Pol - Finlandisation

“Sauna Sweethearts”: and the ‘general reasons’ for such behaviour.

“The Price of maintaining amicable relations with the Soviet Union was a fundamentally Finlandised polity.” Explain and Discuss.


Introduction.

Through the course of this essay I intend to achieve several outcomes; i) explain what ‘Finlandisation’ entails, ii) show the major indicators of the process, iii) with reference to the EU highlight the adaptability of Finnish foreign policy, iv) create an argument for Finlandisation being beneficial, and even expected. Then finally look back on several other factors before making the concluding remarks.

However, before indulging in the salacious debate surrounding the ominous affects of Finlandisation it is first essential that this process be explained clearly. Although almost twenty years old the characterization from ‘The Consensual Democracies’ (Elder, 1988) – an “increasing and insidious penetration of Finland’s internal affairs” – is still widely accepted today. The reoccurring argument that surrounds Finlandisation is that Finnish sovereignty and integrity were compromised by the USSR, principally with their meddling of the political system. The next part of this essay intends to outline the irregular behaviour of Finland as a whole throughout the Cold War and providing enough evidence to assert the claims of Finlandisation.


Friendship and cooperation.

One could not embark on a study of ‘Finlandisation’ without first exploring the basis of Fenno-Soviet relations throughout the Cold War: ‘The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance’ (FCMA / YYA). From 1948 this treaty was integral to much of Finnish politics for over forty years and only terminated with the disintegration of the USSR. Some have even gone as far to say that the FCMA’s “importance exceeded everything else in Finnish polity” (Punasalo, 1978), but without overplaying the importance of this treaty – it was ultimately only threatened to be used once, and never actually called into effect – some interesting observations can be drawn from the main text.

The special case of Finnish neutrality, which was not officially recognised by international law, stemmed from one vague sentence in the preamble that spoke of “Finland’s desire to remain outside the conflicting interests of the Great Powers”. It is unsurprising to learn that this muddy statement hoodwinked very few people into believing this neutrality outside of Finland. Another imprecise assertion is the second article that reads “The high Contrasting Parties shall confer with each other if it is established that the threat of an armed attack as described in Article 1 is present”. In particular the use of the word ‘threat’ makes article 2 very ambiguous, and means that it can be, and was, put into effect on very little evidence.

By and large the purpose of the FCMA as viewed from the Soviet Union was simply to use Finland as a protective barrier for its western border through articles one and two, dissuading its enemies to attack the Soviet Union through Finland. Through article six, the “principle of mutual respect of sovereignty and integrity and that of non-interference of the internal affairs of the other state”, Finland benefited from being able to uphold her independence. It is interesting to note that articles two and six are oxymoronic because evoking article two would immediately breach the assurances of ‘integrity’ and ‘sovereignty’ under article six. The following examples of ‘Finlandisation’ aim to show that in reality the USSR clearly didn’t care much for article six, or the FCMA whatsoever.

The Indicators of Finlandisation,

I) Neutrality; to Russia.

From the 1940’s to the early 1990’s Finnish citizens and Politicians, some more than others, acknowledged and accepted their newfound position of neutrality and the belief that they were to remain outside of the superpower confrontation. Kekkonen himself spoke of Finland’s dilemma in the 1920’s as having to choose between “an anti-Russian line or neutrality in relation to Russia”. (Kekkonen, 1970). Initially they chose the former option, and ended up losing two unpleasant wars against the Soviets. However, from the mid 1940’s President Paasikivi – and later Kekkonen – realised that the latter option of ‘neutrality’ was the best way to conduct Finland’s complex relationship with her neighbour Great Power.

It was because of this ‘neutrality’ based upon the foreword to the FCMA treaty that Finland lost out – so to speak – on the initial trend of integration and cooperation, particularly in when related to the Nordic region. It has been written that Finland was “obliged to look on as a bystander while Nordic cooperation developed” (Jussila, 1999). The cases of the EU, EFTA, the Nordic Council and Nordek all show different levels of Finland’s ‘willingness’ or ‘inability’ to integrate with the regional and international organisations.

When indeed Finland’s request for Nordic Council membership had been ‘permitted’, there was the stipulation that discussion on security policy was to be proscribed at all times. This was clearly because Finnish security policy would have been subjugated by the USSR at the time of her ascension to the Nordic Council, and due to the private nature of such a relationship with Moscow, it was not to be discussed between countries outside the deal. There was a similar case for Finland’s membership of EFTA; initially it only entered as an associate member because the “Kremlin ruled out full membership” (Tiilikainen, 2003). Complete membership was eventually granted in 1986 from what I will go on to show was a more merciful Kremlin.

