Diss: Chapter 2

Chapter two:
Where Old Wars Rage On.

This chapter aims to provide an analytical account into the failing of current policy that is aimed at combating the drugs business in Colombia. Due to the bi-lateral nature of the aid over the last twenty years, it means that I will be focusing on American foreign policy. This chapter first discusses the composition and consequences of U.S. aid in Colombia, followed by the rise of the FARC guerrilla group, and finishing on analysis of the current ‘Plan Colombia’.


Drugs become a security threat.

In 1986, near the final stages of the Cold War, U.S. president Ronald Reagan officially declaired drug trafficking a threat to ‘U.S. national security’. Several years later, in 1990, North American and many Latin American leaders reached the conclusion that the drug business had become a “serious threat to national security and societal well-being” (Kapiszewski, 2002). Since this consensus emerged, drugs, and attempts to triumph over the drug business, have remained one of the biggest issues between America and many countries in her own backyard.

Because of the controversy surrounding Vietnam, the U.S. had to change the wording of their perceived threat in Central and Latin America from Communism to a ‘narco-terrorism’. (Scott, i, 1998). This phrase resonated amongst Americans, who were, at the time, beginning to experience a drug epidemic at home. It also favoured Washington, as it kept public opinion behind their continuous interventions in the continent. One problem with this change is that the new threat is vague and encapsulates both the cartels and the guerrillas.

Some scholars hold a more cynical opinion, and believe that this increasing interest in the U.S. in Latin America throughout the 1990’s was simply ‘trying to create a new niche for itself in a post-cold war world’ (Steinberg, 2000). Thus, many believed that this newfound concern for the region was nothing more than an alibi to continue American presence, by legitimising the use of hard, military force – something that would become intrinsic to Colombian aid – against the drug Cartels.


Misguided policy.

The main problem with a great deal of the U.S. Policy is that it fails to acknowledge the culture of the region. In the Andes cocaleros have been growing and using coca – mainly to minimise certain ill-effects of their lifestyle, such as the altitude sickness and hunger – for centuries. Although it must be recognised that countries like Peru and Bolivia do grow large amounts of the crop, the majority is not intended for the production of cocaine.

Eradication.
Instead of targeting the Cartels, the Realist anti-drug policy seems to focus as much, if not more, on these peasant farmers that grow coca to make a living. From the mid-1990s through to the current day, one of the most criticised elements of the U.S. policy in Colombia and her neighbours has been that of aerial fumigation. In addition to concerns regarding health, target accuracy and overall success, it has fuelled immense friction between peasant farmers (campensinos) and their national governments, which are being forced to pursue these contentious policies. The current President of Bolivia, Evo Morales – who has politically aligned himself with anti-Americans, Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro – recently declared that the cocaleros will “continue to grow coca, there will never be zero coca” (Boggan, 2006). Whilst rhetoric like this is clearly sending a strong message of defiance to America, it shows that these countries are beginning to realise that American policy targeted towards eradication has achieved very little in a long time, and that the U.S. must begin to formulate more successful strategies in their drugs war. However, there is little sign of the U.S. putting an end to fumigation in the future, which will only serve to alienate farmers and infringe on another country’s traditions.

Extradition.
Of all the policies pursued by the U.S., extradition appears to have been the ‘main source of conflict between the government and the traffickers’ (Thoumi, 2002). The key idea is that extradition ensures a percentage of drug lords, however infinitesimal, face the American interpretation of justice. Today, unlike the years of indiscriminate bombings orchestrated by the Medelín Cartel – when extradition was a new threat – many would argue it has become more of an ‘occupational hazard’ for new Cartel leaders. American perseverance ensures that one or two high-profile kingpins are extradited every now and again, such as the former Calí leaders, the Orejuela brothers, in 2005. This may look good in the media, but the overall impact it has on the drugs business is trivial.

