico’s youth, and more importantly, Mexico’s educated and middle class, which started a chain reaction that would eventually see them losing power at all levels of governance and the ultimately, the prestigious Presidential office at the top of the nations political system.
Limited political change; pre 1968.
To argue that the Tlatelolco massacre was the absolute raison d'être for political change in Mexico would be inaccurate. Robert Miller (1985) points out that a constitutional amendment from 1964 “guaranteed minority parties representation based on their percentage of the national vote”. This, he said, was to alleviate criticism that the PRI had a monopoly on the government. At this time opposition parties were polling lower than 10% meaning that the most successful of them – PAN – received a meagre 20 seats from the total of 210 in the chamber of deputies at this time.
Whilst political change clearly did happen before 1968, and even beyond then, the intensity and consequences of them was negligible and only in the years after Tlatelolco did amendments provide the opposition with any real prospect of gaining credible and influential levels of power.
The first group of political reforms and their focus on increased representation.
The late 1970’s:
The first of the major changes to the Mexican political system came less than ten years after the Tlatelolco massacre when, in 1977, congress approved a new law which is best known by the acronym “LFOPPE”. The main aim of this new decree was to simplify the registration of political parties, thus increasing the levels of representation amongst the parties that could participate in elections. Although this did not initially have a large impact on the composition of any powerful positions it did appear to allow smaller parties the opportunity to ‘access public office and gain experience with legislation’ (Shirk, 2005). It is important to note that even though other bills and propositions have passed, that ensured simpler means and lower barriers for other parties to participate in elections and gain positions of power, the LFOPPE law was the real cornerstone in increasing representation in contemporary Mexican politics.
The LFOPPE law also saw the Chamber of Deputies expand for the first time since the revolution, which included one hundred new seats that were exclusively set-aside for the opposition parties (Camp, 2003 b). Although this may sound like a mammoth leap forward in the representation of smaller parties the reality was that the PRI still had more than a governing majority over the chamber and could continue to ratify any legislation with ease.
The reasons for there being no significant change in the make-up of the chamber of deputies throughout the 1970’s, even after the creation of the LFOPPE law, were two-fold. The first was that in the initial aftermath of Tlatelolco no movement, regardless of its size and power, would dare challenge the state’s authority in fear that the sporadic use of violence would be repeated on them; this belief also meant that many activists that emerged over the next thirty years, such as the EZLN, chose to begin their work ‘underground’.
Secondly the PRI appeared to be doing well, especially in their handling of the economic situation. Mexico’s booming economy fuelled by newly discovered oil and favourable conditions for borrowing money at the time meant that rising inflation rates were kept under control. Unfortunately for the PRI this success story was only a short-lived experience.
Whilst the previous ten years of Mexican politics appear to be marked by a series of healthy looking democratic victories with changes contributed to LFOPPE, on close inspection it is clear that the regime had merely shifted its main focus. The PRI policies that seemed dedicated on improving representation of even the smallest political parties obscured the reality that they had simply changed their focus towards the organisation of the elections and consequently suppressing the effects any electoral laws they passed by rigging the elections. When coupled with the other points mentioned above the party’s domination of the political system seemed as strong as ever.
The 1980’s:
Events between the years of 1980 and 1989 would prove to be some of the most important since the revolution for Mexico and it’s political system. This decade saw challenges to the PRI’s domination coming from all sides of the political spectrum and the roots of civil society – something that has never traditionally characterised the Latin American nations.
At the start of the decade the oil prices collapsed and in 1982, and because the country was declared officially bankrupt, President Carlos Salinas was required to force a program of radical reconstruction on the economy. This new model included the privatisation of all but of a handful of the hundreds of state-owned companies with the notable exception being the national oil company PEMEX (Blouet, 2002). Whilst this was an inescapable condition of the country’s dire economic situation it would have undoubtedly began to hinder the loyalty of traditional party support from workers and labourers and the average citizen who were all hit the hardest with a currency on the verge of collapsing and increasing food prices.
Corruption and abuse:
One of the traits of the Mexican political system is the average citizen’s lack of trust in it, particularly from the beginning of the 1980’s when, through a mixture of both foolish economic policy and a sequence of unfortunate world events, there was an economic crisis that severely affected almost every section of Mexican society. Even though Mexico was in turmoil, the economy was in a state of rapid declension and the government was very unpopular, the PRI presidential candidate emerged victorious in the 1982 election.
Before the 1985 mid-term elections a survey conducted by a leading newspaper revealed that only 13% of Mexicans accepted the ‘official’ electoral results to be a truthful reflection of the ballots cast (Adelphi, 1989). The reason for this shocking statistic is that the PRI had become ever more synonymous with corruption and electoral fraud and with every election that passed the results would undoubtedly reinforce its unremitting domination of Mexican politics.
Exactly how far back fraudulent elections date may never be known, however if one were to hazard an expected guess it would have most likely have began to play a major part during the sexino of Jóse López Portillo and would have only intensified with developments attributed to LFOPPE. The threat of the opposition parties’ lust for office gaining real momentum, by capitalising on the voters frustration regarding their unfortunate situation, was also all to real. As the aforementioned figure shows, by the mid 1980’s unfair elections were almost universally accepted by most Mexicans, who knew better than to believe the results they were shown.
To combat these fears the PRI had numerous dirty tricks up their sleeves when it came to rigging elections at every level. Some of the tactics were subtler than others. To name but a few the vast list has been known to include: missing ballot boxes – which were later found burnt out in ditches and rivers, duplicate votes, dead & other illegible ‘electorate’ casting ballots, crashing computers, and drastic last minute changes ranging from polling booth locations to disqualified opposition poll watchers (Camp, 2003 a).
One may ask why such a crooked political system was allowed to exist for several decades however in Mexico the ruling party’s influence stretched well beyond the realm of just politics. Caroline Beer (2006) noted that throughout the seven decades of PRI rule, the government managed to keep their negative qualities such as corruption, the use of violence and electoral fraud out of the public eye, particularly through their stringent control of the media. This was just one of the many extra ways the government and particularly the president could flex their powers of influence beyond the sphere of the political system.
The nascent stage of a new Mexican society:
In 1985 an immense earthquake shook the country’s capital destroying hundreds of buildings and leaving thousands homeless – exact figures are hard to attain because of massive discrepancies between the unreliable governmental statistics and other estimates. Unable to rely on their government ordinary citizens were forced to pull their provisions together and look out for one another buy building shelters and providing basic medical assistance for the injured.
From the rubble of this natural catastrophe rose the foundations of what became one of the most powerful threats to the PRI regime: the ‘rise of civic participation’ (Skidmore, 2005) – or civil society. Up until this period levels of social capital shown in Mexico had been relatively low, yet in the aftermath of the earthquake citizens had learned that they could work together and be more efficient than the government. This realisation brought around a sharp rise in civic trust, which aided the process.
Another factor common to the rise of civic participation across the region as a whole was the appearance of oppressive – mostly military – regimes, which tended to bring together groups with totally conflicting agendas and compelled them to work together against the common enemy. Naturally, the one historic incident specific to the Mexican case that would have fostered the uniting of virtually everybody who didn’t sympathise with the PRI regime would have been the Tlatelolco massacre.
With an increasing pressure being placed on the government and the observable success of some anti-governmental movements in the years to come, the snowballing of Mexican civil society had begun. Gerardo Otero’s book “Mexico in Transition” (2004) is perhaps one of the most detailed accounts of almost every echelon in society – from peasants and sugar cane growers through to bank debtors and the political class – and how they have been able to exert different levels of influence on past and present governments.
The second wave of political reforms: increasing electoral transparency.
The pivot point in political reform:
By the late nineteen eighties the government realised that something would have to be done in order to appease the dissatisfied citizens, of which there was an ever increasing number. Because of this governmental foresight 1987 marked the beginning of a series of electoral reforms that would aid the creation of a more ‘transparent electoral system’ (Kirby, 2003). The first of these was the expansion of the chamber of deputies by 200 new seats – bringing the new total to approximately 500 – elected exclusively through proportional representation. However, although Kirby notes that the first non-PRI governor was elected in 1989, it would be another decade before the party would unwillingly surrender their majority in the lower house of congress.
The 1988 presidential election provided perhaps the most blatant case of fraud when the vote counting computer experienced a ‘technical fault’. Before this hitch the computer displayed that the PRD leader – after splitting from the PRI in the follow up to the election – Cuauthémoc Cardenas (also son of former president and revolutionary icon Lázaro Cárdenas) was sitting comfortably in the lead. However, once this mishap had been resolved the results conveniently displayed that the PRI contender Carlos Salinas had narrowly sealed a victory.
Perhaps the next biggest call for an end to deliberate electoral rigging was after a series of key state elections (Baja California, Yutcán, Tabasco…) between December 1988 and November 1990 in which “the evidence of fraud and abuse was flagrant” (Gentleman, 1992) and claims of the PRI using violence against the PRD and their supporters were particular shocking. It is my belief that these two cases provided to be the pivotal point for which the most important focus of political reform switched from increased representation towards the increased transparency of elections at all levels, which was the new obstacle preventing the smaller parties from being truly represented.
1994; the free and open electoral system Mexico had been waiting for?
Legislation in 1990 formed a new electoral code best known by the abbreviation COFIPE and a new body to observe the elections, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). Through these developments a ‘whole network of people and mechanisms’ were established to ‘ensure that electoral fraud was not committed’ (Scherlen, 1998). These included; party, citizen and foreign observers in precincts; transparent surfaces of ballot boxes to counter the notion of box-stuffing; fair distribution of television air-time to all nine political parties and even indelible ink that was put on voters finger tips once their ballots had been cast.