The ‘Nordek’ project was an attempt at creating another integrational firework, and unsurprisingly, the Finns did not want to set this one alight either. The final result was that almost two years of intense negociations were “killed when President Kekkonen declared [at the last minute] that the Finnish government would not sign the treaty” (Hancock, 1972). Again, the only conclusion one can draw from this would be that a Nordic Customs Union would have considerably bolstered Finland’s ties with the other countries in the region, that were - from the windows of the Kremlin - too ideologically aligned with it’s contrasting superpower. These are all clear-cut examples of Finnish ‘Neutrality’ being tampered with by Soviet Union and their continual breaking of the terms of the FCMA treaty. These actions deliberately interfered with Finnish politics; by majorly influencing it’s foreign policy, and trying to maintain hey loyalty to the USSR.

As for the legacies of Paasikivi and Kekkonen, and their noteworthy ‘Paasikivi-Kekkonen’ policy line of active neutrality, whilst it was arguably the single biggest factor in retaining Finland’s Cold War independence, it was promptly abandoned with the demise of the Soviet Union and the ‘New World Order’ that emerged. Along with this came the collapse of the FCMA treaty, which underscored the emerging realisation that Finland no longer had to worry about any soft or hard Soviet threats to her polity in the foreseeable future. Recent commentators have also noted that the post Cold War era, open and often heated discussions focused on the EU and NATO show that neutrality – and ‘Finlandisation’ – are no longer “holy or everlasting” (Tiilikainen, 1996).


II) Kekkonen’s unending reign.

Perhaps one of the more astute methods in which the USSR sought to influence Finland was to ensure the appointment of politicians who could be regarded as sympathisers, or at least of Soviet inclination. In the delicate situation of Northern Europe, and with significance to the Nordic Balance, it was probably for the best that the man in charge of Finland’s foreign policy was willing to cooperate. It is no surprise to find that once elected, Urho Kekkonen dominated Finnish politics until long after he was no longer capable to do the job. George Maude (1976) spoke of a ‘perpetual presidency of the pro-Soviet Kekkonen with little opposition’.

Once in power Kekkonen utilised article 33 of the Finnish constitution to ensure that foreign policy was a one-man job. This situation led to a highly personalised relationship between the Finnish and Soviet heads of state, which at times incorporated some very private meetings. After the Note Crisis Kruschev and Kekkonen met one-to-one at a Sauna in Siberia, with no interpreters present. This demonstrates how few people it could take to conduct relations between the two states, something that would have greatly benefited Moscow greatly when they had someone as sensitive to the USSR as Kekkonen in the Finnish ‘driving seat’. It would also be foolish to underestimate Kekkonen’s power over Finland’s national politics, he literally was the kingmaker within the country’s political arena.

On reflection, the Note crisis of 1961 was an obvious – and successful – attempt to sway public opinion towards Kekkonen and ensure his re-election, although this was not recognised at the time. In the aftermath of the ‘crisis’ friends and foes alike praised him for his outstanding handling of the combustible situation, it also allowed him to play the ‘Moscow card’ whenever he faced strong opposition. Another stunt over a decade later was the 1973 extension of Kekkonen’s position in office through an ‘emergency law’ that ensured the election scheduled for 1974 was bypassed. To this date no explanation has been given for this but it can only be assumed that the Kremlin had a great deal of influence behind this action.

The ‘Night Frost’ and ‘Note Crisis’ of 1959 and 1961 respectively highlight another aspect that is overlooked in most papers on Finlandisation, that being that the Finns never “fully grasped the Kremlin’s almost obsessive concern about a possible resurgence of German militarism” (Arter, 1995). Whilst this could possibly be included under the umbrella of ‘geopolitics’ the crises illustrated Russia’s almost irrational fear of another attack in the vein of Operation Barbarossa, and their belief that Finland had sufficient military strength to handle such advancement.


III) You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour.

Perhaps the largest penalty as an upshot of Finlandization was the pressure on the media, and predominantly the press, not to release any material that was critical of the Kremlin and the Soviet Union. The main argument was that it could risk jeopardising what was seen as a delicate relationship between the two countries. Because of this the reality was that Finland – at least in terms of relaying propaganda – became Russia’s voice towards the East. In it’s heyday the “Finnish press relied on the Swedish newspapers” (Salminen, 1999) for non-biased accounts of the current political events because there was so much Soviet hot air being circulated in their own editions.