Some may also argue that the process is rather unjust, in that the people who have caused so much violence, and have contributed to the breakdown of Colombian society, are actually being tried for shipping drugs to America. Because of the profits discussed in the previous chapter, there will always be individuals willing to assume the role of a captured boss, meaning that it would take the extradition of hundreds, if not thousands, to provide any significant results.

A certified failure.
The process of ‘certification’ was set up by the U.S. to determine how much aid, if any, a country would receive towards their fight against the drug trade on the basis of their success in the previous year. The chief problem with the process is that in order to secure another large aid package, the region’s weak governments will divert what little resources they have towards fighting the Cartels, instead of social spending. Critics of certification claim that it bears more of a resemblance to a “political instrument than an effective mechanism to reduce drug trafficking” (Chabat, 2002). Some may also believe that the certification process sends out the wrong signals to the Latin American countries, purely because it places an emphasis on compliance rather than any form of co-operation.

Banking on it.
Some scholars also lay heavy responsibility for the current situation on the World Bank and IMF’s methods used to aid the recovery of the ailing economies. James Petras notes that the economic model placed on Colombia in the early 1990’s caused the “Rapid elimination of social gains made by workers during their 50 years of struggle” (2000). Consequences of the Neoliberal reforms such as the removal of unionists, criminalisation of social protests and militarisation of strikes, achieved nothing more than further alienating workers and making them more susceptible to supporting the government’s opponents, such as the FARC. Although this is not a direct policy aimed at the drug business, it means that finite resources are being used to pay back debts, as opposed to funding internal development.

Clarity.
As mentioned in the introduction, U.S. policy fails to effectively distinguish between the three greatest threats (guerrillas, paramilitaries and cartels), and umbrellas them under the term ‘Narco-Terrorists’. This is fitting rhetoric since the ‘War on Drugs’ has been absorbed into the larger and more popular ‘War on Terror.’ While the guerrilla group aims to overthrow the state and the paramilitaries seek to influence or control the politics on the local scale, Walker (1996) describes how the cartels are ‘not trying to overthrow the state’ but attempting to reach some form of ‘accommodation’ with it. By trying to kill three birds with one stone, the U.S. has settled for a vague ‘middle-of-the-road’ policy that fails to effectively deal with any of these specific actors. It may also be one of the main factors that has pushed these groups together and blurred all of their individual differences.

Unintended Consequences.
New Designs.
After several years of intense campaigns against the Medelín and Calí Cartels, and with the successful capture or killing of most of their key figures, it was initially believed to be the beginning of the end of the drug business in Colombia. However, in reality, the Classic Cartels were almost instantly replaced with a new breed of smaller, and more organised, groups that had learnt lessons from the downfall of Escobar’s generation. To avoid becoming as well known as their predecessors – which was arguably their biggest mistake – these new Cartels decided to shun the limelight and assume a more clandestine role.

To make matters worse for anti-drugs policy, these new groups also began working in a cell structure similar to that of a terrorist network, with different cells forming separate links in the chain. Abadinsky (1994) notes that, because of this new structure, the elimination of a single member, or even an entire cell, has little effect on the overall output of the organisation. By replacing the undesirable aspects of the ‘classic’ Cartel organisation, and retaining the beneficial ones such as smuggling routes and keeping up corruption, the new ilk of Cartels had literally perfected their business.

Balloon Effect.
Because of the nature of the supply-demand model, whenever there is the demand for a product, a group will fill the void in the market. For the drugs business, this means that if a link in the chain is disrupted, because there is still demand, it will simply re-locate and continue: this is known as the ‘balloon effect’. For example, in the early 1990’s American eradication was focused towards Peru and Bolivia with the aim of curbing their domestic coca production – some of which was being exported to Colombia for making cocaine. With noteworthy success – particularly in Peru where president Alberto Fujimori launched what would become know as his ‘Fuji-shock’ – both countries saw a significant drop in internal coca production. However, because of the balloon effect, Alfred McCoy (2003) comments how this success meant that U.S. policy had merely pushed coca production from peaceful Peru and Bolivia, into Colombia’s ongoing civil war. As mentioned in the first chapter, the Colombian coca plant has more harvests per year, and does not need to be dried in the sun before use, because it is also grown internally the transportation costs are reduced. This also puts a strain on the people of Colombia, not only through the increased levels of violence associated with the business, but because the country is growing less food to be distributed internally.