Despite these attempts to improve the fairness of elections on the day, the PRI still had a trick or two up their sleeves. One of their final ploys was ‘manipulating the distribution of benefits from federal entitlement programs’ (Klesner, 2001). The case that creeps up time and time again in the body of literature is the PROCAMPO scheme, which was initially introduced in 1993 by the government to subsidise farmers who were still suffering at the hands of the imposition of the unsympathetic economic reforms in the 1980’s. However, it was widely reported that the government deliberately targeted volatile voting areas and was especially generous in the weeks before elections.
Only several weeks before the presidential election of 1994 PROCAMPO assumed a high profile with hundreds of thousands of farmers receiving their first payments (Stephen 1997). These pre-election payments were almost exclusively for the regions where the outcomes of the elections were predicted to be close, or even leaning towards the PAN or PRD. Judith Teichman (1997) also describes PROCAMPO as an ‘important ingredient’ in the PRI’s 1994 electoral victory because in areas where they were sure to win, money was held until after the election when it was given to these loyal districts as a reward. Very little could be done to conceal the fact that this was a conscious decision to literally buy undecided votes and sustain the strongholds but this did not matter because astute schemes like this were the final gasping breaths that the government had to ensure a steady flow of votes, especially at a time when electoral transparency was the heart of the reforms.
The indigenous threat.
Whilst the 1st of January 1994 was supposed to be a historic day in which Mexico began it’s step towards becoming a fully developed nation with the beginning of the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the countries prestige was tainted when a different kind of social movement reared its head in the form of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (the EZLN). This was a group of indigenous Mexicans who had been working ‘underground’ for some time that declared war against Mexico politicians because to coincide with NATFA’s harsh consequences on the native farmers.
A cease-fire was put in place a little over one week after their initial attacks because such poorly armed and trained combatants had little chance against the Mexican national army. This shift from weapons to words was a change in tactics from warfare towards what Clifford Bob (2005) describes as “armed non-violence”, and began a process of negotiations between the EZLN and PRI government.
The apparent success and influence of the EZLN were short lived when, even after accords on indigenous rights and culture were signed, they resorted back to low intensity warfare because of the government’s lack of “political will and the intention to fulfil its word” (Higgins, 2004). To this date, even after several failed attempts to negotiate from both sides, the EZLN are still considered a rebel force and a constant thorn in the government’s side, regardless of the chambers composition.
Good things come in time.
In 1997 the swelling pressure applied to the government over the past two decades was eventually starting to show some major success, and the PRI suffered in what was, at the time, arguably their first major defeat since its creation. Although opposition parties – mainly the PRD and PAN – had been winning small numbers of low-level seats in previous elections 1997 was when the PRI lost its legislative majority in the chamber of deputies and lots of ground at regional level elections. Perhaps the biggest blow was the loss of the prestigious post of the Mexico City Mayor. The significance of this lays in the fact that traditionally this has been used as a stepping-stone to the presidency (Martin, 2005).
The new millennium and a new slate.
Then came the 2000 election, which was viewed by most spectators as a real Mexican miracle. The victory of Vicente Fox dealt the final blow to the PRIs seventy-year domination of the political system. At the risk of playing down the importance of this victory I would argue that this was more of a symbolic result that anything. With the PRI slowly losing more and more ground as the pressure applied from all levels of society and the political spectrum intensified and their methods of controlling the electoral outcomes finally being exhausted.
Fast-forward to the recent 2006 elections and the continuation of this process can be seen, through the further losses for the PRI in both the in both legislative chambers. In the Chamber of Deputies since the 2003 mid-term elections the PAN and PRD saw increases from 151 to 206 seats, and 96 to 159 respectively (Economist, 2006). With a new ‘sub-total’ of 122 seats – a staggering drop form 2003’s 239 seats – the PRI is down to an all-time low but still not out. Because no party has an overall majority legislation will have to be passed by a government comprising at least two of the parties, meaning the PRI can still exert a degree of influence.
Conclusion.
In this essay I hope to have shown that the PRI’s loss in 2000’s presidential was nothing more than another effect of a movement against them that was set in motion over thirty years earlier and that the victory was more emblematic than an unexpected or a turning point against the past success of the PRI.
After highlighting why the power of the Mexican President made it such a sought-after position I went on to explain that the infamous events at Tlatelolco laid the foundations for a slow, but almost exponential increase of pressure on the government that took the shape of new legislation. These new laws (post 1968) had two prominent manifestations; at first they sought after a more representative system, by making the registration process easier and fairer.
The second materialization of these laws came after the realisation that the PRI had been suppressing the representation, even after the formation of a civil society, by fixing the outcomes of the elections through various doubtful means. This second round of reforms called for an increase in electoral transparency, through the creation of COFIPE and the IFE. Once the PRI had exhausted its last efforts to maintain the grip on the political system, which it had held for so long it was only a matter of time before they began to lose political ground.
Unfortunately for Vicente Fox in the future he is more than likely going to be remembered as the first man who defeated the PRI over anything he achieved whilst serving his sexino. By looking at the latest election I hope to have shown that the PRI are still feeling the effect of this pressure and are still losing ground at every election.
Word count – 3,999 (Excluding bibliography)
4,390 (Including bibliography)
Bibliography.
Adelphi Papers: 242. “Mexico: converging challenges”. Autumn 1989. P.28
Beer, Caroline. “Undermining the rule of law: Democratisation and the dark side of police reform in Mexico” Latin American Politics and Society: Vol 48, No.1 P.64
Blouet, Brian. “Latin America and the Caribbean: a systematic and regional survey” New York: Chichester: Wiley, c2002 P.236
Camp, Roderic Ai. “Politics in Mexico : the democratic transformation.” Oxford University Press, 2003. a – Page 189 b – 188
Bob, Clifford, “The marketing of rebellion: Insurgents, media, and international activism” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 P.139
Economist, The. “Pregnant Pause” Table – The age of minority’. Time to wake up – special report on Mexico. November 18th-24th 2006. P.5
Foster, David William. “Mexico City in contemporary Mexican cinema” Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002. P.1
Fox, Claire F. “The fence and the river: culture and politics at the U.S.-Mexico border” Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1999. P.5
Gentleman, Judith “International Integration and Democratic Development: The Cases of Poland and Mexico” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol.34 No.1 P.86
Hershfield, Joanne. “Mexico's cinema: a century of film and filmmakers” Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 1999. P.200
Higgins, Nicholas. “Understanding the Chiapas Rebellion” University of Texas Press. 2004. P.156Hodges, Donald Clark. “Mexico, 1910-1982: reform or revolution?” London : Zed Press. 1979. P.99
Kirby, Peadar. “Introduction to Latin America. Twenty-first century challenges” London; Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2003. P.41
Klessner, Joseph L. “Adiós to the PRI? Changing voter turnout in Mexico’s political transition” Mexican Studies Vol.17 No.1 2001 P.27
Martin, Jo Ann. “Tepoztlán and the transformation of the Mexican state: the politics of loose connections” Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005. P.7
Miller, Robert Ryal. “Mexico: a history” Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985 P.239
Pilcher, Jeffery. “The human tradition in Mexico” Wilmington, Del: SR Books, 2003 P.182Schelren,
Renee G. “Lessons to build on: the 1994 Mexican Presidential Election” Journal of interamerican studies and world affairs. Vol.40 No.1 1998 P.24-25
Shirk, David A. “Mexico's new politics: the PAN and democratic change” Boulder, Colo; London: Lynne Rienner, 2005. P.36
Skidmore, Thomas E. “Modern Latin America” New York; Oxford University Press, 2005. P.59
Stephen, Lynn “Pro-Zapatista and Pro-Pri: Resolving the Contradictions of Zapatismo in Rural Oaxaca” Latin American Research Review Vol.32 No.2 P.55
Teichman, Judith. “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Mexican Authoritarianism”. Mexican Studies Vol.13 No.1 1997 P.141-142
Saturday, May 13, 2006
Pol - Scandy Welfare
What’s so special about the Nordic Welfare Model? Critically analyse the challenges facing it on the threshold of the new millennium.
Introduction:
In recent decades the international portrait that has been painted of the Nordic welfare state has been somewhat caricatured, with the prevailing notions that the state provides facilities of almost every nature, with near 100% income replacement levels for those who require it and free provision of all the essential social and healthcare services. This essay intends to first explore whether a ‘Scandinavian’ style of welfare does indeed exist, and if so, what the main features of such a system are. The main body of this paper will focus on the elements that confront the Nordic welfare states, and if there are any possible solutions to these threats. In the conclusion I intend to summarise the findings of my research and create a hypothesis for the future of welfare in the Nordic region.
A Nordic Model?
Before diving in at the deep end and assessing the current challenges facing the welfare models of the Nordic countries it first is necessary get our feet wet in with a succinct outline and understanding of the brief history and key features of the Nordic welfare state.
If one were to guess the nature of welfare using only stereotypes and reputation, the foremost assumption would be that the Nordic (Scandinavian) states have a very distinct and substantial welfare system when contrasted with other countries worldwide. This, in reality, is true; Francis Castles goes as far as to talk about “Intra-Scandinavian convergence tendencies” [i] when assessing change in welfare policies amongst ‘clusters’ of nations throughout the world. There are several reasons for the emergence of the Scandinavian (or indeed Anglo-Saxon or Mediterranean) welfare systems. These regional differences are the cause of many effects from a shared common history to the specific needs or politics of any given area. One other key aspect to the evolution of a specific cluster of welfare states is that the economies of these Nordic states are all very similar. The countries all have relatively small, but open, markets with large export sections which in turn bring high capital mobility.
The next step away from the shallow end of our Scandinavian swimming pool is to highlight the distinctive features of this established ‘Scandinavian Welfare’ model; however it would make more sense explain the current traits by using history and how the welfare model evolved into what it is today.