Politicians were also limited in what they wanted say about the shape of Finland’s foreign and domestic policy and the Soviet Union. Most infamously, Johannes Virolainen detonated the ‘midsummer bomb’ episode when he was asked why the conservatives did not take their opportunity to participate in government and replied that it was for “general reasons” (Arter, 1981). This answer blatantly meant that the Kremlin objected to conservative activities within the government, but with the suppression of free speech senior politicians realised it was not worth criticising the status quo.Even Kekkonen, despite being the most powerful man in the country, chose detach himself from some of his political beliefs under the cover of various pseudonyms. It is not clear whether these activities were to avoid hullabaloo among Finns or evade scrutiny from the Kremlin it but it has emerged that he wrote a many of his opinions on heavyweight issues, such as NATO, under the pen name ‘Liimatainen’ (Allison, 1985). This could be viewed as another example of free speech being impeded through to the highest levels of Finnish society.


The demise of the USSR; and Finland’s ‘neutrality’.

With the official collapse of the USSR and termination of the FCMA Finland was left in a vacuum with no strong political allies and a substantial chunk missing from her economy. Recession in the early 1990’s hit Finland hard, even more so after losing trade with the USSR (Jenssen, 1998). Eager to escape this furrow parliament simultaneously butchered the myth of ‘Neutrality’ and confirmed existence of ‘Finlandisation’ by applying for unconditional membership of the European Union – including the CFSP – within three months of the USSR’s demise.

It seems paradoxical when a country that had spent the entire Cold War believing in a foreign policy of ‘active neutrality’ and had previously engaged in several wars (including a vicious civil war) to maintain independence submits an application to an organisation that contradicts these historical notions. The reality of this application is that Finland not only wished to be a fully-fledged member, but that it displayed a “willingness to concede autonomy to the European Union” (Mouritzen, 1998).

As with every other member country, including those who do not show the level of Finland’s eagerness, the levels of bureaucracy amassed from EU membership increases year upon year. An OECD report from 2003 notes that the increased coordination between these the state and the organisation means “Finnish legislation increasingly orientates in E.U. legislation” – a case that opponents of the EU would have certainly voiced before the hasty membership.

There is a line of argument that one of the main motives for E.U. membership was to gain “sufficient additional security… especially from Russia” (Readman, 2004). At the time of the application it is believed that this standpoint could not be voiced by parliament for fears of aggravating Russia and inciting further tussles with her neighbour. Although this is a reasonable notion the former Soviet Union had larger matters to deal with than Finland in it’s first three months.

As far as the ‘Finlandisation’ debate is concerned the haste in which E.U. membership was applied is an obtrusive sign that government had been seeking to join the confederation for some time but had been barred from discussing such an arrangement from Moscow. Yet more proof, if need be, that concrete Finlandisation did exist throughout the cold war.


The benefits of an expected partnership.

Although the examples shown above paint a lucid picture of a country clearly handicapped by a Finlandised polity the next section will argue that, even though Finland’s international veracity had been compromised, it was both tolerable and even unsurprising; especially when viewed against the backdrop her history and the agreement’s beneficial aspects.


The economic reward:

From the implementation of the FCMA, and the unique Fenno-Soviet relationship that developed accordingly, Finland has not had as raw a deal as some social scientists would lead us to believe. Not only was it accepted that Finland would keep her political and economic systems that were distinctly western, but an added bonus of the pact involved 5-year barter trade agreements between the cosignatories that would prove to be a stabilising feature of the Finnish economy. Erkki Berndston (1991) makes a strong case for this, and notes that – particularly from the 1960’s onwards – trade between the nations kept unemployment low and that “economically, Finlandization seems to have benefited Finland”.

Although Soviet trade was an important feature of Finland’s economy it was not large enough to create any form of dependency for either party. At its peak, Soviet trade accounted for just over 20% of Finland’s economy, with the remaining 75% or so of her income being generated from the western democracies. It is largely because of this combination of being able to fluctuate trade between the communist and capitalist markets that Finland enjoyed some of the highest global levels of economic growth in the Cold War era, and much like the stereotyped ‘Nordic welfare model’ Finland still enjoys a reputation as one of the worlds financial successes. It is also by no chance that Finland managed to circumvent much of the negative effects of the oil crises in the 1970’s.

A history of coercion.

