I.R. - Mexican Election (2000)

Was the year 2000 a watershed for the Mexican political system?

Introduction.

Anybody who has shown even a remote interest in Mexican politics since the beginning of the new millennium will be well aware that the 2000 Presidential election has been one of the most talked about events in the contemporary history of the country. In brief: for arguably the first time in living memory Mexican elections were no longer dominated by a single party or laden with electoral fraud and a candidate form a party other than the PRI was elected as the country’s new president.

This essay intends to create the argument that although the year 2000 was the end of the PRI’s seventy-year clasp on Mexico’s political system, it was merely the final stage of a very long series of events that began over thirty years earlier. I aim to highlight the starting point of this process and follow its progression through the decades and the 2000 election, which will hopefully illustrate that the PRI’s loss of Mexico’s Presidency was unavoidable.

A brief history:

Since the violent Mexican revolution against repression and the creation of a new political system in the late 1920’s it was – until the 1970’s – almost an understatement to say that the country’s politics was absolutely dominated by the only political party affiliated with the famous revolt, and what was for many years the only official party that an individual could support. With little change to the country’s political system in decades scholars began to debate whether this single-party regime was an imperfect democracy or the perfect dictatorship.

This Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had power over of every level of government, from the lower house of Mexico’s bi-cameral legislature through to the highest electable office, and what was to be the centre of attention in 2000; the country’s head of state, the President.

El Presidente, and his ‘tyrannical’ status:

Since the revolution and the subsequent constitution that was drawn up the Mexican president has been in one of the most powerful elected officials within any country in the world. In the heyday of his power contemporary literature described him as having the party and government ‘under his thumb’ and even went as far to say that the entire political system was built around “presidential despotism” (Hodges, 1979). Whilst this text is slanted against the PRI it did highlight the lack of checks and balances or indeed any other restraints the president is had at the time of its publishing. Before the opening of the system towards representation and transparency the president could personally handpick his successor, cabinets, governments, congressmen and justices of the Supreme Court.

With this level of power vested in one individual it is no surprise to find out that the PRI were more than reluctant to sacrifice this position of office – and that they would go to any lengths, be it legal or not, to retain the privilege. Maintaining control of this luxurious position was one of the few constants that defined the PRI throughout the 20th century, and it keeping the Presidency arguably meant more to the PRI than any of the other political party actually taking control of it. This is also the reason why so much so much stress – perhaps even an over-emphasis – was made when Vicente Fox won the 2000 election.

The true Mexican watershed:

This incident, which I would personally call the ‘real’ watershed, produced a nascent pressure on the government which grew and grew until it eventually became enough to topple the PRI from highest level of government at the beginning of the new millennium. The one single incident that I would class as the event that catalysed three decades of political change in Mexico – and more generally shook “Mexican cultural life as a whole” (Foster, 2002) – is the notorious student massacre in Tlatelolco square.

Ironically, in 1968 several thousand students held a demonstration highlighting the heavy-handed methods used against them by the army and police. This rally was also deliberately held in an area of great cultural significance: Tlatelolco Square. Although the world’s media was watching – it was only a little over one week before Mexico City hosted the Olympic Games –army and police officers opened motiveless fire on the crowd killing what is said to be around three hundred people, with thousands more being arrested, imprisoned and wounded. When the smoke had settled and the sun rose the following day it was clear that the government had crushed its opposition, however, the political costs would proved to be ‘definitive’ (Hershfield, 1999).

Although this kind of action was not a new occurrence – Pilcher (2003) states that these heavy-handed authoritarian measures had previously been used before on workers and peasants – this was an unprovoked and savage assault on a previously untouched section of society. The government had authorized an attack on Mexico’s youth, and more importantly, Mexico’s educated and middle class, which started a chain reaction that would eventually see them losing power at all levels of governance and the ultimately, the prestigious Presidential office at the top of the nations political system.

Limited political change; pre 1968.

To argue that the Tlatelolco massacre was the absolute raison d'être for political change in Mexico would be inaccurate. Robert Miller (1985) points out that a constitutional amendment from 1964 “guaranteed minority parties representation based on their percentage of the national vote”. This, he said, was to alleviate criticism that the PRI had a monopoly on the government. At this time opposition parties were polling lower than 10% meaning that the most successful of them – PAN – received a meagre 20 seats from the total of 210 in the chamber of deputies at this time.

Whilst political change clearly did happen before 1968, and even beyond then, the intensity and consequences of them was negligible and only in the years after Tlatelolco did amendments provide the opposition with any real prospect of gaining credible and influential levels of power.


The first group of political reforms and their focus on increased representation.

