Diss: Chapter 1

Chapter one:
Welcome to Sunny Colombia.

Know your enemy:

Before I can begin to describe the myriad of factors that ensure all roads of the cocaine, and increasingly heroin, business lead to, or stem from, Colombia it is first necessary to define the nature of the perceived threat. Although, in a post 9/11 world, there are many constantly evolving definitions of the phrase ‘organised crime’ the following quotation holds true the main part of most modern definitions.

“Organised crime is present whenever two or more persons are involved in a common criminal project for a prolonged period of time in order to obtain power and profits”. (Stiftung, 1998)
The only differing aspect regarding the definition of criminal groups such as a Cartel is that they usually function in more than one country and when this is the case, the definition would include that the groups operate multijouristictionaly. Upon analysis, the alliance of thousands of Colombians that have been exporting drugs to foreign markets since the 1970s, most certainly matches the definition of International Organised Crime. [1]


The size and scope:

Unfortunately, due to the nature of a shadow economy, no accurate calculation regarding the scale of the drugs trade can be made. Over the years, and from many different sources, a diverse bank of estimates has emerged with the top and bottom figures proving to be a significant distance apart. The most widely cited approximation came from the ‘World Drug Report’ in 1997, which estimated the annual revenue of the illicit global drug business to be worth U.S. $400 billion. (UNODCCP, 1997).

The size of the ‘power and profits’ that are acumulated through participation in the drug business is undoubtedly the single biggest incentive for people to become involved, it is also funds all other activities of the Cartels; from bribery to their expansion. In 1990 for instance, it cost a scant $280 to purchase the raw materials required to make 1 kilogram of cocaine in a laboratory; on the streets of Europe this amount would have sold for around $140,000 (Clutterback, 1990). This equates to a profit margin of 50,000%, and is perhaps the most boorish way of explaining how organised criminals that engage in the drugs market attain such vast amounts of cash.

In their heyday the ‘classic’ cartels were making so much money that it was beyond what they could spend or physically store. For instance, the wealth accumulated by the individual Pablo Escobar was so monumental, that he attempted to barter for his freedom by offering to pay off Columbia’s national debt. Escobar is also reported to have written off $40 Million in notes that had rotted in a basement, because there was nowhere else to store it (Robinson, 1998) and in 1989 Forbes magazine gave him the title of 7th Richest person in the world. Since the fall of the Medelín and Calí Cartels it has been more difficult to estimate the levels of wealth collected by their members. In January of 2007 Colombian police seized $54m, in U.S. Dollars and Euro notes, from the Norte De Valle cartel, the last of the ‘classic’ cartels. A figure that would indicate that their business, and power, is still strong . The fact that these gigantic seizures of funds have no real effect on the operations of a Cartel, ensures that individuals will always want to be involved in such a reliable and profitable business.


Why Colombia, and why coca?

Whether viewed as a blessing or a curse, the geograpy of Colombia is perfect for internationalised trading. It is the only country in South America to have coastlines on two different waterways, the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, the latter being particularly useful in the transportation of illicit goods, because of the hundreds of potential stops at many islands such as Jamaica, Cuba and the Bahamas. By dry land there is the route through Central America, which again offers many different passages to the US border. There is also the straight forward possibility of air transport, again with possible stops at any of the countries and islands in central America.

The biggest appeal of coca farming in the region – beyond the coca farmers’ (‘Cocaleros’) cut of the high market price mentioned above – is the physical properties of the coca plant itself. It is a rugged bush that requires very little effort - a bonus for any cultivator. Also, in Colombia, a coca farmer can expect 5-6 harvests per year, compared to Bolivia and Peru’s 3-4 annual harvests, and in Colombia, the coca leaves do not require to be dried in the sun before they are usable (U.N. 2001). General estimates suggest that although a cocaleros only receives a tiny percentage of the final profits from his crop, he can still sell it for roughly ten times the price of any suggested legal alternative such as coffee, bananas or palm hearts.