This means that although Washington had achieved some degree of ‘success’ in Peru and Bolivia, they had actually made the Colombian business more efficient in the long run. The ‘balloon effect’ also holds true to other aspects of the trade, such as when interdiction efforts are bolstered in the Caribbean, Cartels simply switch to the central American route and vice versa; and when the Medelín Cartel was dismantled the Calí gang took their market share; after the Calí gang had been razed ‘Norte De Valle’ simply replaced them, and as they are currently being targeted new sizeable gangs are beginning to appear outside Colombia - in Rio De Janeiro, Tijuana and other Mexican border towns. Because of this balloon effect it is impossible to completely remove a section of the business because it will, and does, simply appear elsewhere.

Entrepreneurs.
With regards to the growing of coca, a new strain of the plant was recently discovered that can grow up to 9 feet tall, which is twice the size of the regular plant, as well as another new strain that has a yield eight times higher than its regular equivalent (BBC, 2004). Such a discovery explains that although the overall production of coca, in hectares, has decreased and interdiction efforts are stopping more drugs, the prices have remained stable in the streets of the market countries.

Due to its high value-to-weight ratio, refined cocaine is the perfect substance to smuggle, and smuggling is another area in which the Colombian’s entrepreneurs are continually trying to outwit the authorities. Stories from customs offices all over the world finding cocaine in strange places are not uncommon, from homemade submarines, false pregnancy cages, inside toys, and even pizza ovens, the list of methods used to smuggle cocaine into market places is endless.


The FARC.

With roots that date back to the early 1960s, and the first wave of socialist revolutions in Latin America, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, commonly abbreviated to ‘FARC’, has grown from a small band of mountain guerrillas to the largest and oldest Marxist insurgency group in the world. After being almost completely wiped out by the ‘classic’ Cartels in the late 1980’s, the FARC have been able to capitalise on most forms of U.S. anti-drug policy, and re-established themselves with incomparable success. The wealth and power of FARC is now globally recognised, even by the U.S. army, which reluctantly notes that the they have “become the richest self-sustaining insurgent group in history” (MCWP, 2006).

Protection For Profits.
With the fall of communism the FARC’s foreign funding was cut, and they had to replace the missing income, ideally with something closer to home. By selling protection from the paramilitaries, and by taxing coca leaves and paste, they soon realised the economic benefits of joining the business and invested their surplus cash into expanding their movement. However, in order to sustain such a rapid growth FARC had to become more heavily involved in the business; today it has reached the point where it is often hard to distinguish between the FARC and the Cartels. Vocal critics put forth arguments that they have ‘evolved into a purely criminal organisation, with only the thinnest veneer of politics’ (Metz, 2004).

Although there is little denying that the FARC are reliant on the drugs business for their survival today, it would be foolish to believe a group that has spent over forty years fighting deep in the jungle – long pre-dating the drugs business – would so readily abandon their political goals. This is underscored by their willingness to engage in peace-talks, something the government refuses to offer the Cartels. It can be seen that the FARC grasped the opportunity to keep their campaign alive, with the luxury of having enough money left over to properly equip, train, and arm their fighters. In this sense, the FARC could ultimately be viewed as the most successful insurgency in history.

In his article “FARC’s Best Friend”, Mark Peceny (2006) goes into great detail as to how several anti-drug efforts used by the U.S. have inadvertently strengthened the FARC’s power and popular appeal. He describes how: dismantling the Calí and Medelín cartels have made it is easier for FARC to tax the new breed of smaller cartels; how crackdowns on coca growing in Peru and Bolivia have pushed the crop into lawless Colombia – again giving them more coca to tax; and how aerial fumigation has ostracised and angered peasant farmers, who have then turned to the FACR for help and offered support. The article concludes that FARC now “possess unprecedented resources to prosecute its war against the government”. This result not only shows the unintended consequences of what the U.S. had thought to be semi-successful policies, but it also highlights how ineffective a ‘middle-of-the-road’ strategy is at dealing with any of the three great threats.