Firstly, and perhaps the single most important reason for Scandinavia having such a distinguishable welfare style is the dominance of Social Democracy. However, to give the Social Democratic political parties all of the glory would be slightly unfair because although they have governed as a single-party minority, they also used a variety of coalition types to enter the government. From as early as the 1930’s they have been able to find their way into approximately 90% of the Nordic governments and have slowly moulded an undivided opinion amongst Scandinavian citizens – especially in Sweden and Norway – that a high-tax, strong welfare state is the best way forward. The prevalence of strong, united Trade Unions[ii] and a general lack of credible political alternatives (except in Denmark where a sizeable Conservative party did emerge) meant that, as policy makers, the Social Democrats were for the most part of the last century in the ‘driving seat’.
With a common goal amongst most politicians in the Nordic countries the parties began piecing together the foundations of their welfare state with the introduction of pensions and benefits in the 1940s and 1950s to ensure there was a reasonable standard of living. These aspects were strengthened and expanded in subsequent decades whilst the dice of economic fortune rolled in favour of the Scandinavian markets and the countries saw a steady increase in employment with remarkably low levels of inflation. This period very much brought around the beginning of the distinct institutional nature of the Nordic model. However, the oil crises of the 1970’s were the first sings that the Nordic countries were in about to encounter some turbulence. Recession climaxed in the late 1980’s / early 1990’s with a dramatic effect on the direction of Scandinavian welfare.
Whilst the other Nordic countries began to suffer unemployment on a previously unthinkable scale, Norway - with its vast revenue from national oil - was the only country that managed to avoid this situation and also got by without announcing any welfare cutbacks. [iii] The other Scandinavian countries however were not as fortunate; the Swedes suffered a currency devaluation of 16% in a single year (on top of the previous years’ 10%); the Danes experienced a new unemployment high of 11.3% in 1992; and the Finns underwent an all-time unemployment high of 17% in 1991. [iv]
Several different methods were tried out by the countries in order to recover from such distressing fluctuations such as Sweden unveiling the comprehensive “tax reform of the century” with some extensive cutbacks in the public sector. Denmark on the other hand opted for a more active approach of new labour-market policies. [v] Another significant detail to note about the ‘bouncing back’ of the Scandinavian models is that even after some drastic changes to the fundamental organisation of the redistribution of welfare - and the taxation of capital to support it - none of the countries had broken away from the ‘Nordic model’ per-se.
Although the current welfare states are definitely less generous than they have been for previous generations, the stereotype of Scandinavian states taking care of their citizens from the womb-to-the-tomb is not an entirely false statement. Whilst there are minor differences in rates and income coverage between the nations the Nordic countries are generally recognised as having three main characteristics. [vi] The first trait is a broad scope of public and social policy with a commitment to full employment and an active labour market. The main reason for this is that with more people working, the government receives more funding for the welfare system though the high tax levels, which is redistributed directly back into society in several different ways.Another feature that links the Nordic welfare states is a universal flat-rate basic security, on an earnings related basis. This ‘insurance’ is only given to citizens who find themselves off for work a variety of reasons from unemployment to maternal or paternal leave. The percentage of a persons wage replacement differs from approximately 50% to 80% depending on the country and their occupation, however these rates are still amongst the most charitable in the world. The third attribute of the Nordic welfare state is the local, publicly funded provisions. The most common example of these are the childcare centres which are not just heavily used by parents but also responsible for the creation of thousands of jobs, especially amongst women, with the almost comical situation of a mother dropping her child off in one centre, then going to work in another. It is because of initiatives like this that region is also noted as having the world’s highest gender wage equality and gender employment levels.
To fund such high levels of public expenditure the Nordic countries have also become synonymous with some of the highest tax levels in the world. In 1998 Norwegians saw 48% of their total earnings go straight back to their government, Danes had a higher figure of 52% and the Swedes saw a staggering 55% of their income deducted through various taxes. [vii] As extreme as these figures may sound, especially when compared to more conservative tax levels in other welfare models, against the backdrop of such a substantial welfare state, Swedish citizens can still afford to live amongst some of the highest standards in the world with only 45% of their full wage.
Threats to the current Nordic welfare state.
And so we arrive at the deep end of the pool where, despite the relatively successful comeback of the Nordic welfare state with regards to unemployment and malfunctioning economies in previous decades, there are still several substantial challenges looming on the horizon that will push the limits of the already extensive coverage enjoyed by many Scandinavians.
Some of these new challenges will require changes to be made in the in the workings of the welfare system if it is to ensure it survives in tomorrow’s world. This is where the fundamental problem of the challenges starts because most Scandinavians grew up pleased, content and even proud of their unique system. The ramification of this is that public opinion hangs predominantly in favour of preserving the status quo. This attachment of the voters to the system has been written about by Paul Pierson[viii] who states that welfare supporters in Scandinavia are able to effectively fight to sustain their existing benefits, through the previously mentioned trade unions and high levels of democracy.This is a very logical argument, much in the same vein as the FPTP elected government changing the electoral system to a PR scenario, in that it would be irrational for a Scandinavian voter to shooting themselves in the foot. It would then make no sense for the electorate in any of the Nordic countries to support a party who would promote radical cut backs and reforms in the welfare sector. In 2002 Goeran Persson successfully demolished all opposition and saw himself re-elected as the Swedish Prime Minister with a campaign that primarily focused on protecting the country’s welfare system. [ix]. The magnitude of the victory (a gap of over 1 million - 20% - of the votes) is a good indicator not just at how successful Social Democracy still is, but also at how big an issue the survival of the welfare state is in an election. In line with the grain of history the Conservative parties in the region are currently the only electorally successful parties that openly propose anything more than incremental changes to the welfare state.
One of the most striking problems that stalks Nordic welfare system is ever-increasing number of aged people that are legible to collect their pensions. Whilst this is not a problem limited specifically to Scandinavia, the situation is amplified several times by the fact that the region not only has the highest life expectancy rates of any countries in the world but that they also sport some of the largest and most liberal pension payouts per head.
The World Bank have dubbed this upcoming global problem as the ‘Old Age Crisis’ and has published a detailed report on how best to handle the scenario. [x] The report showed that Sweden was already at a disadvantage with the world’s highest percentage of pensioners in the population in 1990 (23%, with the world average sitting at a significantly lower 10%). The CSIS published a similar, but updated, paper in 2002. [xi] Whilst this newer report does not suggest any solutions as such, it does highlight that Norway and Sweden have began taking active measures to slow the rate of pension-related stress on their GDP expenditure, with the later initiating tax incentives for people who rely on private employer pensions.
A second problem presented to the region, and in particular the metropolitan countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, is that of membership with The European Union. This problem is two fold in that the countries not only had to adapt to initially join the union, but that ensuing expansions of the European Union would also add to yet more financial burdens. To contextualise this problem, it is interesting to see that the Social Democrats – synonymous with the region and welfare – were the only mainstream political party that showed signs of Euro-scepticism. [xii] The main concern was that entrance to the E.U. with possibility of further deepening and broadening could endanger the principals of domestic welfare.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the Swedish Social Democrats also claimed that membership would disgrace the country’s lengthy reputation of international neutrality. However the government finally applied for membership in 1990. One must not rule out the decision of the Social Democrats to sustain this argument, for decades after Danish and Norwegian entrances to the E.U. and E.F.T.A. respectively, as a cunning way of ensuring electoral success by using the aforementioned electoral popularity of politicising the welfare state.
Having to support the needs of the further ten central and eastern European struggling states is an extensive task for the European Union as a whole. Immediately after the collapse of communism these nations stated their intentions of a ‘return to Europe’ with a specific emphasis on the economic aspects. Most of these ‘new European’ countries are still struggling in the aftermath of a gigantic increase in poverty related to the collapse of the USSR. Between 1987 and 1994 Estonia (a 2004 entrant) showed a poverty level jump from 1% to 34% and Romania (set for 2007 admission) displayed an 800% jump from 6% to 48% of their population living in poverty.[xiii] Whilst the differences were not quite as drastic by the time these countries entered the E.U. there was still a clearly divisible poverty gap.
A brand new report into the spending on displaced refugees throughout the capitalised world highlighted the European Union’s solution to the growing problem. [xiv] Whilst the E.U. strategy involves the burden sharing of three main pillars – policy, money and actual refugees – the report show’s the amongst the most successful economies in the world it is the smaller nations that are carrying the largest responsibilities. The only two countries in the world that pay a higher percentage of their GDP towards funding refugee protection are the Netherlands and Switzerland.
Another noteworthy set of statistics is Anders Widfeldt’s yearly review of the changes in Sweden.[xv] He comments on a gradual slowing down of the national economy, and an increase in the numbers of unemployed Swedes. Whilst these drops and rises are nowhere near as significant as the values at the time of Sweden’s ‘crisis’ they still demonstrate the fiscal burden being generated within the state. This paradox of a decreasing economy and increasing unemployment highlights the need for a change in the nature of Swedish welfare (and might echo changes across the region if the Swedish way is still to be believed to epitomise the Nordic model).
The above statistics highlight the growing concerns that the Scandinavian welfare states are facing high levels pressure from within their own domestic spheres through forms of increased levels of unemployment, higher pension demands and a fluctuating economy. On top of this there are also some International problems with the expansion of the European Union and the cost of refugee protection, which adds an even greater strain on national expenditure.
Proposed Solutions.
There are several suggested routes down which the Nordic welfare model can venture. One of the most and topical proposals at the moment is put forward by one of the main contributors of reading on the region, Gøsta Esping-Andersen. [xvi] His supposition suggests that in the light of the economies slowly grinding to a stand still, Nordic nations are at a crossroad between liberalising private services, thus creating wage inequalities or actually keeping a degree of wage equality in workplaces and risking higher levels of unemployment.
The nature of the Norwegian welfare state, heavily influenced by the presence of “business elites” [xvii] has led to a recent development. Although these important decision-makers are from privileged backgrounds, such as civil servants and judges, they still predominantly support the existing welfare system. With the support of interest groups and mass public opinion also in line with these business elites a new theory has developed that there will be problems within the governments of Scandinavia regarding the welfare state long before any gaps appear in the public opinion.