Violence.Nevertheless, the properties mentioned so far are not unique to Colombia. For example, Peru and Bolivia both grow large volumes of coca leaves, and countries like Venezuela and Guyana are geographically closer to the favoured transportation route through the Bahamas. The single biggest reason for the establishment of such a rife drugs business is that Colombia failed to experience the levels of social development achieved by its neighbours. Francsco Thoumi (1992) describes how ‘La Violencia’, a ten-year long war between Colombia’s two main political parties, created the perfect breeding ground for a drugs trade through the emergence of two main consequences of the war. Firstly, the government was weakened and lost control of large areas within the country, and secondly, because the conflict put a very low level on the value of human life.

Colombia’s bloody past underlines an inclination towards violence, and the prevailing notion that it is an acceptable method of resolving disputes: even between political parties. With these conditions it would not be impossible to make a strong case for violence being integral to the Colombian mindset; perhaps even a cultural attribute. Despite this, it is evident that the presence of the illegal drugs business – particularly the proliferation of armed groups that benefit from it – embitters the situation. Between 1985 and 2000 over two-hundred bombs had been detonated in Colombian cities; an entire left-wing political party was wiped out by paramilitaries; and four presidential candidates, two-hundred judges, twelve-hundred police officers, one-hundred and fifty-one journalists and an estimated three thousand Colombian citizens were murdered (Pardo, 2000). These figures highlight the actual price Colombia is paying for being the home of cocaine.


Corruption.
Perhaps even more serious than the existence of heightened violence is the dominance of far-reaching corruption in all levels of Colombian society. Cartels prey on the weakness of the state institutions, and use a percentage of their overall profit to buy off police, customs officials, politicians, prominent ministers and even presidents. Unfortunately, much of the ‘evidence’ that points to corruption is anecdotal, but as the government increases its transparency, some major cases of corruption are brought to the fore.

There are so many infamous examples of corruption reaching the highest echelons of Colombia, that to name specific cases is almost becoming cliché. Some of the most notorious instances since the 1990s have included Reynaldo Rodriguez Lopes, an advisor to Peru’s top police officials, who created a travel agency as a front for smuggling cocaine and laundering money (Clayton, 1999). Colombian government agent Carlos Rodrigo Polania – who had previously held the posts of inspector general of Colombia’s intelligence agency and was the official liaison with the DEA, US Customs and Interpol – was directly linked to money laundering organisations (Freemantle, 1995). The well known case of the former Colombian President, Ernesto Samper - receiving some $6 million from the Calí cartel to fund his presidential campaign - demonstrates that drug money can, and will, infect all levels of politics. The severity of this threat is made even worse, because it presents a downward spiral in that the weaker a state is, the easier it will be to corrupt and the more corrupt a state is, the weaker it will become – creating a chronic security threat.

Indeed, the unthinkable levels of state employees and institutions that had been tainted by drug money in the country led to Douglas Farah coining the phrase ‘Colombianisation’ (1990). It is now used to construe any ‘democracy’ that shows a similarly high level of corruption. Farah goes on to argue that these states experience the disintegration of political, economic and social structures; and that states are soon hurled towards a permanent position of violence, with assassinations and human rights violations. A question that must be asked is, “Would corruption exist under a stronger government?” Although this is hard to determine, I believe that a stronger government alone would not solve this problem, but that the elimination of violence within society would also be necessary to prevent the Cartel’s notorious ‘Silver or Lead’ policy, which leaves current politicians with the ‘choice’ of accepting a bribe, or joining the scores of dead people who dared to challenge the cartels.

The National Image.
A further problem associated with such widespread corruption, is that it raises the question of international credibility. With a copious number of the country’s politicians assumed to be in the pockets of the Cartels, it must be believed within International Relations that Colombia, as a state, is unable to act rationally, and that the Government is not always creating policy in the interest of its citizens. Displaying such traits undermines other states’ willingness to support or co-operate with Colombia. One such incident that seriously damaged Columbia’s international standing was Pablo Escobar’s infamous ‘jailbreak’ in 1992. The Colombians who let the world’s most notorious criminal simply walk out of jail, ensured their country became an international harlequin.