With reference to the region as a whole, the U.S. would benefit from learning a lesson from its military, aid as handed out in central America decades ago. According to Angel Rabasa (2001), the FARC buy a lot of their arms from “El Salvador and Nicaragua, from the stockpiles left from the Central American civil wars of the 1980’s”. Although costs a lot of money to transport the guns back to America, where they could be destroyed or sold on, it would ensure that they didn’t fall into the wrong hands, or more ironically, become part of the enemy’s armaments several years later. By learning from these mistakes America should implement a policy of ensuring that it’s military assistance is destroyed or kept safe in the aftermath of such an aid boost.


Plan Colombia
Beginning its long and controversial journey in October 1998, the anti-drug strategy formulated by the Colombian government was initially titled “An Integrated Policy on Drugs for Peace”. It’s main aim was to suppress the drugs business by using peaceful methods such as: alternative crop development; new eradication and interdiction efforts, institutional reforms to combat corruption; and efforts to strengthen international co-operation in dealing with drug trafficking (GAO, 1999). The most interesting aspects of this proposal is that there are few mentions of any military action, and it encouraged other countries other than just the U.S. to participate. Indeed, according to Andrés Pastrana’s administration, “only 25% of the 7.5 billion dollars were to go to the security forces” (Godoy, 2003); the rest would be spent on the peaceful methods that tackled the bigger problems of poverty and underdevelopment.

Unfortunately, the American interpretation of the proposal differed greatly to Andres Pastrana’s pitch, and after several re-drafts in America the original document, which was unmistakably a peace plan, had evolved into an unrecognisable military effort aimed at destroying the cartels and wiping out the coca crop. It also fails drastically to recognise some areas highlighted by Pastrana such as education, poverty and unemployment. Another noteworthy aspect of the new Plan Colombia was that its formulation and implementation were perfectly synchronised with the 2000 U.S. Presidential elections, which could imply that it was merely an aid boost to convince American citizens that Washington was taking a tough line on drugs.

PIE CHART FIGURE
‘Plan Colombia’ aid package, signed into law in July 2000. (In million U.S.D.)Figure 1. (Isacson, 2002)

As figure 1 clearly shows 60% of the funding of the final ‘Plan Colombia’ was spent on military aid, and when the police assistance is factored in the number soars to 74%. Surprisingly, less than half of 1% was spent working towards peace, a figure that highlights the real aims of the American Plan Colombia. Of the $519 million military aid spending, it is understood that some $400 million went straight back to the United States through the purchase of seventy-four helicopters. This is not to mention the employment of American ‘trainers, intelligence gatherers, spray plane pilots, mechanics, logistics personnel, radar operators’ and so on. In a way this ‘aid package’ resembles old-fashioned stings attached aid, where the donating company appears to benefit more than the recipient.

Numerous reports have reached a similar conclusion: Rachel Massey (2001) points out that “several U.S. industries stand to gain from U.S. intervention in Colombia’s civil war”. Evidently from the pie chart and statistics above, the companies involved in outsourcing employees and selling equipment would indeed be making significant gains. Massey’s paper also outlines the health hazards of aerial fumigation, one of the main components of the American plan, and its ineffectiveness, which was highlighted earlier in this chapter.

To date, the U.S. has spent over $3 Billion on this ambitious failure, hoping eradicate, or at least dent, the drug business in Columbia. However because this money is being mostly spent on military tactics, and the majority of this is simply going straight back to the U.S., the results have been dismal. In 2002 the US aimed for an 11% defoliation of the coca plant through aerial eradication, but due to the nature of these realist tactics, and the balloon effect, the final satellite surveillance of Columbia at the end of the year showed an overall increase of 25%, due to the fact it had just been pushed to other areas within in the country (McCoy, 2003).