However, if one observes the track record of the Nordic welfare state since it has matured over the last sixty or so years it is clear to see that it is one of the more durable aspects of anything associated with the Nordic group of countries. Even though it had reached its absolute limits of expansion and was teetering on the verge of a total collapse it still managed to evolve and provide yet more solutions to new problems. This is also fascinating because all countries have so much belief in the system that they waited until the situation of recession hit a ‘crisis’ level before any changes are made.
Unlike the other notable aspects such as the party system, which experienced a radical alteration in the 1970’s, the Scandinavian welfare system has not seen any such drastic change, and even what little change there has been it has manifested itself in the form of cut backs, in a more incremental fashion.
Closing Assertion & Proposed Hypothesis.
In the course of this essay I have shown that there is definitely a distinctive Nordic model of welfare that goes hand in hand with the policies of social democracy. This model’s distinct features include a commitment to full employment, equal and high standards of living for all citizens, substantial pension rates and high wage replacement benefits. It is also true that although the current welfare state is not as munificent as it has been in recent decades, Nordic countries still have some of the highest levels of welfare.
I have also emphasised that the Nordic states are currently under a great deal of stress from both domestic and international pressures. The domestic tensions vary from an increase in the number of the unemployed claiming benefits and the rising number of citizens that have reached the pensionable age whereas international anxiety presents itself in the form of the European Union and the unequal distribution of refugee protection.
Hypothesis:
Change of the Scandinavian welfare state is indisputable because if the situation continues to cruise along its current course on autopilot the upcoming generation of middle-aged, post war ‘baby-boomers’ making the transition to pensionable citizens alone will be enough to make the entire system collapse under the domestic pressures within the next decade or so. However, much like the previous unemployment situations that confronted the region in the 1980’s and 1990’s, I believe that governments will wait until the conditions hit the ‘crisis’ level before adapting any new policies because they believe in the efficiency of their system.
Under these circumstances my conjecture is that the mechanics of the Nordic welfare state will have to undergo some changes in order to keep the public opinion, which is unquestionably in favour of the system, towards that of the government in any country at any time. Whether this means countries will have to unveil new “tax reforms of this century” or adapt a tiered approach with several moderate reforms will be down to the individual governments, but I do feel that governments might have to risk some unpopular decisions amongst the voters if they are to keep a recognisable version of the Scandinavian welfare system for future generations.
Word Count: 3,142
[i] Castles, Francis Geoffrey. “The future of the welfare state: crisis myths and crisis realities”
Oxford University Press, 2004. Page 171.
[ii] Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. “The three worlds of welfare capitalism”. Cambridge. Polity Press.
1990. Page 167.
[iii] Stephens, John D. “The Scandinavian Welfare States: Achievements, Crisis and Prospects”. In Book: “Welfare States In Transition”. Ed. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. Sage Publications. 1996. Page 52.
[iv] Ibid. Pages 34, 54 & 53 respectively.
[v] Goul Andersen, Jørgen.. “Europe’s New State Of Welfare: Unemployment, Employment Policies
and Citizenship”. Policy Press. 2002. Page 54
[vi] Kautto, Mikko. “Nordic States in a European Context’. New York. Routledge. 2001. Page 6.
[vii] Boje, Thomas. “Scandinavia in a New Europe”. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1993. Page47
[viii] Pierson, Paul. “New Politics of the Welfare State”. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 2001 Page 413.
[ix] News Story: “Swedish Left Wins Re-Election”. 16th September 2002. Accessed from site: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2255843.stm
Date: 9th May 2006.
[x] The World Bank. “Averting the Old Age Crisis”. Oxford University Press. 1994. Page 33. Accessed from: Click
Date: 5th May 2006.
[xi] Centre for Strategic and International Studies. “The Global Retirement Crisis”. Washington DC. April 2002. Page 38. Accessed from: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/global_retirement.pdf Date: 3rd May 2006.
[xii] Sitter, Nick. “The Politics of Opposition and European Integration”. West European Politics. Vol. 24. No. 4. Pages 22-39. October 2001.
[xiii] Wagner, Hans-Júrgen. “The Welfare State in Transition Economies and Acension to the E.U”.
West European Politics. Vol 25. No. 2. April 2002.
[xiv] Dewan, Torun. “The Myth of Free-Riding: Refugee Protection and Implicit Burden-Sharing”.
West European Politics. Vol. 29. No. 2. Pages 351-369. March 2006.
[xv] Widfeldt, Anders. “Sweden”. (A yearly review). European Journal of Political Research.
Vol. 43. No. 7-8. Pages 1144-1150. December 2004.
[xvi] Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. “Why we need a new welfare state”. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
Page 185.
[xvii] Gulbrandsen, Trygve. “Elite Consensus on the Norwegian Welfare Model”. West European
Politics. Vol. 28. No. 4. Pages 898-918. September 2005.
Introduction:
In recent decades the international portrait that has been painted of the Nordic welfare state has been somewhat caricatured, with the prevailing notions that the state provides facilities of almost every nature, with near 100% income replacement levels for those who require it and free provision of all the essential social and healthcare services. This essay intends to first explore whether a ‘Scandinavian’ style of welfare does indeed exist, and if so, what the main features of such a system are. The main body of this paper will focus on the elements that confront the Nordic welfare states, and if there are any possible solutions to these threats. In the conclusion I intend to summarise the findings of my research and create a hypothesis for the future of welfare in the Nordic region.
A Nordic Model?
Before diving in at the deep end and assessing the current challenges facing the welfare models of the Nordic countries it first is necessary get our feet wet in with a succinct outline and understanding of the brief history and key features of the Nordic welfare state.
If one were to guess the nature of welfare using only stereotypes and reputation, the foremost assumption would be that the Nordic (Scandinavian) states have a very distinct and substantial welfare system when contrasted with other countries worldwide. This, in reality, is true; Francis Castles goes as far as to talk about “Intra-Scandinavian convergence tendencies” [i] when assessing change in welfare policies amongst ‘clusters’ of nations throughout the world. There are several reasons for the emergence of the Scandinavian (or indeed Anglo-Saxon or Mediterranean) welfare systems. These regional differences are the cause of many effects from a shared common history to the specific needs or politics of any given area. One other key aspect to the evolution of a specific cluster of welfare states is that the economies of these Nordic states are all very similar. The countries all have relatively small, but open, markets with large export sections which in turn bring high capital mobility.
The next step away from the shallow end of our Scandinavian swimming pool is to highlight the distinctive features of this established ‘Scandinavian Welfare’ model; however it would make more sense explain the current traits by using history and how the welfare model evolved into what it is today.
Firstly, and perhaps the single most important reason for Scandinavia having such a distinguishable welfare style is the dominance of Social Democracy. However, to give the Social Democratic political parties all of the glory would be slightly unfair because although they have governed as a single-party minority, they also used a variety of coalition types to enter the government. From as early as the 1930’s they have been able to find their way into approximately 90% of the Nordic governments and have slowly moulded an undivided opinion amongst Scandinavian citizens – especially in Sweden and Norway – that a high-tax, strong welfare state is the best way forward. The prevalence of strong, united Trade Unions[ii] and a general lack of credible political alternatives (except in Denmark where a sizeable Conservative party did emerge) meant that, as policy makers, the Social Democrats were for the most part of the last century in the ‘driving seat’.
With a common goal amongst most politicians in the Nordic countries the parties began piecing together the foundations of their welfare state with the introduction of pensions and benefits in the 1940s and 1950s to ensure there was a reasonable standard of living. These aspects were strengthened and expanded in subsequent decades whilst the dice of economic fortune rolled in favour of the Scandinavian markets and the countries saw a steady increase in employment with remarkably low levels of inflation. This period very much brought around the beginning of the distinct institutional nature of the Nordic model. However, the oil crises of the 1970’s were the first sings that the Nordic countries were in about to encounter some turbulence. Recession climaxed in the late 1980’s / early 1990’s with a dramatic effect on the direction of Scandinavian welfare.
Whilst the other Nordic countries began to suffer unemployment on a previously unthinkable scale, Norway - with its vast revenue from national oil - was the only country that managed to avoid this situation and also got by without announcing any welfare cutbacks. [iii] The other Scandinavian countries however were not as fortunate; the Swedes suffered a currency devaluation of 16% in a single year (on top of the previous years’ 10%); the Danes experienced a new unemployment high of 11.3% in 1992; and the Finns underwent an all-time unemployment high of 17% in 1991. [iv]
Several different methods were tried out by the countries in order to recover from such distressing fluctuations such as Sweden unveiling the comprehensive “tax reform of the century” with some extensive cutbacks in the public sector. Denmark on the other hand opted for a more active approach of new labour-market policies. [v] Another significant detail to note about the ‘bouncing back’ of the Scandinavian models is that even after some drastic changes to the fundamental organisation of the redistribution of welfare - and the taxation of capital to support it - none of the countries had broken away from the ‘Nordic model’ per-se.
Although the current welfare states are definitely less generous than they have been for previous generations, the stereotype of Scandinavian states taking care of their citizens from the womb-to-the-tomb is not an entirely false statement. Whilst there are minor differences in rates and income coverage between the nations the Nordic countries are generally recognised as having three main characteristics. [vi] The first trait is a broad scope of public and social policy with a commitment to full employment and an active labour market. The main reason for this is that with more people working, the government receives more funding for the welfare system though the high tax levels, which is redistributed directly back into society in several different ways.Another feature that links the Nordic welfare states is a universal flat-rate basic security, on an earnings related basis. This ‘insurance’ is only given to citizens who find themselves off for work a variety of reasons from unemployment to maternal or paternal leave. The percentage of a persons wage replacement differs from approximately 50% to 80% depending on the country and their occupation, however these rates are still amongst the most charitable in the world. The third attribute of the Nordic welfare state is the local, publicly funded provisions. The most common example of these are the childcare centres which are not just heavily used by parents but also responsible for the creation of thousands of jobs, especially amongst women, with the almost comical situation of a mother dropping her child off in one centre, then going to work in another. It is because of initiatives like this that region is also noted as having the world’s highest gender wage equality and gender employment levels.