This situation presents a larger security issue than anything stated thus far, because the heavy influence of a sub-state actor, at such high levels of the oldest ‘democracy’ in the region, could act as a deterrent for other countries to co-operate directly with the Government. It also underscores that the citizens’ best interests are not always at the heart of the government, which would explain; the continuation of ‘human insecurity,’ the plight of its citizens, and the continuing existence of criminal organisations that still ‘undermine the capacity for the government to rule the country’ (Hough, 2004).

It is not only corruption that taints the country’s international status. Javier Barón (2001) notes that the previously mentioned existence of “permanent structural violence… places it [Colombia] on the list of nations that are regressing from civilisation to barbarism.” As I have previously noted, corruption already strains International Relations, and in addition, the continuation of the low-intensity conflict prevents other aspects of International Relations, such as globalisation, from occurring. Legitimate businesses and ordinary people are not willing to risk investment or travelling to such an unstable state.

The Silver Lining.
So far I have briefly described the main dangers and negative aspects that the drug business forces upon Colombia, however its existence is not entirely detrimental to the country.

In order to keep some level of public opinion on their side, Cartels invest a portion of their earnings back in to the communities. By the end of the 1980’s the Cartels in Calí and Medelín owned several newspapers and broadcasting companies, and invested approximately a third of their income into Columbian industry, real estate and agriculture projects. They were actively involved with over half of the national football teams, and gave surplus money to peasant farmers and charities. Although these pursuits have decreased with the downfall of the ‘classic’ Cartels, many people and industries today still benefit from the existence of an illegal drug business, particularly the service sector and those who supply luxury items such as suits, cars and so forth. Caroline Moser (2004) describes how it was noticeable that after the seizure of Los Rodriguez, a high-ranking Calí Cartel member, there was a ‘marked decrease in the economic fortunes of his community’. Such economic power not only means that Cartels enjoy the backing of many politicians, but they are also seen as a powerful social entity, using this Robin Hood-ism charity as a masquerade to win the public over, and luring them – to an extent – into forgetting the more negative aspects of their existence.

Not only does the business establish the economic well being of a region, but it also ensures that a constant flow of capital circulates within the country as a whole. John Peeler (1998) notes that Colombia was under a lot less pressure to conform to the Neoliberal policy changes forced upon the region in the 1980’s. This shows there was enough money being spent by the Cartels, and returning to the economy, that it was beneficial not only to the service sector, but to the nation as a whole.

Another ‘benefit’ of the business is that it indiscriminately offers a wide-range of well-paid jobs, that include positions such as: cocaleros, pilots, lookouts, drivers, guards, accountants, labourers, chemists, lawyers, money launderers, tax specialists, smugglers, mules and dealers. Discussed more in chapter two, the business also provides a major source of funding for the paramilitaries and guerrillas, which when taken at a statistical level, keeps their members employed. One aspect of employment which is often overlooked, is that of counter-employment: including the ‘police, customs, coast guards, judges’ (Griffith, 2000) not to mention the ever-increasing role of the Army. By adding the aforementioned service sector to the tally, the total number of individuals employed through direct, or indirect, involvement to the drug business is so colossal, that it is impossible to imagine what would happen if all of those jobs disappeared overnight!


The Bigger Picture.

Although Colombia undoubtedly suffers the worst of these effects first hand, they are by no means exclusive. Every country involved at any link in the drugs chain feels the effects in it’s own different ways.