The late 1970’s:

The first of the major changes to the Mexican political system came less than ten years after the Tlatelolco massacre when, in 1977, congress approved a new law which is best known by the acronym “LFOPPE”. The main aim of this new decree was to simplify the registration of political parties, thus increasing the levels of representation amongst the parties that could participate in elections. Although this did not initially have a large impact on the composition of any powerful positions it did appear to allow smaller parties the opportunity to ‘access public office and gain experience with legislation’ (Shirk, 2005). It is important to note that even though other bills and propositions have passed, that ensured simpler means and lower barriers for other parties to participate in elections and gain positions of power, the LFOPPE law was the real cornerstone in increasing representation in contemporary Mexican politics.

The LFOPPE law also saw the Chamber of Deputies expand for the first time since the revolution, which included one hundred new seats that were exclusively set-aside for the opposition parties (Camp, 2003 b). Although this may sound like a mammoth leap forward in the representation of smaller parties the reality was that the PRI still had more than a governing majority over the chamber and could continue to ratify any legislation with ease.

The reasons for there being no significant change in the make-up of the chamber of deputies throughout the 1970’s, even after the creation of the LFOPPE law, were two-fold. The first was that in the initial aftermath of Tlatelolco no movement, regardless of its size and power, would dare challenge the state’s authority in fear that the sporadic use of violence would be repeated on them; this belief also meant that many activists that emerged over the next thirty years, such as the EZLN, chose to begin their work ‘underground’.

Secondly the PRI appeared to be doing well, especially in their handling of the economic situation. Mexico’s booming economy fuelled by newly discovered oil and favourable conditions for borrowing money at the time meant that rising inflation rates were kept under control. Unfortunately for the PRI this success story was only a short-lived experience.

Whilst the previous ten years of Mexican politics appear to be marked by a series of healthy looking democratic victories with changes contributed to LFOPPE, on close inspection it is clear that the regime had merely shifted its main focus. The PRI policies that seemed dedicated on improving representation of even the smallest political parties obscured the reality that they had simply changed their focus towards the organisation of the elections and consequently suppressing the effects any electoral laws they passed by rigging the elections. When coupled with the other points mentioned above the party’s domination of the political system seemed as strong as ever.

The 1980’s:

Events between the years of 1980 and 1989 would prove to be some of the most important since the revolution for Mexico and it’s political system. This decade saw challenges to the PRI’s domination coming from all sides of the political spectrum and the roots of civil society – something that has never traditionally characterised the Latin American nations.

At the start of the decade the oil prices collapsed and in 1982, and because the country was declared officially bankrupt, President Carlos Salinas was required to force a program of radical reconstruction on the economy. This new model included the privatisation of all but of a handful of the hundreds of state-owned companies with the notable exception being the national oil company PEMEX (Blouet, 2002). Whilst this was an inescapable condition of the country’s dire economic situation it would have undoubtedly began to hinder the loyalty of traditional party support from workers and labourers and the average citizen who were all hit the hardest with a currency on the verge of collapsing and increasing food prices.

Corruption and abuse:

One of the traits of the Mexican political system is the average citizen’s lack of trust in it, particularly from the beginning of the 1980’s when, through a mixture of both foolish economic policy and a sequence of unfortunate world events, there was an economic crisis that severely affected almost every section of Mexican society. Even though Mexico was in turmoil, the economy was in a state of rapid declension and the government was very unpopular, the PRI presidential candidate emerged victorious in the 1982 election.

Before the 1985 mid-term elections a survey conducted by a leading newspaper revealed that only 13% of Mexicans accepted the ‘official’ electoral results to be a truthful reflection of the ballots cast (Adelphi, 1989). The reason for this shocking statistic is that the PRI had become ever more synonymous with corruption and electoral fraud and with every election that passed the results would undoubtedly reinforce its unremitting domination of Mexican politics.

Exactly how far back fraudulent elections date may never be known, however if one were to hazard an expected guess it would have most likely have began to play a major part during the sexino of Jóse López Portillo and would have only intensified with developments attributed to LFOPPE. The threat of the opposition parties’ lust for office gaining real momentum, by capitalising on the voters frustration regarding their unfortunate situation, was also all to real. As the aforementioned figure shows, by the mid 1980’s unfair elections were almost universally accepted by most Mexicans, who knew better than to believe the results they were shown.

To combat these fears the PRI had numerous dirty tricks up their sleeves when it came to rigging elections at every level. Some of the tactics were subtler than others. To name but a few the vast list has been known to include: missing ballot boxes – which were later found burnt out in ditches and rivers, duplicate votes, dead & other illegible ‘electorate’ casting ballots, crashing computers, and drastic last minute changes ranging from polling booth locations to disqualified opposition poll watchers (Camp, 2003 a).