To fund such high levels of public expenditure the Nordic countries have also become synonymous with some of the highest tax levels in the world. In 1998 Norwegians saw 48% of their total earnings go straight back to their government, Danes had a higher figure of 52% and the Swedes saw a staggering 55% of their income deducted through various taxes. [vii] As extreme as these figures may sound, especially when compared to more conservative tax levels in other welfare models, against the backdrop of such a substantial welfare state, Swedish citizens can still afford to live amongst some of the highest standards in the world with only 45% of their full wage.
Threats to the current Nordic welfare state.
And so we arrive at the deep end of the pool where, despite the relatively successful comeback of the Nordic welfare state with regards to unemployment and malfunctioning economies in previous decades, there are still several substantial challenges looming on the horizon that will push the limits of the already extensive coverage enjoyed by many Scandinavians.
Some of these new challenges will require changes to be made in the in the workings of the welfare system if it is to ensure it survives in tomorrow’s world. This is where the fundamental problem of the challenges starts because most Scandinavians grew up pleased, content and even proud of their unique system. The ramification of this is that public opinion hangs predominantly in favour of preserving the status quo. This attachment of the voters to the system has been written about by Paul Pierson[viii] who states that welfare supporters in Scandinavia are able to effectively fight to sustain their existing benefits, through the previously mentioned trade unions and high levels of democracy.This is a very logical argument, much in the same vein as the FPTP elected government changing the electoral system to a PR scenario, in that it would be irrational for a Scandinavian voter to shooting themselves in the foot. It would then make no sense for the electorate in any of the Nordic countries to support a party who would promote radical cut backs and reforms in the welfare sector. In 2002 Goeran Persson successfully demolished all opposition and saw himself re-elected as the Swedish Prime Minister with a campaign that primarily focused on protecting the country’s welfare system. [ix]. The magnitude of the victory (a gap of over 1 million - 20% - of the votes) is a good indicator not just at how successful Social Democracy still is, but also at how big an issue the survival of the welfare state is in an election. In line with the grain of history the Conservative parties in the region are currently the only electorally successful parties that openly propose anything more than incremental changes to the welfare state.
One of the most striking problems that stalks Nordic welfare system is ever-increasing number of aged people that are legible to collect their pensions. Whilst this is not a problem limited specifically to Scandinavia, the situation is amplified several times by the fact that the region not only has the highest life expectancy rates of any countries in the world but that they also sport some of the largest and most liberal pension payouts per head.
The World Bank have dubbed this upcoming global problem as the ‘Old Age Crisis’ and has published a detailed report on how best to handle the scenario. [x] The report showed that Sweden was already at a disadvantage with the world’s highest percentage of pensioners in the population in 1990 (23%, with the world average sitting at a significantly lower 10%). The CSIS published a similar, but updated, paper in 2002. [xi] Whilst this newer report does not suggest any solutions as such, it does highlight that Norway and Sweden have began taking active measures to slow the rate of pension-related stress on their GDP expenditure, with the later initiating tax incentives for people who rely on private employer pensions.
A second problem presented to the region, and in particular the metropolitan countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, is that of membership with The European Union. This problem is two fold in that the countries not only had to adapt to initially join the union, but that ensuing expansions of the European Union would also add to yet more financial burdens. To contextualise this problem, it is interesting to see that the Social Democrats – synonymous with the region and welfare – were the only mainstream political party that showed signs of Euro-scepticism. [xii] The main concern was that entrance to the E.U. with possibility of further deepening and broadening could endanger the principals of domestic welfare.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the Swedish Social Democrats also claimed that membership would disgrace the country’s lengthy reputation of international neutrality. However the government finally applied for membership in 1990. One must not rule out the decision of the Social Democrats to sustain this argument, for decades after Danish and Norwegian entrances to the E.U. and E.F.T.A. respectively, as a cunning way of ensuring electoral success by using the aforementioned electoral popularity of politicising the welfare state.
Having to support the needs of the further ten central and eastern European struggling states is an extensive task for the European Union as a whole. Immediately after the collapse of communism these nations stated their intentions of a ‘return to Europe’ with a specific emphasis on the economic aspects. Most of these ‘new European’ countries are still struggling in the aftermath of a gigantic increase in poverty related to the collapse of the USSR. Between 1987 and 1994 Estonia (a 2004 entrant) showed a poverty level jump from 1% to 34% and Romania (set for 2007 admission) displayed an 800% jump from 6% to 48% of their population living in poverty.[xiii] Whilst the differences were not quite as drastic by the time these countries entered the E.U. there was still a clearly divisible poverty gap.
A brand new report into the spending on displaced refugees throughout the capitalised world highlighted the European Union’s solution to the growing problem. [xiv] Whilst the E.U. strategy involves the burden sharing of three main pillars – policy, money and actual refugees – the report show’s the amongst the most successful economies in the world it is the smaller nations that are carrying the largest responsibilities. The only two countries in the world that pay a higher percentage of their GDP towards funding refugee protection are the Netherlands and Switzerland.
Another noteworthy set of statistics is Anders Widfeldt’s yearly review of the changes in Sweden.[xv] He comments on a gradual slowing down of the national economy, and an increase in the numbers of unemployed Swedes. Whilst these drops and rises are nowhere near as significant as the values at the time of Sweden’s ‘crisis’ they still demonstrate the fiscal burden being generated within the state. This paradox of a decreasing economy and increasing unemployment highlights the need for a change in the nature of Swedish welfare (and might echo changes across the region if the Swedish way is still to be believed to epitomise the Nordic model).
The above statistics highlight the growing concerns that the Scandinavian welfare states are facing high levels pressure from within their own domestic spheres through forms of increased levels of unemployment, higher pension demands and a fluctuating economy. On top of this there are also some International problems with the expansion of the European Union and the cost of refugee protection, which adds an even greater strain on national expenditure.
Proposed Solutions.
There are several suggested routes down which the Nordic welfare model can venture. One of the most and topical proposals at the moment is put forward by one of the main contributors of reading on the region, Gøsta Esping-Andersen. [xvi] His supposition suggests that in the light of the economies slowly grinding to a stand still, Nordic nations are at a crossroad between liberalising private services, thus creating wage inequalities or actually keeping a degree of wage equality in workplaces and risking higher levels of unemployment.
The nature of the Norwegian welfare state, heavily influenced by the presence of “business elites” [xvii] has led to a recent development. Although these important decision-makers are from privileged backgrounds, such as civil servants and judges, they still predominantly support the existing welfare system. With the support of interest groups and mass public opinion also in line with these business elites a new theory has developed that there will be problems within the governments of Scandinavia regarding the welfare state long before any gaps appear in the public opinion.
However, if one observes the track record of the Nordic welfare state since it has matured over the last sixty or so years it is clear to see that it is one of the more durable aspects of anything associated with the Nordic group of countries. Even though it had reached its absolute limits of expansion and was teetering on the verge of a total collapse it still managed to evolve and provide yet more solutions to new problems. This is also fascinating because all countries have so much belief in the system that they waited until the situation of recession hit a ‘crisis’ level before any changes are made.
Unlike the other notable aspects such as the party system, which experienced a radical alteration in the 1970’s, the Scandinavian welfare system has not seen any such drastic change, and even what little change there has been it has manifested itself in the form of cut backs, in a more incremental fashion.
Closing Assertion & Proposed Hypothesis.
In the course of this essay I have shown that there is definitely a distinctive Nordic model of welfare that goes hand in hand with the policies of social democracy. This model’s distinct features include a commitment to full employment, equal and high standards of living for all citizens, substantial pension rates and high wage replacement benefits. It is also true that although the current welfare state is not as munificent as it has been in recent decades, Nordic countries still have some of the highest levels of welfare.
I have also emphasised that the Nordic states are currently under a great deal of stress from both domestic and international pressures. The domestic tensions vary from an increase in the number of the unemployed claiming benefits and the rising number of citizens that have reached the pensionable age whereas international anxiety presents itself in the form of the European Union and the unequal distribution of refugee protection.
Hypothesis:
Change of the Scandinavian welfare state is indisputable because if the situation continues to cruise along its current course on autopilot the upcoming generation of middle-aged, post war ‘baby-boomers’ making the transition to pensionable citizens alone will be enough to make the entire system collapse under the domestic pressures within the next decade or so. However, much like the previous unemployment situations that confronted the region in the 1980’s and 1990’s, I believe that governments will wait until the conditions hit the ‘crisis’ level before adapting any new policies because they believe in the efficiency of their system.
Under these circumstances my conjecture is that the mechanics of the Nordic welfare state will have to undergo some changes in order to keep the public opinion, which is unquestionably in favour of the system, towards that of the government in any country at any time. Whether this means countries will have to unveil new “tax reforms of this century” or adapt a tiered approach with several moderate reforms will be down to the individual governments, but I do feel that governments might have to risk some unpopular decisions amongst the voters if they are to keep a recognisable version of the Scandinavian welfare system for future generations.
Word Count: 3,142
[i] Castles, Francis Geoffrey. “The future of the welfare state: crisis myths and crisis realities”
Oxford University Press, 2004. Page 171.
[ii] Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. “The three worlds of welfare capitalism”. Cambridge. Polity Press.
1990. Page 167.
[iii] Stephens, John D. “The Scandinavian Welfare States: Achievements, Crisis and Prospects”. In Book: “Welfare States In Transition”. Ed. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. Sage Publications. 1996. Page 52.