A brief glance at her last thousand years it is evident that Finland is certainly no stranger to foreign influence. Over the centuries she has ‘clocked up’ approximately five hundred years as part of the Kingdom of Sweden and over one hundred years as a Duchy of the Russian Empire. The latter included some heavy-handed ‘Russification’ efforts that interfered with language, laws and other central aspects of Finnish culture (Arter, 1999). In comparison to these previous encounters of peripheral influence regarding the overall timescale – and the severity of the original ‘Russification’ effort – forty or so years Finlandisation suddenly seems like a reasonable arrangement.

A second argument is that Finland has also previously sided with one of the biggest ogres to have ever appeared on the political stage: Nazi Germany. Even though Germany’s aggressive military expansionism of the early 1940’s was “based on cultural values that the Finns abhorred” (Berry, 1987) Finland became bedfellows with the Germans in order to enhance her capacity to fight against Russia in the ‘Winter War’. Whilst this relationship was short-lived it highlights the fact that Finland has gone to great lengths in order to remain independent, even if it meant collaborating with one of the most notorious states in history.


Some other ‘general reasons’.

Ultimately, the case of Finland, and Finlandisation is peppered with many contradictions and oddities. Ideologically, Finland is considered to be in the western camp as she is a rich, modern democracy with a flourishing capitalist market and free, fair elections. However, in relation to her geography, Finland occupies a somewhat helpless spot somewhere between no-man’s land and the east of Europe. It is because of this grey zone that Finland has experienced isolation and the aforementioned pressures of external influences, nevertheless, it also is because of this grey area and her bifurcated personality that she was able to get the best of both worlds throughout the second world war.

What else is true is that although it unquestionably existed, the severity of Finlandisation decreased over time, and most rapidly from the 1980’s, for several reasons. To begin with, there was the emergence of more ‘compassionate’ Soviet leaders such as Gorbachev, who granted Finland full membership status of EFTA in 1986. Secondly, Finland’s strategic significance declined with Germany’s integration into the EEC – thus ending the threat of an attack via Finland. Thirdly, the USSR shifts to a focus of internal policy following the appointment of Yeltsin as communist party leader. Fourthly, my suggestion that by the mid 1980’s Finland is so deeply integrated with western organisations (UN, Nordic Council, EFTA, OECD…) that that she was deemed a lost cause.

Perhaps it is more unfortunate than anything else that the Finns came to be identified as the international illustration of a state being affected by the presence of a nearby superpower. Throughout the early twentieth century Denmark had established a foreign policy to avoid confrontation with the adjoining German Reich. It was only when Denmark has able to abandon this policy, after World War II that Finland was left no choice but to opt for a ‘Danish’ policy. (Sundelious, 1982). It is also true that throughout the Second World War Iceland was not just forced to cooperate with Great Britain and America, but was subjected to an compulsory occupation that - at one point - included over 20,000 troops. These are just two examples from a historical catalogue of states that have been subject to compulsory cooperation, or influenced by their neighbours; yet ‘Icelandisation’ or ‘Denmarkisation’ failed to appear in the literature of their times.


Conclusions.

After examining the FCMA document I drew attention to the major arguments supporting the view that Finland’s polity was indeed ‘Finlandised’ during the Cold War using the three most prolific examples that have appeared in the narrative on the subject. In the second portion, I highlighted a distinct change in Finland’s policy, from the Cold War traits ‘neutrality’ and ‘independence’ and how they were hurriedly shelved using the example of European Union membership.In the third part, I argued that the Finlandisation itself was not an unbelievable direction of policy against the milieu of events before the cold war’, and that the country even benefited from the process, then highlighted some other – perhaps unfortunate – features of Finland and her relationship with the Russian Bear.

As for the future of Finland, any beliefs of neutrality should have been wiped away with full EU membership – and how fast the security aspect of the FCMA was traded by the EU’s CFSP. It is because of this, and indeed her history of, sporadic decisions that it would be foolish to rule out NATO membership in the near future, especially on the grounds that it is still taboo because, as I’ve hopefully demonstrated, Finland will do almost anything to that will benefit her position either economically or internationally. It is also valuable to note that the country has participated in NATO schemes such as the ‘Partnership for Peace’ for many years.
Finally, and above all else, it is incredible to observe that even after all of the trauma and turmoil in Finnish history, Finland and her people have accomplished the mean feat of retaining a strong cultural identity in one form or another. This has been facilitated by two factors; the first has been the adaptability of the foreign policy direction and the second has indeed been the obvious resilience of the Finnish people. It is due to the latter part that even if Finland continues her trend of integration through organisations that there will always be a strong national identity.

Word Count – 3,506.


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