One may ask why such a crooked political system was allowed to exist for several decades however in Mexico the ruling party’s influence stretched well beyond the realm of just politics. Caroline Beer (2006) noted that throughout the seven decades of PRI rule, the government managed to keep their negative qualities such as corruption, the use of violence and electoral fraud out of the public eye, particularly through their stringent control of the media. This was just one of the many extra ways the government and particularly the president could flex their powers of influence beyond the sphere of the political system.

The nascent stage of a new Mexican society:

In 1985 an immense earthquake shook the country’s capital destroying hundreds of buildings and leaving thousands homeless – exact figures are hard to attain because of massive discrepancies between the unreliable governmental statistics and other estimates. Unable to rely on their government ordinary citizens were forced to pull their provisions together and look out for one another buy building shelters and providing basic medical assistance for the injured.

From the rubble of this natural catastrophe rose the foundations of what became one of the most powerful threats to the PRI regime: the ‘rise of civic participation’ (Skidmore, 2005) – or civil society. Up until this period levels of social capital shown in Mexico had been relatively low, yet in the aftermath of the earthquake citizens had learned that they could work together and be more efficient than the government. This realisation brought around a sharp rise in civic trust, which aided the process.

Another factor common to the rise of civic participation across the region as a whole was the appearance of oppressive – mostly military – regimes, which tended to bring together groups with totally conflicting agendas and compelled them to work together against the common enemy. Naturally, the one historic incident specific to the Mexican case that would have fostered the uniting of virtually everybody who didn’t sympathise with the PRI regime would have been the Tlatelolco massacre.

With an increasing pressure being placed on the government and the observable success of some anti-governmental movements in the years to come, the snowballing of Mexican civil society had begun. Gerardo Otero’s book “Mexico in Transition” (2004) is perhaps one of the most detailed accounts of almost every echelon in society – from peasants and sugar cane growers through to bank debtors and the political class – and how they have been able to exert different levels of influence on past and present governments.


The second wave of political reforms: increasing electoral transparency.

The pivot point in political reform:

By the late nineteen eighties the government realised that something would have to be done in order to appease the dissatisfied citizens, of which there was an ever increasing number. Because of this governmental foresight 1987 marked the beginning of a series of electoral reforms that would aid the creation of a more ‘transparent electoral system’ (Kirby, 2003). The first of these was the expansion of the chamber of deputies by 200 new seats – bringing the new total to approximately 500 – elected exclusively through proportional representation. However, although Kirby notes that the first non-PRI governor was elected in 1989, it would be another decade before the party would unwillingly surrender their majority in the lower house of congress.

The 1988 presidential election provided perhaps the most blatant case of fraud when the vote counting computer experienced a ‘technical fault’. Before this hitch the computer displayed that the PRD leader – after splitting from the PRI in the follow up to the election – Cuauthémoc Cardenas (also son of former president and revolutionary icon Lázaro Cárdenas) was sitting comfortably in the lead. However, once this mishap had been resolved the results conveniently displayed that the PRI contender Carlos Salinas had narrowly sealed a victory.

Perhaps the next biggest call for an end to deliberate electoral rigging was after a series of key state elections (Baja California, Yutcán, Tabasco…) between December 1988 and November 1990 in which “the evidence of fraud and abuse was flagrant” (Gentleman, 1992) and claims of the PRI using violence against the PRD and their supporters were particular shocking. It is my belief that these two cases provided to be the pivotal point for which the most important focus of political reform switched from increased representation towards the increased transparency of elections at all levels, which was the new obstacle preventing the smaller parties from being truly represented.

1994; the free and open electoral system Mexico had been waiting for?

Legislation in 1990 formed a new electoral code best known by the abbreviation COFIPE and a new body to observe the elections, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). Through these developments a ‘whole network of people and mechanisms’ were established to ‘ensure that electoral fraud was not committed’ (Scherlen, 1998). These included; party, citizen and foreign observers in precincts; transparent surfaces of ballot boxes to counter the notion of box-stuffing; fair distribution of television air-time to all nine political parties and even indelible ink that was put on voters finger tips once their ballots had been cast.

Despite these attempts to improve the fairness of elections on the day, the PRI still had a trick or two up their sleeves. One of their final ploys was ‘manipulating the distribution of benefits from federal entitlement programs’ (Klesner, 2001). The case that creeps up time and time again in the body of literature is the PROCAMPO scheme, which was initially introduced in 1993 by the government to subsidise farmers who were still suffering at the hands of the imposition of the unsympathetic economic reforms in the 1980’s. However, it was widely reported that the government deliberately targeted volatile voting areas and was especially generous in the weeks before elections.