[iv] Ibid. Pages 34, 54 & 53 respectively.
[v] Goul Andersen, Jørgen.. “Europe’s New State Of Welfare: Unemployment, Employment Policies
and Citizenship”. Policy Press. 2002. Page 54
[vi] Kautto, Mikko. “Nordic States in a European Context’. New York. Routledge. 2001. Page 6.
[vii] Boje, Thomas. “Scandinavia in a New Europe”. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1993. Page47
[viii] Pierson, Paul. “New Politics of the Welfare State”. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 2001 Page 413.
[ix] News Story: “Swedish Left Wins Re-Election”. 16th September 2002. Accessed from site: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2255843.stm
Date: 9th May 2006.
[x] The World Bank. “Averting the Old Age Crisis”. Oxford University Press. 1994. Page 33. Accessed from: Click
Date: 5th May 2006.
[xi] Centre for Strategic and International Studies. “The Global Retirement Crisis”. Washington DC. April 2002. Page 38. Accessed from: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/global_retirement.pdf Date: 3rd May 2006.
[xii] Sitter, Nick. “The Politics of Opposition and European Integration”. West European Politics. Vol. 24. No. 4. Pages 22-39. October 2001.
[xiii] Wagner, Hans-Júrgen. “The Welfare State in Transition Economies and Acension to the E.U”.
West European Politics. Vol 25. No. 2. April 2002.
[xiv] Dewan, Torun. “The Myth of Free-Riding: Refugee Protection and Implicit Burden-Sharing”.
West European Politics. Vol. 29. No. 2. Pages 351-369. March 2006.
[xv] Widfeldt, Anders. “Sweden”. (A yearly review). European Journal of Political Research.
Vol. 43. No. 7-8. Pages 1144-1150. December 2004.
[xvi] Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. “Why we need a new welfare state”. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
Page 185.
[xvii] Gulbrandsen, Trygve. “Elite Consensus on the Norwegian Welfare Model”. West European
Politics. Vol. 28. No. 4. Pages 898-918. September 2005.
Thursday, May 04, 2006
P & I.R. End of History?
Was there ever an End of 'History'?
“I believe that in the end I remain right: modernity is a very powerful freight train that will not be derailed by recent events, however painful. Democracy and free markets will continue to expand as the dominant organising principles for much of the world.” [i]
Francis Fukuyama
One month after 9/11
Ever since the publication of his original article ‘The End of History?’ American born philosopher Francis Fukuyama has been at the centre of a relatively unnecessary yet ongoing debate as to whether his original and most famous hypothesis is actually feasible or just another radical piece of academic fiction.
The main misunderstanding that readers gather from the article – and later published book titled ‘The End of History and the Last Man’ – is they think that the End of History can only be possible if everything immediately backs down and surrenders to both capitalism and liberal democracy, this however is not the case. Fukuyama makes it very clear in the first part of the proper book that there is a clear definition between ‘history’ and ‘events’. The above quote encapsulates his stance perfectly because even though he recognises that the events of September 11th 2001 were tragic, they still have very little effect on the progression of the western style economy and democracy and if one was to gamble on the outcome it has more than encouraged the spread of Liberal Democracy.
Here lies the biggest problem in assessing whether or not there has been an end of history since Fukuyama’s paper was published. His differentiation between ‘events’ and ‘history’ as previously stated means that he can dismiss most of the opposition he gets by stating that it is merely a single blip or ‘event’ that goes against the idea of his theory. It is very true that comparatively speaking, although a span of twenty years is a long time in one’s life, when put in the context of human history it is a very short slot.
To get around this problem I intend to look at what little, credible, cited evidence there has been in attempts to either prove or disprove the theory, and to measure the effects of these over the course of the last twenty or so years. I will conclude this paper with my own belief of whether or not we have indeed reached the notorious End of History, or if not, how far along the process we are at the moment.
The Hard Evidence.
Despite the volume of criticism and negativity that emerged when the theory was initially released almost twenty years later there is some strong evidence that can verify, at least parts of, Fukuyama’s theory.
Throughout the book Fukuyama deliberately conflicts his notion of history coming to an end against that of Karl Marx’s original concept. The historical materialists believe that history would come to an end in a “communist utopia” [ii] in which societies infamous dialect between the master and the slave would be eradicated, forming the perfect egalitarian and classless society. Fukuyama however believes that this eventuality can only realistically take place in a liberal democracy[iii]. Again, this spread of liberal democracy is the key aspect of the texts.
One source that authenticates the End of History theory is the Freedom House organisation. According to their official statistics the total number of ‘free’ countries has more then doubled from 1975 to 2005; from 40 countries to 89 respectively. Also, when Fukuyama’s paper was first published in 1989 only 69 countries were official democracies. Today, the number of governments decided in ‘electoral democracies’ stands at a far more impressive 122.[iv] This is hard evidence goes a long way in backing up what Fukuyama originally hypothesised about the spread of western liberal democracy.
Another set of statistics in a similar vein is that many of the former soviet countries, after the collapse of communism, successfully managed to increase their levels of freedom and democracy. Using the ‘Comparative Freedom Rankings’[v] scale (7 being the least free and 1 being the most) it’s easy to see how countries such as Latvia, Bulgaria and Lithuania have managed to embrace the democratic values of the west. Estonia currently stands sits on a rating of 1, which is a phenomenal achievement after having only regained its full independence in 1991.
Because the selected countries have all applied for and been subsequently approved of membership to the European Union it must be brought into question as to how much of an influence the Copenhagen Criteria was in these countries transition to democracies. This argument can also be brought up in the global context, with the suggestion that liberal democracy has only been so readily accepted because of the west’s strength and influence. Yet, regardless of the reasons for change within these sovereign states, the fact is that the empirical figures of the countries that have accepted electoral democracies and the idea of the free market economy definitely support Fukuyama’s proposed conjecture..
Two Green Problems.
However, further examination of the freedom ranking figures highlights a clear dividing line between the former soviet countries located in and near Eastern Europe, and those situated in the continent of Asia. The states of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have all shown plummets in their freedom ratings from 1991 through to 2005 with the later showing the worst score possible, a freedom rating of seven.
It is not without a sense of irony that when understanding the threat from these states, that it was partly created from the successful progression of liberal democracy to all ends of the globe. Several authors describe in detail how the influence of the western - secular - powers eclipsed Islam and that it could only survive if it incorporated elements of totalitarianism to keep the younger generation from completely losing interest in what was becoming a comparatively dated and stagnant system of governance.
“What began as an ideological current became an extreme, radical political movement” [vi]
-Youssef M. Choueiri
The rapid rise and strength of the Islamic Fundamentalist movement, often nicknamed the ‘green pearl’, has undoubtedly been one of the largest counter-arguments regarding the End of History thesis, especially since it burst into the global limelight in 2001. This growing menace has also taken the form of a new kind of threat due to the very volatile and broad spectrum of people that are represented under the very lose term.
Inherent behavioural traits of an Islamic political faction can differ greatly depending on the circumstances. When there is room for political negotiation Islam can take the shape of a moderating and reforming movement, however when this political space is blocked it can develop into a radical and destructive force. [vii] It is unfortunately this volatile nature of the Islamic political groups and the tiny minority of extremists who resort to physical violence or terror that appear to be leaving a negative mark on western society. Recent publication of the already infamous Muhammad cartoons is the perfect illustration of the radical side of Islamic politics and the clash between the values of the east and the west regarding freedom of the press.
The Cold War is seen as the faultless personification of a battle between two conflicting ideologies and economic systems, however the so-called ‘green threat’ of Islam pushes this even further, into previously un-marked territory, with the addition of religion. The emergence of Islamic Fundamentalism has also drawn the emphasis away from the traditional Realist concept of inter-state actions because there is no longer a single state that can be held responsible for any actions made in the name of Islam; it also adds another dimension to the ‘classical’ equation.
The overall problem with classifying Islamic Fundamentalism as a factor that disproves the End of History is that although its presence, especially in the more violent and unstable manifestations, can pose a threat to the immediate physical security of people living in the west, it has yet to be proven as a viable alternative to a capitalist democracy. It has a very low appeal to people raised elsewhere in the world and due to it’s totalitarian nature can be easily discredited, much in the same way as all the previous ‘alternatives’ to a liberal democracy.
Ecologists put forward the second significant argument that runs against the grain of Fukuyama’s hypothesis. The main reason for them doubting the ‘End of History’ is that they believe as capitalism spreads, especially when mixed with an increasing population, it will eventually collide with Earth’s natural restrictions, forcing a drastic change of policy from the west. Michael Parkin has already noted, “Economic activity directly influences the quality of the environment”.[viii] Examples he uses are the depletion of non-renewable resources, clearing of forests and the pollution of lakes and rivers amongst others.
Other Environmentalists have taken a more direct line and directly criticised Fukuyama’s writings. One such academic is Michael Carley who argues that the End of History merges Capitalism with Consumerism and Liberal Democracy and simply assumes the inevitability of the entire package. Carley contends that an economic system, value system and political ideology are entirely separate and makes the rational claim that capitalism has “no inherent dependence or affinity with political freedom”[ix]
The exponential rate at which the global population is expanding is a serious contributor that – in the long run – could be the single biggest threat to Fukuyama’s vision of a democratic utopia. In china alone 8.5 million hectares of farmland are being lost every year to the construction industry and the annual income per head has doubled in approximately ten years. [x] This is reached in the UK only every 60 years. Losing so much farming and agricultural land every year to accommodate for an increasing population is interesting predicament because it appears to be burning the candle at both ends.
Whilst these sound like logical arguments they do not appear to have been properly addressed by Fukuyama, nor have they been given much praise from anybody outside the traditional Green movement. Since these valid points have been relatively overlooked there is definitely a possibility of an interesting contingency plan in several decades time that could see food shortages and starvation jump over from the borders of what might be left of the third world and into an overly-populated ‘developed’ world that can’t support the saddle of it’s own success.
