Diss: Conclusion

CONCLUSION
By drawing from information in relevant chapters, the following paragraphs provide succinct answers to the three main questions posed at the start of this paper.

“Why did the drugs business materialise in Colombia, and what were the consequences?”

As shown in chapter one, Colombia’s specific conditions were optimal for the rapid growth of any criminal enterprise. A weakened government, violent history and low levels of social development ensured that the brutality and depravity, associated with the drugs business was generally accepted. Furthermore, although the business had created jobs and ensured a steady flow of local and national capital, Colombia had to, and still does, pay severe penalties, including the systematic use of violence by many different actors, a sullied international reputation, and the subsistence of a government that appears to be rampantly tarnished by drugs money.


“Why are the current tactics failing to deliver significant results?”

By classifying the three main actors in Colombia’s civil war – the Guerrillas, Cartels and Paramilitaries – under the non-specific term of “narco-terrorsts,” the U.S. has settled for a sweeping policy that not only fails to effectively deal with any of these actors, but also disregards thousands of years of Andean culture. Additionally, the ‘balloon effect’ ensures that no matter how successful any approach is at removing a link in the drugs business, it will dexterously resurface in a different region, and continue to meet foreign demand. In short, America’s conventional – realist-based – tactics are ineffective in a ‘War on Drugs’.


“What can be altered to create a more successful anti-drug policy?”

The paramount challenge for the future of America’s anti-drug policy is to strike the apposite balance between funding the supply and demand sides. At the supply side, the overwhelming prescription of conventional, realist, war tactics needs to end, and an auxiliary balance between modern military tactics and social spending must be accomplished. Regarding domestic policy, although the legalisation and control of all drugs must not be ruled out as a solution, it is unlikely to be called on for quite some time. Until then, the U.S. should concentrate on treating drug abuse as a health issue, and reducing the dangers of drug use through a combination of ‘harm reduction’ and informative educational campaigns.


What comes next?

By and large, Colombia is currently at a crossroads, from which there appears to be two main directions for the future of the country. Yet, the decision of which path to choose does not lie with Colombia, but largely with America, and to a lesser extent, the rest of the world. Down one road the future looks optimistic, the United States begins to realise that the ‘War on Drugs’, as it stands, is an extravagant misuse of resources. Thus, America begins to change the composition of its Colombian aid, together with a new focuses aimed at suppressing internal demand, both of which begin to gain support of a wider international community.

The other option for the future of Colombia is to continue down the current path, which more or less guarantees that the chronic civil war, and a rampant drugs business, both survive through the prolongation of existing U.S. anti-drug tactics. Regrettably, by observing the emphasis on compliance, and the lack of elasticity that has characterised American ‘aid’ in Colombia over the past twenty years, it is likely that this will remain the situation for many years to come, as the American Government continues to pursue it’s fantasy of achieving a drug free society.