In the end, one lesson can be learned from Plan Colombia and its realist attempts to combat the business in Colombia, this being that, even if these approaches appear to provide some initial ‘success’, in the long run they always lead to the diversification of methods and routes, and the sophistication, co-operation and expansion of the drugs business in one way or another.


Negotiations.
Of all the tactics used to combat the drugs business, it is perhaps the Colombian government’s offer of peace talks with the guerrillas that has promised the most success in the long run. Yet, it would appear that the United States is reluctant to accept any form of settlement. As the last serious attempt to reach a peace deal unfolded in the late 1990’s Congress announced that it would cut off counternarcotic assistance if Pastrana’s peace initiatives interfered with coca eradication efforts. (Crandal, 2001). It is also true that as developments were being made the U.S. announced their version of Plan Colombia that would soon be implimented in the country; this would also have have had a de-stabilising effect on the negociations and soured relations with the guerrillas.

Other than eliminating one of the biggest contributors in the prolonged civil war, a peace deal with FARC would help counter-drug efforts in two main ways. Firstly it would expose the cartels by removing a lot of their protection that is currently preventing the government from making any real progress against them. Secondly, FARC personell would be a major asset in any operations against the Cartels – or possible splinter guerrilla groups – because they would not only know the tactics used by FARC, and the terrain, but also where the crops are grown and how best to attack their remaining strongholds.


The ‘Results’

Despite twenty or so years of these extensive efforts to reduce the overall production and distribution of Cocaine, the evidence suggests that the opposite is actually happening. The World Drug Report of 2006 indicates that cocaine seizures increased to 558 metric tons in 2004, an 18% rise from 2003 and the highest figure ever recorded. It also notes that Colombia accounts for 32% of this figure – the highest in the world – with a 29% increase from recorded seizures last year (UNODC, 2006). Although this means that more drugs are being intercepted, it would suggest that higher levels of drugs are actually being produced.

More generally, the root of all U.S. policy failure in Colombia is that it is “embedded in the overly-simplistic assumption that nation states are always the primary actors” (Bagley, 1988). I described in the previous chapter, although the Cartels have infiltrated the state, they themselves are sub-state actors; the same is also true of the guerrillas and paramilitaries. One would assume that realist theory may have been tried out for several years before being replaced with a more fitting approach, but it has actually remained the major premise behind U.S. policy for the entire duration, and is in all probability is the principal reason behind the lack of any substantial results.


Conclusion.

It is not just Plan Colombia, or even the onset of the 1980’s ‘War on Drugs’ that brought about the first stages of American military intervention in Colombia. From the outset of the successful Cuban revolution the United States made serious efforts to ‘prevent more Cubas’ from springing up in the continent. From approximately 1962 CIA Special Forces began training the Colombian police and paramilitaries in ‘counter-insurgency, sabotage and terror’ techniques (Scott, ii, 2003). This clearly planted the seeds from which the current anti-insurgency emphasis is still continuing grow. By using this timescale, it can be seen that America has been trying to defeat the FARC for forty-five years and has not only failed to do so, but they have actually helped widen their availability of funds.

When put into this context, U.S. policy has become little more than intervention in another country’s civil war – and if one were to be cynical, there is more than regional stability on the list of American priorities. With the majority of the Southern Cone of Latin America already leaning to the political left, and the current battle for support of the region’s people between George Bush and Hugo Chavez, the U.S. will likely do everything in it’s powers to ensure that FARC doesn’t legitimise and disrupt the balance in Colombia’s political system.

Overall U.S. policy in Colombia can be characterised by two constants, persistence and militarisation, both of which are bad news for Colombians that wish to see the end of the conflict. It is also true that even if the drugs business was completely eliminated, the civil war, which pre-dates the business, would indefinately continue. One must also ask the qestion of whether it is actually possible to win a ‘war’ against such a volatile mixture of drugs, insurgency, corruption, and common deliquency.