The End Of… Realism?
Another important aspect that is rarely brought forward when discussing ‘The End Of History?’ and the subsequent book is the era in with Fukuyama was raised and educated in. Born in 1952, a mere five years after the significant primary events of the Cold War began, Fukuyama would have been growing up and moulded in a time where the battle between communism and capitalism was the biggest factor in every level of politics. By the time he had reached university age Fukuyama would have lived through and studied key cold war events such as the ‘Bay Of Pigs’, ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ and ‘Strategic Arms Limitation Talks’[xi] in the same, if not greater, depth as today’s generation studies the Berlin Wall and Iraq invasion.
The main point being that Fukuyama grew up in an era that was dominated and defined by the Cold War, and that once it showed signs of drawing to an end everybody could only hypothesise as to what changes this would bring to International society in the so called ‘New World Order’. Due to the vacuum of the post Cold War political climate many different theories emerged, although I believe the spotlight shone brightest on Fukuyama’s theory because it was released just before the fall of the Berlin Wall, an image that has become synonymous with the triumph of liberal democracy over the discredited communism. With the lessening importance of traditional Realist traits in the international system such as restraints on the use of force in world politics, dramatic improvements in peace building and peace making, the phenomenon of collective security and limitations of sovereignty all looming on the horizon it can be almost understandable why others could have taken the wrong idea from the book.
Another interesting aspect about the timeframe in which Fukuyama released his famous theory was that – in a similar style to Huntington – the title of the published book differed to that of the original article. In 1989 the article title was 'The End of History?’. However by the time the full-length book was published the title had been changed to 'The End of History and the Last Man'. With the removal of the question mark we must assume that Fukuyama believed his hypothesis was in the at least in the process of beginning. With the notion of the 'Last Man' being placed at the end, we also know that Fukuyama drew greatly from 19th century thinker Friedrich Nietzsche, who originally coined the term. It is also interesting to note that in the second half of the book, dedicated to the idea of the pessimistic last man, Fukuyama does not endorse the theory at all, but simply views it as an inevitability.
Fukuyama himself has made it no secret that he is still a firm believer and dedicated supporter of liberal democracy. Being one of the key members of the ‘Project for the New American Century’ think tank he made a public recommendation that President Clinton should overthrow Saddam Hussein in 1998 [xii] and participated in a similar letter after the 9/11 attacks on America.[xiii] These actions clearly show that Fukuyama still views his country as the predominant defender and promoter of liberal values, and free democracy.
Closing premise.
Overall, the concept of the End of History is very fascinating, even though it’s neither new nor completely original. As a mark of how intelligent he is, Fukuyama managed to let himself off lightly by being very ambiguous. There is no mention of a specific timescale in which history will effectively end, and it is true that no matter what happens in the international sphere, short of the United States crumbling overnight, Fukuyama would be able to pass it off as an ‘event’. The only risk he actually appears to have taken would be that nothing overly drastic changes in the international field of politics.
With the fall of the USSR in the epic battle for the title of undisputed superpower and no other contender with the capabilities to challenge America it would appear that in the foreseeable future the chance of a fresh interstate conflict between two of the smallest ever number of non-democracies is as slim as ever. However, in saying all of this I too would be inclined to hop on the bandwagon because after the fall of fascism, communism and so forth, no other ideology has risen to the task of providing a credible alternative to the current status quo. Coupled this with the hard fact that non-democracies are becoming more of a collector’s item and it would seem like a pretty good bet that nothing will go too wrong.
Finally, as I showed earlier in this paper, the only real challenge to liberal democracy at the moment comes from Islamic Fundamentalism, and even then, it is practically immeasurable at this point in time. The only question that remains to be answered once and for all is whether Huntington or Fukuyama was correct in their ‘solutions’ or answers for the post Cold War planet. As with many other things in the world, only time can tell, but to answer the question in today’s world, it would be a very strong statement to say that history has drawn to a close given the way in which foreign policy is pointing all most democratic countries towards Asia. Personally, I don’t think anybody will know until the outcome of the feud between the Middle East and the Democratic West, although I think everybody knows who Fukuyama is rooting for.
Word Count: 2,648.
Endnotes:
[i] ‘The West has won’. The Guardian Newspaper. Francis Fukuyama. 11th October 2001.
Accessed from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,567333,00.html Date: 1st May 2006.
[ii] Francis Fukuyama, “The End Of History?”. ‘The National Interest’, Summer, 1989. Page 2. Accessed from: http://www.marion.ohio-state.edu/fac/vsteffel/web597/Fukuyama_history.pdf Date: 24th April 2006.
[iii] Fukuyama, Francis. “The end of history and the last man” London : Penguin, 1992
Page 118
[iv] ‘Freedom in the World 2006’. Freedom House. Pages 3 & 5.
Accessed from: http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/Charts2006.pdf
Date: 27th April 2006.
[v] ‘Freedom in the World Comparative Rankings: 1973-2005’. Accessed from: http://65.110.85.181/uploads/FIWrank7305.xls
Date: May 1st 2006.
[vi] Choueiri, Youssef. “Islamic fundamentalism” London ; Washington, D.C. 1997.
Page 63.
[vii] Mawsilili, Ahmad. “Islamic Fundamentalism: myths and realities.” Reading: Ithaca, 1998.
Page 25.
[viii] Parkin, Michael “Economics” Boston; London: Addison-Wesley 2003 Page 446.
[ix] Carley, Michael. “Managing sustainable development”. London; Sterling : Earthscan, 2000.
Page 37.
[x] Ibid. Page 36.
[xi] Events taken from ‘The Cold War Museum’ online. Accessed from: http://www.coldwar.org Date: 20th April 2006.
[xii] ‘Letter To President Clinton On Iraq’. January 26th 1998. Accessed from: http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm
Date 19th April 2006
[xiii] ‘Letter to President Bush on the War On Terrorism’. September 20th 2001. Accessed From: http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm
“I believe that in the end I remain right: modernity is a very powerful freight train that will not be derailed by recent events, however painful. Democracy and free markets will continue to expand as the dominant organising principles for much of the world.” [i]
Francis Fukuyama
One month after 9/11
Ever since the publication of his original article ‘The End of History?’ American born philosopher Francis Fukuyama has been at the centre of a relatively unnecessary yet ongoing debate as to whether his original and most famous hypothesis is actually feasible or just another radical piece of academic fiction.
The main misunderstanding that readers gather from the article – and later published book titled ‘The End of History and the Last Man’ – is they think that the End of History can only be possible if everything immediately backs down and surrenders to both capitalism and liberal democracy, this however is not the case. Fukuyama makes it very clear in the first part of the proper book that there is a clear definition between ‘history’ and ‘events’. The above quote encapsulates his stance perfectly because even though he recognises that the events of September 11th 2001 were tragic, they still have very little effect on the progression of the western style economy and democracy and if one was to gamble on the outcome it has more than encouraged the spread of Liberal Democracy.
Here lies the biggest problem in assessing whether or not there has been an end of history since Fukuyama’s paper was published. His differentiation between ‘events’ and ‘history’ as previously stated means that he can dismiss most of the opposition he gets by stating that it is merely a single blip or ‘event’ that goes against the idea of his theory. It is very true that comparatively speaking, although a span of twenty years is a long time in one’s life, when put in the context of human history it is a very short slot.
To get around this problem I intend to look at what little, credible, cited evidence there has been in attempts to either prove or disprove the theory, and to measure the effects of these over the course of the last twenty or so years. I will conclude this paper with my own belief of whether or not we have indeed reached the notorious End of History, or if not, how far along the process we are at the moment.
The Hard Evidence.
Despite the volume of criticism and negativity that emerged when the theory was initially released almost twenty years later there is some strong evidence that can verify, at least parts of, Fukuyama’s theory.
Throughout the book Fukuyama deliberately conflicts his notion of history coming to an end against that of Karl Marx’s original concept. The historical materialists believe that history would come to an end in a “communist utopia” [ii] in which societies infamous dialect between the master and the slave would be eradicated, forming the perfect egalitarian and classless society. Fukuyama however believes that this eventuality can only realistically take place in a liberal democracy[iii]. Again, this spread of liberal democracy is the key aspect of the texts.
One source that authenticates the End of History theory is the Freedom House organisation. According to their official statistics the total number of ‘free’ countries has more then doubled from 1975 to 2005; from 40 countries to 89 respectively. Also, when Fukuyama’s paper was first published in 1989 only 69 countries were official democracies. Today, the number of governments decided in ‘electoral democracies’ stands at a far more impressive 122.[iv] This is hard evidence goes a long way in backing up what Fukuyama originally hypothesised about the spread of western liberal democracy.
Another set of statistics in a similar vein is that many of the former soviet countries, after the collapse of communism, successfully managed to increase their levels of freedom and democracy. Using the ‘Comparative Freedom Rankings’[v] scale (7 being the least free and 1 being the most) it’s easy to see how countries such as Latvia, Bulgaria and Lithuania have managed to embrace the democratic values of the west. Estonia currently stands sits on a rating of 1, which is a phenomenal achievement after having only regained its full independence in 1991.
Because the selected countries have all applied for and been subsequently approved of membership to the European Union it must be brought into question as to how much of an influence the Copenhagen Criteria was in these countries transition to democracies. This argument can also be brought up in the global context, with the suggestion that liberal democracy has only been so readily accepted because of the west’s strength and influence. Yet, regardless of the reasons for change within these sovereign states, the fact is that the empirical figures of the countries that have accepted electoral democracies and the idea of the free market economy definitely support Fukuyama’s proposed conjecture..
Two Green Problems.