Being one of the major transit countries, Brazil is heavily impacted by the presence of drugs. In 1994 city police of Rio de Janeiro were so heavily ‘plagued by corruption’ and ‘entangled with organised crime’ (Aguero, 1998) that the national army had to be called in to restore order and suppress the violent crimes related to narco-trafficking. The favelas in Rio display many negatives of the existence of drugs and gangs, including a murder approximately every half hour (Lund, 1999). The Central Bank of Brazil also reported that in 1997, one third of it’s money was ‘suspicious’ and that an estimated $20 million per day came over the border in laundering scams from Paraguay alone (Ciprut, 2001).

In December 2006 Mexican President, Felipe Calerdon, had to initiate drastic measures to restore order in several towns near the U.S. border. Some 4,000 troops were sent to Michoacan to control the violence, bringing the nationwide total police presence to 20,000 officers in Cartel strongholds. It has also recently been published that police deaths in Mexico have increased by 50% the in past year, most of the fatalities occurring in a gunfight with a criminal group. As mentioned earlier, Bolivia also has some problems trying to legitimise growing the coca leaf, while Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela feel the effects of the “Violence that is continuing and even escalating in some parts of the country” (R.I., 2007), through the thousands of refugees that cross into their borders every year. These examples show how neighbouring countries, and those used as transit zones, eventually become entangled with the effects of the drugs business.


Realism.
For the purpose of explaining their rise, I intend to show that the theory of Classical Realism perfectly describes the behaviour of actors in the drugs business, if only for it having the most pessimistic view of human nature. The first sentence in the cornerstone of Realism reads “International Politics, like all politics is a struggle for power” (Morgenthau, 1949). When the emphasis is taken away from ‘international politics’ and projected on to sub-state groups, it provides a perfect synopsis for the position of the Cartels in their blurred struggle with and against the paramilitaries, guerrillas and the Government of Colombia. Because of their illicit nature, the Cartels – as they are today – would never be allowed to enter legitimate politics, therefore they do not seek governing power, but simply assent, and in order to achieve this they must blackjack the people with influence. This struggle for acceptance, by ultimately ‘pocketing’ the people with power, also fits well with the recognised definition of organised crime.

In addition, Realism is known to distort parts of the human semblance, and depict a rather bleak vision of reality, where humans are ‘pessimistic about the prospect of eliminating war’ (Walt, 2005). This viewpoint is almost a perfect explanation for the stigma of bestial behaviour associated with Colombia’s war torn past and extended periods of violence. ‘La Violencia’ also goes to show that violence and war are not only reserved for the military groups, but that they are embraced by political parties as, what is seen as, a legitimate method of claiming power. The Cartels’ flagrant policy of ‘silver or lead’ is an example of how this violence has developed, and been espoused as a method of ensuring that people see things their way.

Looking at the perspective of an individual in the drugs business, we can draw from political realist Thomas Hobbes, who once described the life of man as being ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ (1668). Again, this comment that is not an inacurate depiction of people ininvolved with the drugs business. At this point, it is important to note that not all Columbians per se would be best described by this pessimistic sentence, but when describing the ruthless behaviour of individual Cartel members, it is an accurate blueprint.

Ironically, the Cartels fit the mould of classical realism a little too well, and through both violence and corruption (crude Realist actions), have gained so much influence in a short timescale (an intensified Realist goal), that their power stretches beyond that of the Government in many areas of the country. From local districts to national departments, they have come to almost embody the state itself, which immediately breaks down the state-centrism integral to the theory of Classical Realism.This paper puts forth the concept of “Narco-Realism” as the first attempt to explain how the Cartels operate. They use their disposable income to coerce everyone with power into joining their cause (regardless of their political orientation), and people who are not willing to conform are simply disposed of. As mentioned above, they use realist actions to achieve realist goals and appear to have no real principles, political orientation, or ethics: in that they will buy, sell, kill and employ indiscriminantly, and all with intensified violence.

[1] Chapter two discusses the structure and evolution of the Cartels in relation to U.S. Policy in greater detail; it also highlights the other threats perceived by America such as the guerrillas & paramilitaries.