Only several weeks before the presidential election of 1994 PROCAMPO assumed a high profile with hundreds of thousands of farmers receiving their first payments (Stephen 1997). These pre-election payments were almost exclusively for the regions where the outcomes of the elections were predicted to be close, or even leaning towards the PAN or PRD. Judith Teichman (1997) also describes PROCAMPO as an ‘important ingredient’ in the PRI’s 1994 electoral victory because in areas where they were sure to win, money was held until after the election when it was given to these loyal districts as a reward. Very little could be done to conceal the fact that this was a conscious decision to literally buy undecided votes and sustain the strongholds but this did not matter because astute schemes like this were the final gasping breaths that the government had to ensure a steady flow of votes, especially at a time when electoral transparency was the heart of the reforms.

The indigenous threat.

Whilst the 1st of January 1994 was supposed to be a historic day in which Mexico began it’s step towards becoming a fully developed nation with the beginning of the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the countries prestige was tainted when a different kind of social movement reared its head in the form of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (the EZLN). This was a group of indigenous Mexicans who had been working ‘underground’ for some time that declared war against Mexico politicians because to coincide with NATFA’s harsh consequences on the native farmers.

A cease-fire was put in place a little over one week after their initial attacks because such poorly armed and trained combatants had little chance against the Mexican national army. This shift from weapons to words was a change in tactics from warfare towards what Clifford Bob (2005) describes as “armed non-violence”, and began a process of negotiations between the EZLN and PRI government.

The apparent success and influence of the EZLN were short lived when, even after accords on indigenous rights and culture were signed, they resorted back to low intensity warfare because of the government’s lack of “political will and the intention to fulfil its word” (Higgins, 2004). To this date, even after several failed attempts to negotiate from both sides, the EZLN are still considered a rebel force and a constant thorn in the government’s side, regardless of the chambers composition.

Good things come in time.

In 1997 the swelling pressure applied to the government over the past two decades was eventually starting to show some major success, and the PRI suffered in what was, at the time, arguably their first major defeat since its creation. Although opposition parties – mainly the PRD and PAN – had been winning small numbers of low-level seats in previous elections 1997 was when the PRI lost its legislative majority in the chamber of deputies and lots of ground at regional level elections. Perhaps the biggest blow was the loss of the prestigious post of the Mexico City Mayor. The significance of this lays in the fact that traditionally this has been used as a stepping-stone to the presidency (Martin, 2005).

The new millennium and a new slate.

Then came the 2000 election, which was viewed by most spectators as a real Mexican miracle. The victory of Vicente Fox dealt the final blow to the PRIs seventy-year domination of the political system. At the risk of playing down the importance of this victory I would argue that this was more of a symbolic result that anything. With the PRI slowly losing more and more ground as the pressure applied from all levels of society and the political spectrum intensified and their methods of controlling the electoral outcomes finally being exhausted.

Fast-forward to the recent 2006 elections and the continuation of this process can be seen, through the further losses for the PRI in both the in both legislative chambers. In the Chamber of Deputies since the 2003 mid-term elections the PAN and PRD saw increases from 151 to 206 seats, and 96 to 159 respectively (Economist, 2006). With a new ‘sub-total’ of 122 seats – a staggering drop form 2003’s 239 seats – the PRI is down to an all-time low but still not out. Because no party has an overall majority legislation will have to be passed by a government comprising at least two of the parties, meaning the PRI can still exert a degree of influence.


Conclusion.

In this essay I hope to have shown that the PRI’s loss in 2000’s presidential was nothing more than another effect of a movement against them that was set in motion over thirty years earlier and that the victory was more emblematic than an unexpected or a turning point against the past success of the PRI.

After highlighting why the power of the Mexican President made it such a sought-after position I went on to explain that the infamous events at Tlatelolco laid the foundations for a slow, but almost exponential increase of pressure on the government that took the shape of new legislation. These new laws (post 1968) had two prominent manifestations; at first they sought after a more representative system, by making the registration process easier and fairer.

The second materialization of these laws came after the realisation that the PRI had been suppressing the representation, even after the formation of a civil society, by fixing the outcomes of the elections through various doubtful means. This second round of reforms called for an increase in electoral transparency, through the creation of COFIPE and the IFE. Once the PRI had exhausted its last efforts to maintain the grip on the political system, which it had held for so long it was only a matter of time before they began to lose political ground.

Unfortunately for Vicente Fox in the future he is more than likely going to be remembered as the first man who defeated the PRI over anything he achieved whilst serving his sexino. By looking at the latest election I hope to have shown that the PRI are still feeling the effect of this pressure and are still losing ground at every election.

Word count – 3,999 (Excluding bibliography)
4,390 (Including bibliography)


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