However, further examination of the freedom ranking figures highlights a clear dividing line between the former soviet countries located in and near Eastern Europe, and those situated in the continent of Asia. The states of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have all shown plummets in their freedom ratings from 1991 through to 2005 with the later showing the worst score possible, a freedom rating of seven.
It is not without a sense of irony that when understanding the threat from these states, that it was partly created from the successful progression of liberal democracy to all ends of the globe. Several authors describe in detail how the influence of the western - secular - powers eclipsed Islam and that it could only survive if it incorporated elements of totalitarianism to keep the younger generation from completely losing interest in what was becoming a comparatively dated and stagnant system of governance.
“What began as an ideological current became an extreme, radical political movement” [vi]
-Youssef M. Choueiri
The rapid rise and strength of the Islamic Fundamentalist movement, often nicknamed the ‘green pearl’, has undoubtedly been one of the largest counter-arguments regarding the End of History thesis, especially since it burst into the global limelight in 2001. This growing menace has also taken the form of a new kind of threat due to the very volatile and broad spectrum of people that are represented under the very lose term.
Inherent behavioural traits of an Islamic political faction can differ greatly depending on the circumstances. When there is room for political negotiation Islam can take the shape of a moderating and reforming movement, however when this political space is blocked it can develop into a radical and destructive force. [vii] It is unfortunately this volatile nature of the Islamic political groups and the tiny minority of extremists who resort to physical violence or terror that appear to be leaving a negative mark on western society. Recent publication of the already infamous Muhammad cartoons is the perfect illustration of the radical side of Islamic politics and the clash between the values of the east and the west regarding freedom of the press.
The Cold War is seen as the faultless personification of a battle between two conflicting ideologies and economic systems, however the so-called ‘green threat’ of Islam pushes this even further, into previously un-marked territory, with the addition of religion. The emergence of Islamic Fundamentalism has also drawn the emphasis away from the traditional Realist concept of inter-state actions because there is no longer a single state that can be held responsible for any actions made in the name of Islam; it also adds another dimension to the ‘classical’ equation.
The overall problem with classifying Islamic Fundamentalism as a factor that disproves the End of History is that although its presence, especially in the more violent and unstable manifestations, can pose a threat to the immediate physical security of people living in the west, it has yet to be proven as a viable alternative to a capitalist democracy. It has a very low appeal to people raised elsewhere in the world and due to it’s totalitarian nature can be easily discredited, much in the same way as all the previous ‘alternatives’ to a liberal democracy.
Ecologists put forward the second significant argument that runs against the grain of Fukuyama’s hypothesis. The main reason for them doubting the ‘End of History’ is that they believe as capitalism spreads, especially when mixed with an increasing population, it will eventually collide with Earth’s natural restrictions, forcing a drastic change of policy from the west. Michael Parkin has already noted, “Economic activity directly influences the quality of the environment”.[viii] Examples he uses are the depletion of non-renewable resources, clearing of forests and the pollution of lakes and rivers amongst others.
Other Environmentalists have taken a more direct line and directly criticised Fukuyama’s writings. One such academic is Michael Carley who argues that the End of History merges Capitalism with Consumerism and Liberal Democracy and simply assumes the inevitability of the entire package. Carley contends that an economic system, value system and political ideology are entirely separate and makes the rational claim that capitalism has “no inherent dependence or affinity with political freedom”[ix]
The exponential rate at which the global population is expanding is a serious contributor that – in the long run – could be the single biggest threat to Fukuyama’s vision of a democratic utopia. In china alone 8.5 million hectares of farmland are being lost every year to the construction industry and the annual income per head has doubled in approximately ten years. [x] This is reached in the UK only every 60 years. Losing so much farming and agricultural land every year to accommodate for an increasing population is interesting predicament because it appears to be burning the candle at both ends.
Whilst these sound like logical arguments they do not appear to have been properly addressed by Fukuyama, nor have they been given much praise from anybody outside the traditional Green movement. Since these valid points have been relatively overlooked there is definitely a possibility of an interesting contingency plan in several decades time that could see food shortages and starvation jump over from the borders of what might be left of the third world and into an overly-populated ‘developed’ world that can’t support the saddle of it’s own success.
The End Of… Realism?
Another important aspect that is rarely brought forward when discussing ‘The End Of History?’ and the subsequent book is the era in with Fukuyama was raised and educated in. Born in 1952, a mere five years after the significant primary events of the Cold War began, Fukuyama would have been growing up and moulded in a time where the battle between communism and capitalism was the biggest factor in every level of politics. By the time he had reached university age Fukuyama would have lived through and studied key cold war events such as the ‘Bay Of Pigs’, ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ and ‘Strategic Arms Limitation Talks’[xi] in the same, if not greater, depth as today’s generation studies the Berlin Wall and Iraq invasion.
The main point being that Fukuyama grew up in an era that was dominated and defined by the Cold War, and that once it showed signs of drawing to an end everybody could only hypothesise as to what changes this would bring to International society in the so called ‘New World Order’. Due to the vacuum of the post Cold War political climate many different theories emerged, although I believe the spotlight shone brightest on Fukuyama’s theory because it was released just before the fall of the Berlin Wall, an image that has become synonymous with the triumph of liberal democracy over the discredited communism. With the lessening importance of traditional Realist traits in the international system such as restraints on the use of force in world politics, dramatic improvements in peace building and peace making, the phenomenon of collective security and limitations of sovereignty all looming on the horizon it can be almost understandable why others could have taken the wrong idea from the book.
Another interesting aspect about the timeframe in which Fukuyama released his famous theory was that – in a similar style to Huntington – the title of the published book differed to that of the original article. In 1989 the article title was 'The End of History?’. However by the time the full-length book was published the title had been changed to 'The End of History and the Last Man'. With the removal of the question mark we must assume that Fukuyama believed his hypothesis was in the at least in the process of beginning. With the notion of the 'Last Man' being placed at the end, we also know that Fukuyama drew greatly from 19th century thinker Friedrich Nietzsche, who originally coined the term. It is also interesting to note that in the second half of the book, dedicated to the idea of the pessimistic last man, Fukuyama does not endorse the theory at all, but simply views it as an inevitability.
Fukuyama himself has made it no secret that he is still a firm believer and dedicated supporter of liberal democracy. Being one of the key members of the ‘Project for the New American Century’ think tank he made a public recommendation that President Clinton should overthrow Saddam Hussein in 1998 [xii] and participated in a similar letter after the 9/11 attacks on America.[xiii] These actions clearly show that Fukuyama still views his country as the predominant defender and promoter of liberal values, and free democracy.
Closing premise.
Overall, the concept of the End of History is very fascinating, even though it’s neither new nor completely original. As a mark of how intelligent he is, Fukuyama managed to let himself off lightly by being very ambiguous. There is no mention of a specific timescale in which history will effectively end, and it is true that no matter what happens in the international sphere, short of the United States crumbling overnight, Fukuyama would be able to pass it off as an ‘event’. The only risk he actually appears to have taken would be that nothing overly drastic changes in the international field of politics.
With the fall of the USSR in the epic battle for the title of undisputed superpower and no other contender with the capabilities to challenge America it would appear that in the foreseeable future the chance of a fresh interstate conflict between two of the smallest ever number of non-democracies is as slim as ever. However, in saying all of this I too would be inclined to hop on the bandwagon because after the fall of fascism, communism and so forth, no other ideology has risen to the task of providing a credible alternative to the current status quo. Coupled this with the hard fact that non-democracies are becoming more of a collector’s item and it would seem like a pretty good bet that nothing will go too wrong.
Finally, as I showed earlier in this paper, the only real challenge to liberal democracy at the moment comes from Islamic Fundamentalism, and even then, it is practically immeasurable at this point in time. The only question that remains to be answered once and for all is whether Huntington or Fukuyama was correct in their ‘solutions’ or answers for the post Cold War planet. As with many other things in the world, only time can tell, but to answer the question in today’s world, it would be a very strong statement to say that history has drawn to a close given the way in which foreign policy is pointing all most democratic countries towards Asia. Personally, I don’t think anybody will know until the outcome of the feud between the Middle East and the Democratic West, although I think everybody knows who Fukuyama is rooting for.
Word Count: 2,648.
Endnotes:
[i] ‘The West has won’. The Guardian Newspaper. Francis Fukuyama. 11th October 2001.
Accessed from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,567333,00.html Date: 1st May 2006.
[ii] Francis Fukuyama, “The End Of History?”. ‘The National Interest’, Summer, 1989. Page 2. Accessed from: http://www.marion.ohio-state.edu/fac/vsteffel/web597/Fukuyama_history.pdf Date: 24th April 2006.
[iii] Fukuyama, Francis. “The end of history and the last man” London : Penguin, 1992
Page 118
[iv] ‘Freedom in the World 2006’. Freedom House. Pages 3 & 5.
Accessed from: http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/Charts2006.pdf
Date: 27th April 2006.
[v] ‘Freedom in the World Comparative Rankings: 1973-2005’. Accessed from: http://65.110.85.181/uploads/FIWrank7305.xls
Date: May 1st 2006.
[vi] Choueiri, Youssef. “Islamic fundamentalism” London ; Washington, D.C. 1997.
Page 63.
[vii] Mawsilili, Ahmad. “Islamic Fundamentalism: myths and realities.” Reading: Ithaca, 1998.
Page 25.
[viii] Parkin, Michael “Economics” Boston; London: Addison-Wesley 2003 Page 446.
[ix] Carley, Michael. “Managing sustainable development”. London; Sterling : Earthscan, 2000.
Page 37.
[x] Ibid. Page 36.
[xi] Events taken from ‘The Cold War Museum’ online. Accessed from: http://www.coldwar.org Date: 20th April 2006.
[xii] ‘Letter To President Clinton On Iraq’. January 26th 1998. Accessed from: http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm
Date 19th April 2006
[xiii] ‘Letter to President Bush on the War On Terrorism’. September 20th 2001. Accessed From: http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm
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